dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the court’s disposition of the case. In my opinion, consideration of mitigating factors by the Board or by this court is precluded under the law as interpreted by our decisions. Once the Board determines that the crime for which an attorney stands convicted inherently involves moral turpitude, further inquiry by the Board is at an end, and the Board is required to recommend, as it did, disbarment. In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1164 (D.C.1979) (en banc). Once this court concludes that an attorney has been convicted of a crime which inherently involves moral turpitude, it is compelled to order disbarment. D.C.Code § ll-2503(a) (1989); Colson, 412 A.2d at 1169; In re Willcher, 447 A.2d 1198 (D.C.1982). “[0]nly in a disciplinary proceeding based upon the conviction of a crime, where the nature of the crime is not such as plainly and unquestionably offends the generally accepted moral code, must evidence as to the circumstances of the crime including the actor’s knowledge and intention be admitted.” Colson, 412 A.2d at 1167. The holding of the majority resolves that the offense of conviction in this case does not fall into that category. Here, respondent claimed in mitigation that alcoholism caused him to reach a point “where he appeared unable to distinguish between acceptable and unac*659ceptable behavior or to control his conduct.” To the extent that these factors go to the circumstances of the crime, including intent and knowledge, they are irrelevant. Id. To the extent that respondent asks for consideration of his alcoholism in mitigation of sanction, it is not pertinent to the required disposition of disbarment. Therefore, a remand to the Board for the purpose of its consideration of mitigating factors is inconsistent with current law. In my opinion, only the en banc court can reach the result reached by the court today. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971). Therefore, I am constrained to dissent.