concurring in the result.
Prior to seeking leave of court to relocate with her children from Omaha to Pittsburgh, the mother in this case sold her home in Omaha, purchased a home in Pittsburgh, gave notice of resignation from her employment in Omaha, and accepted new employment in Pittsburgh. She recited these facts in her application to modify the decree to permit relocation, representing that the employment she had secured in Pittsburgh “offers to her and the minor children a significantly better financial opportunity.” In my view, this statement was disingenuous in that the mother knew or reasonably should have known that her new employment in Pittsburgh was not a career advancement, but, rather, a significant step backward in terms of salary and benefits compared to the position she left in Omaha. By the time of trial, she had obtained a different job in Pittsburgh at a salary which was still $9,000 per year less than she earned while employed in Omaha, representing a 27 percent reduction in her income. Based upon this evidence, I cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority that the living conditions and employment opportunities associated with the relocation “enhanced the mother’s life and that of the children.”
*212Cross-examination revealed that the only legitimate reason for the relocation was the mother’s desire to live near her extended family. In considering the best interests of the children, I would regard this motive as being substantially outweighed by the father’s interest in maintaining the regular and frequent visitation with his children which existed while the family lived in Omaha following the dissolution. See Kalkowski v. Kalkowski, 258 Neb. 1035, 607 N.W.2d 517 (2000). Viewed prospectively, I would regard an order permitting relocation by the custodial parent under these circumstances to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Unfortunately, that is not the posture in which this case reached the appellate courts. As a result of the unreviewable temporary order, relocation was a fait accompli by the time of the hearing on the merits in the district court more than 1 year later. In order to rectify what I believe to have been error by the trial court, it would be necessary to now uproot the children from the environment in which they have lived for nearly 3 years. As there is no indication that this environment is in any way harmful or unstable, I cannot conclude that requiring the children to move back to Nebraska at this stage of their lives would be in their best interests which, in the final analysis, is our paramount concern. Therefore, while I unequivocally agree with the majority’s disapproval of temporary orders permitting relocation by custodial parents, I reluctantly concur in the result.
Connolly and McCormack, JJ., join in this concurrence.