(concurring).
I agree with the result reached by the majority, but disagree with its underlying analysis. At issue is whether a negotiated discount obtained by a plaintiffs health insurer is a “collateral source” as defined by Minn.Stat. § 548.251, subd. 1 (2008), of the collateral-source statute. In my view, this case presents a straightforward question of statutory construction.
Minnesota Statutes § 548.251, subdivision 1, provides that collateral sources are “payments related to the injury or disability in question made to the plaintiff, or on the plaintiffs behalf up to the date of the verdict,” pursuant to “(2) health, accident and sickness, or automobile accident insurance or liability insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage.” Subdivision 2, which sets forth the procedure for determining “collateral sources,” is also relevant. It provides that if a motion is filed, the court shall determine the “amounts of collateral sources that have been paid for the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise available to the plaintiff as a result of losses.” Minn.Stat. § 548.251, subd. 2(1) (2008).
The majority concludes, and I agree, that the statute unambiguously provides that negotiated-discount amounts a plaintiff is billed by a medical provider but does not pay because the plaintiffs insurance provider negotiated a discount on plaintiffs behalf are “collateral sources” under Minn.Stat. § 548.251. This conclusion is based on the plain and ordinary meaning of payments as set forth in subdivision 1 and the explanatory provision of subdivision 2 that collateral sources include amounts “otherwise available to the plaintiff.” Because the statute is unambiguous, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to go beyond the words of the statute to determine the purpose of the law. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2008); Toth v. Arason, 722 N.W.2d 437, 441-42 (Minn.2006); Peterson v. Halvorson, 200 Minn. 253, 256, 273 N.W. 812, 813 (1937) (concluding that when the statute is “too plain to admit of any other view” the court is without power to change the plain language of the statute (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Simon v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 262 Minn. 378, 385, 115 N.W.2d 40, 45 (1962) (concluding that when an “insurance contract is unambiguous, the language used must be given its ordinary and usual meaning,” and the court may not “redraft an insurance contract under the guise of strict construction to reach a result that [the court] would prefer”). Consequently, the history of the common-law collateral-source rule, and case law from other jurisdictions are not necessary. In my view, the majority’s consideration of these matters constitutes dicta.