(dissenting). The majority holds that the last provision of subsection I 1 of the Child Support Guidelines Formula Manual categorically precludes *205imputation of income to defendant simply because she is a recipient of means-tested benefits. The majority fails to recognize that the provision is inconsistent with parents’ statutory obligation to support their children. The provision also exceeds the legislatively delegated authority of the manual, because it conflicts with the statutory mandate that the manual, and hence an award of child support, be based on “the actual resources” of the parent. I would hold that the last provision of subsection I is void, and the categorical preclusion against imputing income to means-tested benefit recipients cannot be given effect.
*2041. A payee/payer source of income is a means tested income such as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (tanf), Family Independence Payments (fip) (formerly afdc), Food Stamps, Supplemental Security Income (ssi), etc.
*205Were all this not sufficient, the Court also imposes a Sword v Sword2 analysis on the inquiry, although Sword applies only in contempt proceedings. The Court creates a nonexistent dispute regarding whether imputation of income was appropriate as a matter of fact, an argument long ago waived by defendant. The record supports the finding of a voluntarily unexercised ability to earn, and remand is unnecessary and incorrect. The Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
i
This appeal involves whether income may be imputed to a means-tested benefit recipient who has been found by the trial court to have a “voluntary unexercised ability to earn.” Relevant to that inquiry is the Child Support Guidelines Manual, subsection I, which enumerates both the responsibilities for the friend of the court in making the determination *206whether to impute income and the relevant considerations involved. Subsection I provides in relevant part:
The determination as to the appropriateness of imputation in a particular case is a judicial one. In all cases in which the Friend of the Court investigation shows voluntary reduction of income or where there is voluntary unex-ercised ability to earn, the Friend of the Court shall make two recommendations: one is based on actual income and the other is based on actual plus imputed income. The recommendation should also take into account the possible inclusion of a child care recommendation where imputation would make that issue relevant. The recommendation shall include the basis for imputation and the basis of the amount imputed.
In considering a party’s unexercised ability to earn, the Friend of the Court shall consider among other equitable factors the following criteria:
1. Prior employment experience;
2. Educational level;
3. Physical and mental disabilities;
4. The presence of children of the marriage in the party’s home and its impact on the earnings of the parties;
5. Availability of employment in the local geographical area;
6. The prevailing wage rates in the local geographical area;
7. Special skills and training; or
8. Whether there is any evidence that the party in question is able to earn the imputed income.
This imputation provision must be applied equally to payers and payees and to men and women. Imputation is not appropriate where:
1. A payee/payer source of income is a means tested income such as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (tanf), Family Independence Payments (fip) (formerly afdc), Food Stamps, Supplemental Security Income (ssi), etc.
*207The obligations of the friend of the court listed in the first paragraph of subsection I are consistent with the friend of the court’s statutory obligation “to investigate all relevant facts” regarding child support. MCL 552.505(l)(e); MSA 25.176(5)(l)(e) (emphasis added). They are likewise consistent with MCL 552.517(3); MSA 25.176(17)(3) which states:
The office shall use the child support formula developed by the bureau under section 19 in calculating the child support award. If the office determines from the facts of the case that application of the child support formula would be unjust or inappropriate, or that income should not be based on actual income earned by the parties, the office shall prepare a written report that includes all of the following:
(a) The support amount, based on actual income earned by the parties, determined by application of the child support formula and all factual assumptions upon which that support amount is based.
(b) An alternative support recommendation and all factual assumptions upon which the alternative support recommendation is based.
(c) How the alternative support recommendation deviates from the child support formula.
(d) The reasons for the alternative support recommendation.
(e) All evidence known to the friend of the court that the individual is or is not able to earn the income imputed to him or her. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, under both the guidelines and the statute, in order to impute income to a parent, the friend of the court shall investigate all relevant facts, and, if it finds an unexercised ability to earn an income, shall make one recommendation on the basis of actual income and an alternative recommendation on the basis of actual plus imputed income. In addition, the *208record must disclose the factors on which the imputation of income is based.
In this case, the friend of the court and the trial court fully complied with these mandates. As the majority acknowledges, the friend of the court made two recommendations to the trial judge. The first recommendation, based only on “actual income,” was that defendant not be required to pay any child support (because “actual income” was zero).3 The second recommendation, based on “imputed income” of $170 a week at a minimum wage job, was that defendant should pay $33 a week in support of the child who resided with his father.4 The friend of the court based the imputation of income on the fact that it could find no reason why defendant was not capable of working a minimum wage job for forty-hours a week, and that it found defendant’s proffered explanations for failing to gain employment unbelievable. The factual findings of the trial court support this conclusion. As the circuit court found:
Although Ms. Barber has a limited work history, once recovered from her surgery, there appears to be no physical or mental reason preventing her from working full time. Her children are getting older; they are in school full time; *209and if her one daughter had special needs, she is not now receiving any type of therapy.
I believe Ms. Barber has the ability to work; that there are unskilled jobs available at minimum wage or greater; and that she has no compelling personal and/or family needs which would keep her from obtaining some type of employment.
Defendant does not challenge the factual basis for the order of child support.
Notwithstanding the fact that the friend of the court and the trial court followed the specific requirements of the manual and of the relevant statutes in imputing income to defendant, the majority holds that income may not be imputed without deviating from the manual. This conclusion is based on the last provision of subsection I quoted above, which states:
Imputation is not appropriate where:
1. A payee/payer source of income is a means tested income such as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (tanf), Family Independence Payments (fip) (formerly afdc), Food Stamps, Supplemental Security Income (ssi), etc.
The plain reading of this provision is a categorical preclusion against imputing income in all cases in which the defendant is a recipient of means-tested benefits. As the Court of Appeals noted, such a categorical preclusion conflicts with numerous statutory provisions that must be construed in pari materia with the manual, including MCL 722.712(a); MSA 25.492(a), MCL . 552.519(3)(a)(vi); ' MSA 25.176(19)(3)(a)(vi), and with MCL 722.717(3); MSA 25.497(3).
*210The provision of subsection I at issue is, for example, contradictory to the statutory obligation of parents to support their children. MCL 722.712(a); MSA 25.492(a). The mandate of the guidelines is that parents receiving afdc benefits must be excused from their statutory obligation to support their children without consideration of their voluntarily unexercised ability to earn. Upholding such a mandate impermissi-bly grants the Friend of the Court Bureau the power to act in derogation of the statute.
Likewise, analysis of MCL 552.519(3)(a)(vi); MSA 25.176(19)(3)(a)(vi) demonstrates that the Friend of the Court Bureau has exceeded its legislatively delegated authority in promulgating the categorical preclusion against imputing income to means-tested benefits recipients. This statute is the “enabling” statute that requires the friend of the court to develop and recommend a child support formula. The statute states that “the formula shall be based upon the needs of the child and the actual resources of each parent.” (Emphasis added.) The majority acknowledges that the term “actual resources” includes “certain payers’ unexercised ability to pay.” Ante at 198. It fails to perceive, however, that the practice of imputing income serves to account for the “actual resources” of those individuals who could presently earn an income, but who do not. Otherwise stated, a parent’s voluntarily unexercised ability to earn, when it exists, is among the “actual resources” of the parent.
In subsection I, the manual recognizes that the award of child support is a judicial determination, but then, in the provision at issue, directs the trial court to ignore defendant’s voluntarily unexercised ability *211to earn when the defendant receives means-tested benefits. It follows that in that subset of cases in which there is a means-tested benefit recipient, this provision directs the court to base its order of support not on the actual resources of the parents or even the needs of the child, but on the coincidental fact that defendant receives public assistance. Quite simply, a provision of the manual that requires such a result in the absence of deviation from the manual is contrary to § 519, is therefore without legislative authority, and is void.5 For this reason, the categori*212cal preclusion against imputing income to means-tested benefit recipients cannot be given effect.
In sum, the manual states that afdc benefits may not be counted as “actual income.” Consistent with statutory directive, however, the manual created by the Friend of the Court Bureau cannot preclude imputation of income on the basis of defendant’s voluntarily unexercised ability to earn, when that unexer-cised ability is among defendant’s actual resources. As contemplated by statute, defendant’s voluntary unexercised ability to earn is the basis for imputation of income in this case. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals that defendant is required to pay child support because she is a voluntarily unemployed individual, and that defendant will not be required to pay support as long as her “sole source of income” is afdc, but that the amount will accrue during that time.
n
To the extent that the majority transposes, the Sword v Sword factors, or the eight factors contained *213in the manual6 into the determination it requires on remand, it must first be observed that the order before us is not an order of contempt. In Sword, Justice Coleman was discussing inability to pay as a defense in a civil contempt proceeding resulting from an “order of the court resulting from a previous trial . . . .” Id. at 382. The factors cited by the majority were “suggested as] some possible lines of inquiiy” to determine whether an individual should be held in contempt of court for failure to comply with the terms of a support order. Id. at 378. The initial order of support and findings of contempt are obviously distinct. Second, the guidelines incorporate virtually all Justice Coleman’s suggestions as considerations in imputing income. Third, the defendant did not assert error on the basis of inadequate ground for *214imputation, and therefore has waived the issue.7 Finally, and most significantly, MCL 552.517(3); MSA 25.176(17)(3) sets forth the factors that must be shown supporting the judicial decision to impute income. The friend of the court’s findings and those adopted by the trial court satisfied these statutory requirements. The manual cannot and does not purport to alter these requirements, because, to the extent it would be claimed to do so, the manual conflicts with legislative mandate.
In all events, the majority’s assertion that the “trial court gave no consideration, except as to defendant’s medical condition, to any of the factors required by Sword or the manual,” ante at 200, is incomprehensible, given the express written findings of the trial court, already noted above:
Although Ms. Barber has a limited work history, once recovered from her surgery, there appears to be no physical or mental reason preventing her from working full time. Her children are getting oldér; they are in school full time; and if her one daughter had special needs, she is not now receiving any type of therapy. *215I believe Ms. Barber has the ability to work; that there are unskilled jobs available at minimum wage or greater; and that she has no compelling personal and/or family needs which would keep her from obtaining some type of employment.
The record is clear that both the Mend of the court8 and the trial courts considered the factors in subsection I before imputing income to defendant.9 The majority’s decision to remand this case to the Mai court for consideration of the Sword and manual factors is thus both legally incorrect and factually unnecessary. The error in that approach is only compounded by the final conclusion that remand is also necessary to comply with “the four pieces of information,” ante at 203, required by MCL 722.717(3); MSA 25.497(3). Three of the four are, by the majority’s own view, inapplicable or satisfied. The result is that an order of child support long ago legitimately entered will be delayed until the trial court utters the magic words that apply the manual is unjust and inappropriate. The statute at issue requires only a statement of reasons to impute income, a requirement undoubtedly met by the courts below.
For the reasons stated above, I dissent.
Weaver and Taylor, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J.Imputation is not appropriate where:
399 Mich 367; 249 NW2d 88 (1976).
In addition to satisfying the mandate of § 517 and subsection I, this first recommendation also satisfies the initial directive of the manual that requires the exclusion of afdc benefits from the calculation of net income (subsection G).
All parties concede, and correctly so, that this second recommendation was not based even in part on the afdc benefits received by defendant, nor did this recommendation require defendant to satisfy the support obligation by the use of her afdc benefits. Therefore, this second recommendation also comports with subsection g. For the same reasons, the court’s support order in this case is consistent with MCL 400.63(1); MSA 16.463(1).
The provision of subsection i at issue also conflicts with the obligations of the friend of the court under MCL 552.505; MSA 25.176(5) and with the obligations imposed on the Mend of the court under subsection I described above. To give effect to the provision of subsection I at issue renders these mandatory obligations of the Mend of the court completely meaningless in the subset of cases in which the defendant receives afdc. Even were the Mend of the court to complete its obligations to investigate all relevant facts and to make two separate recommendations, the trial court would be presumptively required to ignore the factual findings of the Mend of the court because of the defendant’s afdc recipient status.
Furthermore, it is clear that the Legislature contemplates situations in which income may be imputed to parents without deviating from the guidelines. MCL 552.517(3); MSA 25.176(17)(3), provides:
The office shall use the child support formula developed by the bureau under section 19 in calculating the child support award. If the office determines from the facts of the case that application of the child support formula would be unjust or inappropriate, or that income should not be based on actual income earned by the parties, the office shall prepare a written report that includes all of the following:
(a) The support amount, based on actual income earned by the parties, determined by application of the child support formula and all factual assumptions upon which that support amount is based.
(b) An alternative support recommendation and all factual assumptions upon which the alternative support recommendation is based.
(c) How the alternative support recommendation deviates from the child support formula.
(d) The reasons for the alternative support recommendation.
*212(e) All evidence known to the friend of the court that the individual is or is not able to earn the income imputed to him or her. [Emphasis added.]
This statutory language clearly distinguishes between cases in which deviation will be appropriate and cases in which imputation of income will be appropriate. Furthermore, there is nothing in this section that suggests that subsection 3 does not apply to cases in which a parent is receiving means-tested benefits. To the contrary, MCL 552.517(3); MSA 25.176(17)(3) clearly contemplates that review will be had under MCL 552.517; MSA 25.176(17) in cases in which “a child is being supported in whole or in part by public assistance-. . . .” The majority’s holding that the courts must deviate from the manual in order to impute income to an afdc recipient is not consistent with legislative intent.
The eight factors listed in the manual are found in subsection I, reproduced in relevant part at page 206. The ten factors cited in Sword are nearly identical:
1. Employment history, including reasons for any termination of employment.
2. Education and skills.
3. Work opportunities available.
4. Diligence employed in trying to find work.
5. Defendant’s personal history, including present marital status and present means of support.
6. Assets, real and personal, and any transfer of assets to another.
7. Efforts made to modify the decree if it is considered excessive under the circumstances.
8. Health and physical ability to obtain gainful employment.
9. Availability for work (exact periods of any hospitalization, jail time, imprisonment).
10. Location(s) of defendant since decree and reason(s). for move(s), if there has been any change of address. [399 Mich 378-379.]
At the motion hearing from which defendant appealed, the defendant presented two arguments. The first was that federal statutes “preempted” imputation of income to defendant. The second was that the statutes of this state and the guidelines preclude imputation of income. Defense counsel expressly informed the trial court that the amount of the support order was not at issue. He did not claim that income could be imputed only if the trial court’s order expressly referenced the factors contained in subsection i. Likewise, in defendant’s initial application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, defendant raised three points of error — the two issues of law noted above, and a policy argument regarding imputation of income to afdc recipients. Having failed to raise any issue in respect to the sufficiency of the foundation for the finding of a voluntarily unexercised ability to earn before the trial court or the Court of Appeals, defendant has waived the issue, Arndt v Ball, 335 Mich 595, 600; 56 NW2d 394 (1953), and defendant’s two-page attempt to reopen the record before this Court should be unavailing.
The friend of the court referee also noted that defendant had recently moved to an area that defendant contended lacked employment opportunities. The referee found that contention to be without merit, and also found that the reasons for defendant’s move were contrary to the interests of her children. >
Furthermore, the fact that both the friend of the court referee and the trial court referenced some of these factors verbatim unequivocally supports the conclusion that they were well aware of their responsibility to consider these factors, and that they did so.