concurring in result.
I share some, but not all, of Justice Dickson's concerns with the analysis of Article I, § 9, of the Indiana Constitution contained in Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954 (Ind.1993). In particular, I find troubling Price's implication that, while protection for political speech is "enshrine[d]" in Article I, § 9, other types of speech-religious, literary, scientific, artistic, for example-must apparently look elsewhere in the Indiana Bill of Rights for protection. This does not seem to square with the fact that Article I, § 9, covers "the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever."
At the same time, I agree with both the majority and Justice Dickson that Mr. Whit-tington's rights under Article I, § 9, were not implicated by his prosecution for disorderly conduct here and so concur in result, leaving the development of the protections afforded speech under the Indiana Constitution to future cases.