dissenting in part and concurring in part:
As I have in Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District No. 1, 313 Ill. App. 3d 702, 730 N.E.2d 61 (2000), appeal allowed, 191 Ill. 2d 529, 738 N.E.2d 925 (2000), and Capps v. Belleville School District No. 201, 313 Ill. App. 3d 710, 730 N.E.2d 81 (2000), I dissent from the majority opinion because I believe that the Park District is immune from liability pursuant to section 2—201 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2—201 (West 1998)) because its decision not to investigate the activities of Archway was a determination of policy as well as an exercise of discretion.
Policy decisions are those that require the governmental entity to balance competing interests and to make a judgment call as to what solution will best serve each of those interests. See Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 342 (1998). Policy decisions require the governmental entity, through its employees, to balance various interests that may compete for the time and resources of the entity, including the interests of efficiency and safety. See Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 342. Attempts to balance these interests involve determinations of policy. See Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 343.
In Harrison, this court defined a policy determination as one that requires considered evaluation and judgment by a governmental unit, utilizing its own particular expertise, to formulate principles and procedures directed toward the achievement of common and general goals for the community’s benefit. During this evaluation process, several factors must be considered, including the public benefit, the practicability of the plan or procedure, and the best methods to be • employed considering available resources, costs, and safety.
In my opinion, the Park District’s decision not to investigate the activities of Archway was a policy determination as well as an exercise of discretion. The record demonstrates that the Park District contracted with the fixed-base operator to act as its agent in operating the airport. The fixed-base operator then contracted with Archway; the Park District did not. As a matter of policy, the Park District determined that it would allow a fixed-base operator to manage and operate the airport in all its aspects, including the use thereof by Archway.
Determining whether to expend time and resources investigating the activities of Archway is a determination of policy requiring the balancing of various interests competing for the attention and resources of the Park District. I believe that it was a policy determination on the part of the Park District not to supervise, monitor, or investigate the activities of Archway. Accordingly, I believe that the Park District is immune from liability pursuant to section 2—201 of the Tort Immunity Act on both counts III and V of plaintiffs amended complaint.
I must also dissent from the majority’s finding of lack of immunity pursuant to section 3—109 of the Tort Immunity Act, at least with respect to count III of plaintiffs amended complaint. Section 3—109 of the Tort Immunity Act provides immunity for a governmental entity when a plaintiff is injured while engaging in a hazardous recreational activity. Skydiving is such a hazardous recreational activity. See 745 ILCS 10/3—109(b) (West 1998). However, there are two exceptions to this immunity: (1) when the governmental entity knows or should know of a dangerous condition, while the plaintiff does not, and could not reasonably be expected to, have such knowledge, and the governmental entity fails to warn the plaintiff of or guard the plaintiff from the dangerous condition or (2) when an act of wilful and wanton conduct by the governmental entity is a proximate cause of the injury. Thus, where a complaint adequately pleads facts bringing the case within one of these exceptions, the immunity of section 3—109 is not available to the governmental entity.
With respect to the first exception to immunity in section 3—109, I find that the complaint in the instant case contains absolutely no allegations that the Park District failed to warn the decedent of or guard the decedent from a dangerous condition of which it had notice and the decedent did not. The only allegation of negligence remaining in the case is the Park District’s failure to investigate Archway’s activities following a series of fatalities. There is no allegation of negligence in the Park District’s failure to warn or guard the decedent. Further, although plaintiffs amended complaint does allege that the Park District knew or had reason to know of the dangerous propensity for harm and serious injuries and/or death to persons using the services of Archway, there is no allegation that the decedent did not, or could not reasonably have been expected to, have similar knowledge. Plaintiff has simply failed to plead facts in either count III or count V of her amended complaint bringing her case within the first exception to immunity in section 3—109. See Burdinie v. Village of Glendale Heights, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 516 (1990), overruled on other grounds by McCuen v. Peoria Park District, 163 Ill. 2d 125 (1994) (regarding section 3—106 immunity).
With respect to the second exception to immunity found in section 3—109, I note that count III of plaintiff’s complaint contains absolutely no allegation that the governmental entity’s wilful and wanton conduct was a proximate cause of the decedent’s injury. Count III does not allege that the Park District acted wilfully and wantonly or even that it acted with reckless disregard for the decedent’s safety. I do not agree with the majority that wilful ánd wanton misconduct or reckless disregard for the safety of the decedent can be inferred from count III of plaintiffs complaint. This second exception to immunity under section 3—109 does not apply to count III of plaintiffs complaint.
I understand the desire of the majority of this court to provide some opportunity for a remedy to this plaintiff, who has suffered a horrible loss. However, we cannot overlook the law of this state with respect to pleading in order to reach a desired result. This court should not read allegations into a complaint that simply are not there in order to reach a desired result. In my opinion, that is what the majority has done in this case with respect to immunity under section 3—109 of the Tort Immunity Act.
In conclusion, I would find immunity under section 2—201 for both counts III and V of plaintiffs amended complaint because, in determining not to investigate the activities of Archway, the Park District was determining policy in the exercise of its discretion. I would find immunity under section 3—109 for count III of plaintiffs amended complaint, which alleges insufficient facts to bring the case within either of the exceptions to the immunity provided by section 3—109. In all other respects I concur in the decision of the majority.