concurring:
I join in the court’s disposition of this case, and for the most part I concur in Judge Belson’s opinion for the court. I do not agree, however, with the first half of part IV, which affirms the trial court’s *456granting of the Arpads’ motion to dismiss the derivative action (amended count I) and the defamation action (amended count II), a ruling which my colleagues uphold as within the trial court’s discretion under Super. Ct.Civ.R. 12-I(e). I think the trial court’s ruling warrants closer scrutiny.
Even though Rule 12-I(e) permits the court in its discretion to treat an unopposed motion as conceded, I believe it would be an abuse of discretion to do so with respect to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion unless the motion is actually meritorious. If the complaint really does state a claim upon which relief can be granted, then in my judgment it is an abuse of discretion to grant an unopposed Rule 12(b)(6) motion, notwithstanding Rule 12-I(e). Judge Belson correctly states at page 18, “Unopposed motions for summary judgment may not, however, be treated as automatically conceded,” citing Kurth v. Dobricky, 487 A.2d 220 (D.C.1985), and Milton Properties, Inc. v. Newby, 456 A.2d 349, 354 (D.C.1983). I think that the same rule should apply to Rule 12(b)(6) motions,1 and that Kurth and Milton Properties govern this aspect of the instant case. Thus it is not sufficient to say merely that the trial court acted within its discretion in treating the motion to dismiss as conceded; the court was obliged to examine the complaint and determine whether it really did fail to state a claim so that appellees were entitled to dismissal as a matter of law. On appeal we must apply the same standard in reviewing the trial court’s decision.
Fortunately, the amended counts I and II were dismissible for essentially the reasons asserted here by appellees. Count I did not contain any allegation that the action was not collusive, as required by Super.Ct. Civ.R. 23.1. Nor was it verified, which Rule 23.1 also demands. Count II failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim of defamation against Sheldon Arpad; the defect in count IV of the original complaint was not cured by the amended complaint. I therefore would affirm the dismissal of these two counts, not merely as an exercise of trial court discretion under Rule 12-I(e), but on the merits.
In all other respects I am in full agreement with Judge Belson’s opinion.
. Nothing in Rule 12-1 suggests that motions for summary judgment should be treated differently from other kinds of motions. See Pagan v. Horton, 464 A.2d 146, 148 (D.C.1983).