concurring:
I concur in my colleagues’ conclusion that the trial court properly granted Summary Judgment in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Downing. I am not able to conclude, however, as does the majority, that no other carrier was at the same priority level under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1713(a) as Harleysville. Rather, in my view, the stipulated facts lead only to the conclusion that Prudential could not have had a higher priority level under § 1713(a) than Prudential. Because I do not consider Manolakis v. Transamerica Insurance Company, 396 *27Pa.Super. 256, 578 A.2d 503 (1990), alloc. granted, 526 Pa. 637, 584 A.2d 319 (1991) to be controlling under the facts before us, I would hold that the Downings were entitled to coverage by Harleysville despite having exhausted the limits of the coverage provided by Prudential. Accordingly, I concur only in the majority’s result.
Under the stipulated facts of this case, I agree with the majority’s conclusions that Downing cannot be considered to be an “occupant” of the Harleysville vehicle, and that Harleysville falls within the fourth level of § 1713(a). I also agree that Prudential is not an insurer at the third level of priority within § 1713(a) because Downing cannot be considered to be an “occupant” of the Prudential vehicle once he left that vehicle to undertake business unrelated to its use and maintenance.
I am unable to conclude from the stipulated facts, however, that the Prudential vehicle was not within the priority level defined by § 1713(a)(4). Gerald Hartley testified in his deposition that, following the accident, Downing was found underneath the Prudential vehicle. Counsel for both parties stipulated to the accuracy of this testimony. Nothing in the record leads me to conclude that Downing did not strike the Prudential vehicle, thereby involving it in the accident; consequently, I am unable to join the majority’s holding that that Prudential vehicle was not “involved in the accident” so as to place Prudential within § 1713(a)(4). Instead, I consider whether the recovery Downing seeks is allowable regardless of whether Prudential, having paid the limits of its liability, was within § 1713(a)(4). For the reasons which follow, I conclude that such recovery was not precluded.
First party benefits may not be increased by stacking the limits of coverage of multiple motor vehicle policies covering an individual for the same loss. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1717(2). In Laguna v. Erie Insurance Group, 370 Pa.Super. 308, 536 A.2d 419 (1988), a panel of this court held that § 1717(2) precludes recovery of first-party benefits from an insurer *28once first-party benefits have been paid by an insurer of a higher priority under § 1713.
In Manolakis, a claimant sought first-party medical benefits from Transamerica Insurance Company, which denied the claim because Allstate Insurance Company, an insurer at the same level of priority under § 1713, had already paid the limits of its coverage. Transamerica contended that payment of additional benefits would constitute stacking, which was prohibited under § 1717(2). Allstate had paid the claimant its policy limits of $10,000 in medical coverage and $50,000 in income loss coverage. Manolakis sought further recovery of medical expenses under the Transamerica policy which provided coverage for $100,000 for medical expenses and $15,000 for loss of income. The Manolakis court held that recovery of the medical benefits sought would constitute stacking and was thus prohibited by § 1717(2).
I do not, however, find Manolakis controlling because the claimant there sought total benefits in excess of the coverage provided by either policy. Here, the Prudential policy provided a $10,000 limit for recovery of first-party benefits, which Downing recovered. The Harleysville policy limits first-party benefits to $100,000; however, Downing sought only $90,000 in first-party benefits. Therefore, the total recovery sought by Downing is within the limits of one of the applicable policies. I would affirm the order of the. trial court because I do not perceive such a recovery to constitute stacking.
Moreover, the Legislature has provided for recovery from multiple carriers within § 1713(b), which states:
(b) Multiple sources of equal priority. — The insurer against whom a claim is asserted first under the priorities set forth in subsection (a) shall process and pay the claim as if wholly responsible. The insurer is thereafter entitled to recover contribution pro rata from any other insurer for the benefits paid and the costs of processing the claim. If contribution is sought among insurers *29responsible under subsection (a)(4), proration shall be based on the number of involved motor vehicles.
Accordingly, I conclude that the trial court has properly granted Downing’s motion for summary judgment, and I concur in the majority’s result.
TAMILIA, J., joins.