concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the court that the employer’s unilateral modification of the employee handbook fails for lack of consideration and that an enforceable contract exists between the parties. Therefore, I concur in today’s opinion to the extent that it affirms the appellate court’s decision to reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of those counts in the amended complaint which sound in breach of contract. Unlike my colleagues, however, I would affirm that portion of the circuit court’s order which dismissed the counts sounding in promissory estoppel, a theory that the appellate court did not discuss in its opinion and this court elects to “not address.” See 186 Ill. 2d at 117.
I
Counts I through IV of plaintiffs’ amended complaint allege a breach of contract action against defendant. In these counts, plaintiffs allege that defendant breached “Economic Separation” policy 7 — G contained in the 1971 employee handbook when it discharged plaintiffs on November 1, 1991. Counts V through VIII allege an action based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In these counts, plaintiffs allege that they had reasonably relied upon “Economic Separation” policy 7 — G contained in the 1971 handbook to their detriment. Defendant sought dismissal of the amended complaint pursuant to section 2 — 619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 619(a)(9) (West 1994)). According to defendant, certain disclaimers made in 1983 modified the 1971 handbook. The circuit court took the matter under advisement. On July 19, 1995, the circuit court issued a memorandum of opinion in which it found that no valid agreement existed between the parties “for purposes of a Duldulao theory or a promissory estoppel theory.” Several weeks later, on August 8, 1995, the circuit court ordered the dismissal of plaintiffs’ amended complaint with prejudice.
Plaintiffs thereafter sought review of the August 8, 1995, order and specifically included in their notice of appeal reference to the circuit court’s earlier memorandum of opinion. The appellate court held that the circuit court erred in ruling that the 1983 disclaimers rendered policy 7 — G unenforceable. 289 Ill. App. 3d 75. Notably absent from the appellate court’s opinion is any reference to the promissory estoppel counts or the effect of its opinion on that theory of recovery. In fact, the appellate court’s judgment line reads only “[rjeversed and remanded.” 289 Ill. App. 3d at 80. This court today affirms that judgment (186 Ill. 2d at 106, 117) and does “not address” the promissory estoppel claims. One question arises from this procedural history — Is it only the breach of contract counts which have been reversed on appeal, or has the circuit court’s dismissal order in its entirety been reversed? Both this court and the appellate court purport to reverse that order, yet do so without any comment on the propriety of the promissory estoppel claims. By “not addressing” the claims today, this court leaves the status of those dismissed counts unclear and creates potential confusion for both the parties and the circuit judge upon remand. That being the case, our discussion of the issue is warranted.
II
Generally, courts have used the doctrine of promissory estoppel in order to enforce promises when consideration is lacking, such as in cases involving gratuitous promises, charitable subscriptions, and certain intrafamily promises. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts §§ 6 — 1 through 6 — 3 (3d ed. 1987). However, in recent years, courts have expanded the use of the doctrine to enforce promises underlying otherwise defective contracts and promises made during the course of preliminary negotiations. In some instances, the doctrine has been employed to provide a remedy for reliance upon offers subsequently withdrawn. Calamari & Perillo, at § 6 — 5. But, in all instances, application of promissory estoppel is appropriate only in the absence of an express agreement. The doctrine serves to impute contractual stature based upon an underlying promise and to provide a remedy to the party who detrimentally relies on the promise. 2A A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 196A, at 55-56 (Supp. 1991).
In Illinois, to establish a claim based on promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must allege and prove that (i) defendant made an unambiguous promise to plaintiff, (ii) plaintiff relied on such promise, (iii) plaintiffs reliance was expected and foreseeable by defendant, and (iv) plaintiff relied on the promise to its detriment. Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 141 Ill. 2d 281, 309-10 (1990). Although a party may plead claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel in the alternative, our appellate court has held that “once it is established, either by an admission of a party or by a judicial finding, that there is in fact an enforceable contract between the parties ***, then a party may no longer recover under the theory of promissory estoppel.” (Emphasis added.) Prentice v. UDC Advisory Services, Inc., 271 Ill. App. 3d 505, 512 (1995), citing Wagner Excello Foods, Inc. v. Fearn International, Inc., 235 Ill. App. 3d 224, 237 (1992). The appellate court explained its holding as follows:
“In contrast to the legal remedies which arise from a breach of contract, promissory estoppel is an equitable theory of recovery which permits the enforcement of promises that are unsupported by consideration. Where proof of a contract fails, and where refusal to enforce a party’s promise would be unjust in light of the promisee’s detrimental reliance, promissory estoppel becomes the appropriate form of redress. It is not available, however, where there is in fact a contract between the parties. In such a situation, promissory estoppel becomes superfluous.” Prentice, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 513.
The analyses contained in both Prentice and Wagner were predicated on case law from across the nation. See Prentice, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 513-15 (discussing cases); Wagner, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 233-35 (analyzing cases). These cases hold that, once an enforceable contract has been found to exist, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is inapplicable. See Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Mowry, 96 U.S. 544, 24 L. Ed. 674 (1878); General Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 915 F.2d 1038, 1042 (6th Cir. 1990); Walker v. KFC Corp., 728 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1984); Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation District, 70 Cal. 2d 240, 449 P.2d 462, 74 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1969). See also Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 230 N.W.2d 588 (1975); Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of Claremont, 135 N.H. 270, 608 A.2d 840 (1992); Tuomala v. Regent University, 252 Va. 368, 477 S.E.2d 501 (1996).
Plaintiffs, in their amended complaint, allege that, in reliance on “Economic Separation” policy 7 — G contained in the 1971 contract, they gave up the opportunity to work elsewhere, thereby causing detriment. We today have held that plaintiffs’ continued employment constituted the consideration necessary to make the 1971 handbook an enforceable contract. By remaining in their positions and presumably rendering satisfactory service, plaintiffs performed their part of the bargain and provided the consideration called for in the 1971 handbook. See Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, 115 Ill. 2d 482, 490 (1987). There is no occasion, therefore, to rely upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel, which, as noted above, is necessary only to supply consideration for a promise when no actual consideration was given by the promisee. Plaintiffs admit as much here in this court, for they have characterized their promissory estoppel claims as an “alternative” theory of recovery “if the Court does not find that a valid enforceable contract exists.” As the California Supreme Court has stated,
“[t]he purpose of [promissory estoppel] is to make a promise binding, under certain circumstances, without consideration in the usual sense of something bargained for and given in exchange. If the promisee’s performance was requested at the time the promisor made his promise and that performance was bargained for, the doctrine is inapplicable.” Youngman, 70 Cal. 2d at 249, 449 P.2d at 468, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
In this case, plaintiffs agreed to forgo employment elsewhere in order to bind themselves to the 1971 handbook. “ ‘Where *** the performance which is said to satisfy the detrimental reliance requirement of the promissory estoppel theory is the same performance which represents consideration for the written contract, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable.’ ” General Aviation, 915 F.2d at 1042, quoting General Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 703 F. Supp. 637, 647 n.10 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
This court, like the appellate court below, has held that an enforceable contract exists between the parties. In other words, plaintiffs are now entitled to contractual remedies upon proving defendant’s breach and, therefore, need not resort to an equitable remedy originally designed to prevent injustice when the promise at issue did not rise to the level of an enforceable contract. See 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel & Waiver § 48 (1966). Although the question of whether a contract exists between these parties has been affirmatively answered by this court, the parties may, upon remand, continue to dispute the terms of the contract and the obligations it created, thereby creating a question of fact as to whether a breach of the contract did indeed occur. However, for purposes of the promissory estoppel question at issue here, it is irrelevant whether plaintiffs will ultimately prove a breach of the contract because “it is the existence of consideration and not the existence of a breach which precludes reliance on the theory of promissory estoppel.” Prentice, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 513 n.2.
In light of the above, I would hold that the remedy of promissory estoppel is no longer available to plaintiffs under the facts of this case. I, therefore, would affirm that portion of the circuit court’s order which dismissed counts V through VIII of the amended complaint.
JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.