(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. Plaintiff seeks approval by defendant township of an application for a new, Class C liquor license, claiming compliance with the township’s requirements.
Plaintiff says that in denying the application, defendant discriminated against plaintiff and treated plaintiff unfairly because defendant granted liquor licenses to others in the same area.
The Michigan Liquor Control Act, enacted in 1933 shortly after enactment of the Twenty-first Amendment to the U. S. Constitution which repealed national Prohibition, the Eighteenth Amendment, prohibits the sale and delivery of alcoholic liquor within the state, except by the Liquor Control Commission and its authorized licensees. MCLA 436.3; MSA 18.973. These statutes provide for special treatment of the liquor business and authorize local government units to limit *615greatly the number of outlets selling liquor by the glass.1
Section 17 of the statute authorizes the liquor commission to issue Class C liquor licenses in its discretion. MCLA 436.17; MSA 18.988. Provision for local control is made in the following language:
"All applications for licenses to sell beer and wine or spirits for consumption on the premises, except in counties of 1,000,000 population or over, shall be approved by the local legislative body in which said applicant’s place of business is located before being granted a license by the commission.”
The statute has recently been interpreted in a license renewal case to give local authorities "a great deal of control” over the sale of alcoholic beverages in their community. Bundo v Walled Lake, 395 Mich 679, 687; 238 NW2d 154, 157 (1976). In fact, Bundo indicates there is a substantial question whether procedural due process safeguards are available where a new license has not been acquired.2
In Case v Liquor Control Commission,3 the Court said that no one has an inherent right to a liquor license. In Fitzpatrick v Liquor Control Commission,4 the Court indicated selling intoxicating liquor at retail is not a natural right to pursue an ordinary calling. Thus, Postal v Village of Grosse Pointe 5 cited by plaintiff providing for licensing of restaurants, but not relating to liquor, is not appli*616cable nor controlling here for the reason that the liquor business is, as a matter of statutory policy, treated differently than other businesses.
In Bundo, the Court said:
"The procedure for obtaining a new license and that for renewing an existing license are quite different. Under § 17 every application for a new license must gain the approval of the local legislative body before the Liquor Control Commission may issue a license.”6
The discretion vested in local governing bodies with respect to applications for new, Class C, tavern licenses is clearly broader than where a question of renewal or revocation is involved.7
Under Hanson v Romeo Village Council,8 the Court held that the statute vests in the local legislative body full power and discretion with respect to approval of liquor licenses and that it is not reviewable even if a court might believe its exercise by the local legislative body to be in an arbitrary and capricious manner. If we were to follow Hanson literally, plaintiff’s suit would necessarily fail. However, while Hanson has not been expressly overruled, there is language in Bundo and in Bisco’s, Inc v Liquor Control Commission,9 that suggests that with respect to renewal of liquor licenses an "extremely narrow” judicial review is available.
There is an inherent inconsistency in requiring a governing body to declare in advance in writing every reason and every standard that may be used in denying an application for a new license. Such an approach appears to turn the burden of proof *617around so as to require the governing body to justify a denial. The number of liquor licenses in an area is a legislative decision, wisely entrusted to local control by the Legislature. It is definitely not a matter for a court to substitute its judgment for the elected legislators under the guise of applying constitutional due process or constitutional equal protection.
Where a particular applicant for a liquor license seeks approval of a local governing body, the widest and the broadest discretion should be left the local governing body. To require declaring and publishing a standard in advance is obviously to suggest that there is a judicial review on the merits. While I would not be prepared to say that there is no possible abuse of discretion great enough to require judicial intervention, I would keep judicial review very narrow and very limited; there is no assurance that the judiciary does a better job in making administrative decisions of this nature.
Assuming that, with respect to issuance of a new license, there may possibly be an "extremely narrow” judicial review available, I would hold that a very heavy burden of proof was upon the applicant to show an unmistakable discrimination or an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion in denying a new license.
In this case, plaintiff claims that defendant township must establish and publish standards governing denial of an application for a new license. Plaintiff cites Mallchok v Liquor Control Commission10 in support of its position.
In Mallchok, this Court found that the Liquor Control Commission had failed to adopt formal rules and regulations in compliance with the Ad*618ministrative Procedures Act. Since the reason for denial of a specially designated distributor (SSD) license (sale of packaged liquor for consumption off the licensee’s premises) was application of the so-called half-mile regulation and, since the regulation had not been published, this Court remanded the application to the Liquor Control Commission for re-evaluation under the rules existing at the time of the final order of denial. Also, this Court chose to find that under the special circumstances of that case, "absent rules or regulations constituting grounds for denial”, the Liquor Control Commission should grant that plaintiff a license.
In this case, no claim is made that the Administrative Procedures Act applies to an elected township board in exercising its statutory discretion relative to approval or disapproval of an application for a new, Class C liquor license. Applying the Administrative Procedures Act to the appointed Liquor Control Commission is quite a different matter involving different considerations than where a locally elected township board is involved. Consequently, I would conclude that, by its express terms, the Administrative Procedures Act is inapplicable to a township board exercising this discretion,11 and, thus, Mallchok is not precedent here.
The majority say that if, pursuant to MCLA 600.2116; MSA 27A.2116, defendant township had published a resolution adopting a "one liquor license per mall” policy, then a prima facie case for its existence and validity would be established. The majority also assert that, under MCLA 42.8; MSA 5.46(8), defendant township was required to publish the resolution and failed to do so.
*619I would not agree. MCLA 42.8 merely requires publication of proceedings of a township board. It may be that here defendant township board did not make its policy a matter of record until this case. That does not necessarily invalidate the policy. MCLA 600.2116; MSA 27A.2116 is merely a rule of evidence simplifying admissibility into evidence of certain public records; it is not intended to and does not operate to switch plaintiffs burden of proof.
In this case, plaintiff did not have a "right” to a liquor license. Plaintiff was entitled to a fair exercise of discretion by defendant township board with respect to plaintiffs application and nothing more. Defendant has denied plaintiffs request and given reasons.
Plaintiff claims that approval by defendant of two other tavern license applications constituted unfair discrimination against plaintiff, apparently on a theory that, chronologically, plaintiff’s application was made first and that plaintiff is equally qualified or entitled to a license. Plaintiff does not contest the fact that there was already one establishment in the Orchard Mall which had a liquor license.
The record indicates that an establishment, known as Bloomfield Charlie’s, obtained an approval of a transfer of a license to a location near to, but outside of, the subject mall and that some distance away, a license was approved in a bowling alley. The issuance of these licenses, even if after application by plaintiff in this case, does not constitute an abuse of discretion by defendant.
The transfer of an existing license to a new location is a different situation involving different statutory and other considerations than issuance of a new license. Thus, on this record, approval of *620a transfer of license for Bloomfield Charlie’s was not an arbitrary and capricious discrimination against plaintiff. The issuance of a new license in the bowling alley was approximately two-tenths of a mile away and, in fact, seems to have been applied for previous to the subject application.
I would find plaintiff has not met its burden of proving defendant discriminated against plaintiff and acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
Lastly, applied to this case, I do not believe the policy of "one license per mall” is impermissibly vague. I have no difficulty in recognizing Orchard Mall as a mall under the commonly accepted dictionary definitions.12 There may well be cases where it will be difficult to determine whether a particular shopping center is a mall or not, but this is not such a case. In fact, on appeal, plaintiff’s brief raises no issue of vagueness or uncertainty of treatment. Difficulty in determining the boundaries of a policy is nothing new in the law, but it is not a basis for invalidating a policy otherwise lawfully promulgated.
I would affirm.
In fact, under some circumstances, a local governing unit may, by referendum, prohibit selling of liquor by the glass. MCLA 436.56; MSA 18.1027; MCLA 91.1; MSA 5.1740; MCLA 67.1; MSA 5.1285; 1963 Const, Art. 4, § 40.
Bundo v Walled Lake, supra, p 685, fn 6.
314 Mich 632, 643; 23 NW2d 109 (1946).
316 Mich 83; 25 NW2d 118 (1946).
239 Mich 286; 214 NW 148 (1927).
Bundo v Walled Lake, supra, p 693.
See, Jones v City of Troy, 405 F Supp 464 (1975).
339 Mich 612, 615; 64 NW2d 570 (1954).
395 Mich 706; 238 NW2d 166 (1976).
72 Mich App 341; 249 NW2d 415 (1976).
MCLA 24.203(2); MSA 3.560(103)(2) states as follows:
" 'Agency’ means * * * It does not include an agency in the legislative or judicial branches of state government, the governor, an agency having direct governing control over an institution of higher education, or the state civil service commission.”
Mall: "a street for pedestrians only, with shops on each side and often with decorative plantings, benches, etc.; a completely enclosed, air-conditioned shopping center like this.” Webster’s New World Dictionary, Second College Edition, 1974.
Mall: "an open or covered passageway or concourse providing access to rows of stores and closed permanently or at stated times to motor vehicles; also: a complex of shops with associated passageways and parking space.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, 1974.