(dissenting). I write separately because I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion in this case. The trial court correctly concluded that the Wisconsin open records law governs disclosure of public records and that because the Humane Society is not an "authority" required to disclose records under the open records law, disclosure was not mandated in this case. The majority acknowledges that Schultz does not challenge this conclusion on appeal. Schultz argues only that because § 174.046(4), Stats., (the dog impoundment records law) denominates the subject records as "public" that she is entitled to review them. I disagree.
As noted by the majority, § 174.046(4), STATS., was enacted two years before the open records law. The majority goes on to conclude that because the open records law does not mention the dog impoundment records law, it is presumed that the legislature did not intend to repeal or reduce the operation of this statute. I agree with this conclusion. I disagree, however, with the majority's conclusion that the records at issue here were subject to disclosure under the common law.
*581Prior to the enactment of the current open records law, the only records accessible to the public under common law were records from officers of governmental agencies. Nonprofit corporations were not required to disclosed records under the common law. See generally, Linda De La Mora, Comment, The Wisconsin Public Records Law, 67 Marq. L. Rev. 65, 73 (1983) (discussing the types of records subject to disclosure under the common law). Hence, the Humane Society, which is a nonprofit corporation, would not have to disclose any of its records under the common law.
After the enactment of the open records law, more entities were required to disclose public records. At the current time, however, because the Humane Society is not an "authority," it is not required to do so. If, therefore, the Humane Society was not required to disclose its records under common law, and it is not required to disclose its records under current statutory law, I cannot conclude that simply because the dog impoundment statute labels the subject records "public" that they must be disclosed. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.