concurring.
Thompson’s efforts at rehabilitation before the 1989 amendments were fitful. The Bureau found that Thompson “discontinued his [1987] retraining program at Bismarck State College due to back problems” and that he “returned to Bismarck State College in August 1988.” Upon the advice of a Bureau vocational consultant, Alan McCurry, Thompson discontinued schooling again in February 1989, while he was undergoing further medical evaluation. The Bureau made no findings about the reason for this discontinuation. Eventually, on March 30, 1990, the Bureau imposed a new rehabilitation plan in keeping with changed rehabilitation services spelled out in section 5 of the 1989 Act. Thus, the Bureau’s handling of Thompson’s rehabilitation has also been erratic.
Nowhere did the Bureau determine that Thompson had not entered into a “rehabilitation contract” or that he had withdrawn from the initial rehabilitation program without good cause. See NDCC 28-32-13 (“[T]he agency shall make and state concisely and explicitly its findings of fact and its separate conclusions of law_”). Still, on appeal, the Bureau argues, without supporting findings, that Thompson “refused to sign the rehabilitation contract ... and he withdrew from the training program.” See Evans v. Baches, 437 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1989) (Remand to agency for failure to make critical finding). For those undeveloped reasons, the Bureau says it “reinstated benefits, and was forced to re-evaluate Thompson’s rehabilitation potential.” Compare Smith v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 447 N.W.2d 250, 253 at n. 2 (N.D.1989) (Applying 1987 Rehabilitation Services Chapter to a claimant injured in 1984 who was awarded rehabilitation services in 1987 but did not sign a written contract before 1989 amendments became effective). Without adequate findings on the relevant circumstances, I question whether we should decide that there was not an enforceable rehabilitation contract.
Thompson worries that the new rehabilitation plan may limit partial disability benefits after his retraining, if his medical condition still limits the kind of sedentary work that he can do. See 1989 N.D.Laws, ch. 771, § 5(2)(i)(5). Understandably, Thompson seeks to preserve his “rights” under the earlier version of the Rehabilitation Services Chapter that did not restrict partial disability benefits after retraining.
There can be a vested right to disability payments under the Workers’ Compensation Act when a claimant remains disabled from a job injury. 81 Am.Jur.2d Workmen’s Compensation § 18 (1976) (“[A]ny legislation which purports to change a substantial term of a contract operative at the' time of the plaintiff’s injury would impair the obligation of such contract and fall within the ban of the Constitution.”) Com*256pare Gregory v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 369 N.W.2d 119, 121 (N.D.1985) (“The Bureau argues that ... all rights to recover benefits vest on the date of injury....”) Yet, Thompson seems to confuse a vested right to benefits while disabled with some perceived right to remain disabled without regard to rehabilitation. By the same token, the Bureau seems to confuse the potential of rehabilitation with actual rehabilitation. In today’s parlance, both Thompson and the Bureau need to “get real.”
Despite my misgivings, and because the Bureau has reasonably determined that Thompson is an appropriate candidate for rehabilitation, I tentatively concur in affirming the Bureau’s presently stated intention to apply the amended Rehabilitation Benefits Chapter. Compare Mullins v. North Dakota Department of Human Services, 483 N.W.2d 160, 166 (N.D.1992) (“[I]t is not presently possible to judicially address [a claimant’s] anxieties” about future benefits). I write separately to express my understanding about the very limited relevance of the Bureau’s stated intention.
The goal of rehabilitation is to save employers and society from the long-term cost of supporting an employee made useless by a permanent disability. This worthy purpose has been promoted by authorizing additional short-term investments to educate and to restore a handicapped but promising employee to usefulness through substantial gainful employment. Both the original Rehabilitation Services Chapter and its 1989 amendments authorized comprehensive rehabilitation services “to assist the claimant and the claimant’s family in the adjustments required by the injury....” NDCC 65-05.1-01. The 1989 amendments to the Act made explicit the goal of returning “the disabled worker to substantial gainful employment with a minimum of retraining, as soon as possible after an injury occurs.” 1989 N.D.Laws, ch. 771, § 1(3). In other respects, the 1989 amendments changed procedures, delineated the worker’s responsibilities, and detailed some of the services to be used in future rehabilitation efforts. But, until it is accomplished, the Act’s goal of rehabilitation is only a purpose, not a reality.
Because the Bureau’s findings and conclusions about Thompson’s potential rehabilitation are only prognostic, today’s decision cannot be final and conclusive on future benefits for Thompson. See Lass v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 415 N.W.2d 796 (N.D.1987) (Act did not permit Bureau, in denying present benefits, to deny future benefits that are based upon change in claimant’s condition). See also n. 5 of Chief Justice Erickstad’s opinion for the majority. Benefits for Thompson in the future must depend upon the results of his rehabilitation in light of his impaired condition, not upon the Bureau’s hopeful predictions.