(dissenting). The facts are accurately set forth in Judge Kaufman’s opinion. At the time of plaintiffs injury, compensation benefits for a general disability were payable for only 500 weeks. In order to qualify for additional benefits, it was incumbent upon plaintiff to show that he was totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of § 361 of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act.
"Total and permanent” is a term of art in Michigan and is defined to mean any of the following conditions:
"(a) Total and permament loss of sight of both eyes.
"(b) Loss of both legs or both feet at or above the ankle.
"(c) Loss of both arms or both hands at or above the wrist.
"(d) Loss of any 2 of the members or faculties enumerated in (a), (b) or (c).
"(e) Permanent and complete paralysis of both legs or both arms or of 1 leg and 1 arm.
"(f) Incurable insanity or imbecility.
"(g) Permanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs or both hands or both arms or 1 leg and 1 arm; for the purpose of this subdivision such permanency shall be determined not less than 30 days before the expiration of 500 weeks from the date of injury.” MCL 418.361; MSA 17.237(361).
In the instant case plaintiffs petition of February, 1970, alleged back, arm and leg problems as well as imbecility. Thus, it would appear that he *416may have been able to qualify for total and permanent disability benefits under subsections (e), (f) or (g), supra. Even from the incomplete record before us, we can determine that the evidence submitted to the hearing referee consisted of plaintiffs testimony and medical evidence relating to plaintiffs psychiatric problems as well as his back, leg and arm complaints. Benefits were denied because plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proving he was totally and permanently disabled.
Plaintiff’s second petition alleged industrial loss of use of the legs and psychiatric problems. Thus, it is evident that plaintiff was, for the second time, attempting to obtain benefits under subsections (f) and (g). Under these circumstances it was not error to apply the doctrine of res judicata to this case. The same issues had in fact been previously raised, litigated and decided. The hearing referee’s decision constituted a final adjudication of plaintiffs physical condition as of that time. Hlady v Wolverine Bolt Co, 393 Mich 368; 224 NW2d 856 (1975).
Moreover, even if plaintiff raised only one of the statutory bases for a finding of total and permanent disability, i.e., incurable insanity or imbecility, and failed to raise any of the others, I believe he should be precluded from subsequently raising such issues absent a showing of change of condition. In Hlady, supra, 376, the Court indicated that a decision in a worker’s compensation case is "conclusive of all matters adjudicable at that time”. Here, it can certainly be said that the question of whether plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled, on whatever basis, was adjudicable at the time of the November, 1971, decision. Since the burden of proof is on the claimant to prove his disability, Benefield v W R Grace Co, 34 *417Mich App 442; 191 NW2d 567 (1971), his failure to meet this burden is necessarily a determination that as of the time of the decision he was not totally and permanently disabled.
To hold otherwise would allow a party to try his case in a piecemeal fashion, first attempting to qualify under one subsection of § 361 and, if unsuccessful, trying again under each remaining subsection until every possibility is exhausted. Such a result would be totally unnecessary since there is no reason why a party could not present proofs on any or all of the statutory criteria at a single hearing.
This writer is not unaware that there are cases which hold that in worker’s compensation cases unless the precise issue was litigated and decided the matter is not res judicata. See, e.g., Stokes v Lakey Foundry Corp, 20 Mich App 217; 173 NW2d 832 (1969), White v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 352 Mich 201; 89 NW2d 439 (1958). However, Hlady, supra, indicates that that rule does not have universal application even in the area of workers’ compensation. Moreover, there is no compelling reason why the doctrine of res judicata should not bar a party who has applied for total and permanent disability benefits and failed to sustain his burden of proof from relitigating that issue.
Of course, this would not preclude the claimant from alleging a change in his condition such that he is currently totally and permanently disabled. I agree with Judge Kaufman’s opinion that plaintiffs 1976 petition was sufficient to alert those involved that plaintiff was alleging incurable insanity or imbecility. Therefore, I would remand the case to allow plaintiff to pursue this claim.
However, as noted by the majority of the appeal *418board, a change of condition with respect to the leg claim would not entitle plaintiff to benefits because of the time limits of § 361(g) and the fact that the 1971 decision precludes relitigation of the issue. ,
I would affirm the appeal board’s determination that res judicata applies to this case but remand to allow plaintiff to show a change in condition with respect to the psychiatric claim.