(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Contrary to the majority’s opinion, I do not believe that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applies to this case. I would remand this case for a jury to decide the negligence of both parties.
Appellant Josephine Goodwin testified at trial that she did not think the roof of the dining hall was dangerous, even though she knew that all roofs could be hazardous. Rather than appreciating and consenting to any risk, Goodwin testified that she never thought about it, nor did she think about taking any precautions.
From testimony given at trial, a jury could have found respondent Legionville negligently supervised its invitees who attended the work and play weekend. The board of Legionville had approved the shingling project. It invited these nonprofessional workers to the camp to do maintenance and other chores to prepare the campground for summer sessions, thus saving Legionville $3000-$4000 per year. The board knew that approximately fifty to one hundred people would be working this weekend. The board knew that the volunteers were nonprofessionals who may have had little or no experience in shingling. The board supplied the shingling materials, but provided no other supplies or safety devices. Legionville had no supervisor present, and left it up to the work and play group to supervise any activity.
Some states, including Minnesota, make a distinction between “primary” and “secondary” assumption of risk. This court has stated that:
The term “assumption of risk” has two. meanings in Minnesota. In its primary *51sense it means simply that the defendant owed no duty of care toward the plaintiff and therefore could not be guilty of negligence with respect to him. In its “secondary” sense assumption of risk means simply that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or fault.
Swagger v. City of Crystal, 379 N.W.2d 183, 184 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1986) (quoting Pitts v. Electro-Static Finishing, Inc., 607 F.2d 799, 801, n. 2 (8th Cir.1979)). The supreme court has defined primary assumption of risk as follows:
Primary assumption of risk, express or implied, relates to the initial issue of whether a defendant was negligent at all — that is, whether the defendant had any duty to protect the plaintiff from a risk of harm. It is not, therefore, an affirmative defense. * * * The classes of cases involving an implied primary assumption of risk are not many.
Springrose v. Wilmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971).
Primary assumption of risk has not been applied in cases of negligent supervision of invitees. Since the institution of comparative fault in Minnesota, primary assumption of risk has most often been applied to inherently dangerous sporting events. See Wagner v. Thomas J. Obert Enterprises, 396 N.W.2d 223 (Minn.1986) (rollerskating); Swagger, 379 N.W.2d 183 (softball).
Primary assumption of risk bars a plaintiffs claim because:
Assumption of risk in this form is really a principle of no duty, or no negligence, and so denies the existence of any underlying cause of action. Without a breach of duty by the defendant, there is thus logically nothing to compare with any misconduct of the plaintiff.
Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 68, at 496-97 (W. Page Keeton ed. 5th ed. 1984).
Both Swagger and Wagner follow this reasoning. In Swagger, this court reaffirmed that an owner of a ballpark has a limited duty to protect spectators. This duty is fulfilled when the owner provides a choice between sufficiently screened in seats and open seats. There can be no breach of duty or no negligence if a spectator in an open seat is hit by a ball, when management has provided screened in seats. Because there was no negligence by the defendant, primary assumption of risk did not apply. Swagger, 379 N.W.2d at 185.
In Wagner, the supreme court ruled that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk applied to injuries caused by well known incidental risks of inherently dangerous rollerskating. Wagner, 396 N.W.2d at 226. However, the court also ruled that:
The doctrine of primary assumption of risk does not * * * relieve the rink management of its duty to safely supervise skating activities or to maintain the premises in a safe condition. Negligent maintenance and supervision of a skating rink are not inherent risks of the sport itself.
Id.
The majority correctly states that Le-gionville owed a duty to the work and play guests, including Goodwin. Legionville had a duty to use reasonable care for the safety of their guests. See Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972). The scope of the duty depends upon several factors:
Among the factors to be considered might be the circumstances under which the entrant enters the land (licensee or invitee); foreseeability or possibility of harm; duty to inspect, repair, or warn; reasonableness of inspection or repair; and opportunity and ease of repair or correction.
Id. at 174 n. 7, 199 N.W.2d at 648 n. 7.
It is clear that Legionville owed a continuing duty to Goodwin for her safety. Legionville invited her onto its land to do maintenance work free of charge. The possibility of harm to one of the volunteer nonprofessional helpers, and specifically to a person working on a roof, was foreseeable. Because Legionville knew volunteers would be shingling, it had a duty to take precautions for these people’s safety. This was more than a duty to tell helpers to *52wear rubbersoled shoes. It would have been reasonable for Legionville to have a specific person supervise the shingling activity. It would have been reasonable for Legionville to take some safety precautions on its own, such as insisting that a toe board be used. There was an opportunity for such precautions to be used without any difficulty.
Because there was evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that Legion-ville breached its duty, primary assumption of risk does not apply, and a directed verdict was improper.
The definition and elements of assumption of risk, in both the primary and secondary sense, are correctly stated by the majority. To decide that a person assumed a risk it must be found that 1) she had knowledge of the risk, 2) she appreciated the risk, and 3) she had a choice to avoid the risk or chance it and voluntarily chose to chance it. Evanson v. Jerowski, 308 Minn. 113, 118, 241 N.W.2d 636, 640 (1976).
The Evanson court explained that:
Basic to the defense [of primary assumption of risk] “is the manifestation of consent to relieve a defendant of the obligation of reasonable conduct.
* * * * * *
It is not every deliberate encountering of a known danger which is reasonably to be interpreted as evidence of such consent. The jaywalker who dashes into the street in the middle of the block, in the path of a stream of cars driven in excess of the speed limit, certainly does not manifest consent that they shall use no care and run him down. On the contrary, he is insisting that they shall take immediate precautions for his safety; and while this is certainly contributory negligence, it is not assumption of the risk. This is undoubtedly the most frequent errors of attorneys, and even of the courts, in dealing with the defense.”
Id. at 118-119, 241 N.W.2d at 640 (quoting Prosser, Torts, § 68 at 450).
There was no showing by Legionville that plaintiff manifested her consent to Legionville’s negligent supervision of her safety. By going on the roof at Legion-ville’s invitation and for Legionville’s benefit, Goodwin was insisting that Legionville take precautions for her safety.
Similar to the present case is Rieger v. Zackoski, 321 N.W.2d 16 (Minn.1982). In Rieger, the court found that the defendant Brainerd International Raceways (BIR) negligently supervised its racetrack by allowing a spectator’s car to enter the track after the race. Id. at 24. The plaintiff was injured when he jumped a fence and entered the racetrack and tried to flag down the spectator’s car. Id. at 19. Defendant BIR also knew that spectators often jumped the fence and entered the track after the day’s races were completed. Id. at 22. Defendant BIR had a security force to keep cars off the track at the end of the races, because it was foreseeable that cars on the track could hit spectators. Id. at 22. The court found that BIR had a duty to escort plaintiff from the racetrack. Id. at 23. Because defendant BIR breached this duty, primary assumption of risk did not apply. Id. at 23-24. Plaintiff's secondary assumption of risk was considered under comparative fault. Id. at 23-24. See Minn.Stat. § 604.01 (1986).
In the present case, Legionville had a duty of reasonable care for Goodwin’s safety. This duty included supervising the work and play guests; and specifically taking precautions for the roofers’ safety. Providing a supervisor and a toe board would have been reasonable precautions to fulfill this duty. Because Legionville breached its duty, primary assumption of risk cannot apply to this case. Legion-ville’s duty and breach of duty cannot be negated by Goodwin’s negligence for her own safety. This is the type of situation which is considered to be secondary assumption of risk and should be evaluated under comparative fault. See Isker v. Gardner, 360 N.W.2d 468 (Minn.Ct.App.1985) pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 1985).
I would remand this case so that both parties’ negligence could be considered by a jury.