(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Contrary to our longstanding rules of statutory interpretation that require a strict construction of statutes in abrogation of the common law, the majority adopts an expansive interpretation of the word “payments” in the collateral-source statute, MinmStat. § 548.251 (2008), which extends beyond the plain meaning to a negotiated discount between the plaintiffs insurance company and his medical providers. I interpret “payments” according to its plain and ordinary meaning to exclude the amount of a write-off that no one has paid. Thus, I would hold that the injured plaintiff who procured the insurance coverage is entitled to the benefit of the discount, not the tortfeasor who caused the injury.
In a personal injury action, the measure of damages for past medical expenses is the reasonable value of medical services *283received. See Dahlin v. Kron, 232 Minn. 312, 320, 45 N.W.2d 833, 837 (1950). We never have required an injured party to have paid the full value of medical services for the tortfeasor to be liable for those services. See Dyson v. Schmidt, 260 Minn. 129, 140, 109 N.W.2d 262, 269 (1961) (noting that “the test of recoverability in damages” in Minnesota does not depend upon “whether or not medical bills have been paid”). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, “Minnesota law has long provided that an injured party may recover from a tortfeasor the ‘reasonable value’ of medical services received, even if the injured party acquired the services for less.” Ince v. Aetna Health Mgmt., Inc., 173 F.3d 672, 676 (8th Cir.1999).
Under the common-law collateral-source rule, the fact that some or all of a plaintiffs medical expenses were paid by an independent source does not prevent the plaintiff from recovering those same medical expenses from a tortfeasor. See Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, 453 N.W.2d 326, 331 (Minn.1990). The collateral-source rule applies in a variety of contexts, including “insurance proceeds, employment benefits, gifts of money or medical services, welfare benefits or tax advantages.” Hueper v. Goodrich, 314 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn.1982) (medical services provided free of charge); see, e.g., Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 188-89, 207 N.W.2d 348, 352-53 (1973) (insurance); Local 1140, Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 282 Minn. 455, 459, 165 N.W.2d 234, 236-37 (1969) (donated blood); Dyson, 260 Minn. at 140, 109 N.W.2d at 269 (workers’ compensation benefits). The common-law collateral-source rule also applies in the context of a negotiated discount of medical bills. See, e.g., Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180, 531 S.E.2d 316, 322-23 (2000) (explaining that portions of medical expenses that health care providers wrote off constitute compensation from a source collateral to the tortfeasor).
We have noted multiple rationales for the common-law collateral-source rule. One rationale is that when a plaintiff has paid for a benefit, for example, by purchasing insurance, he “should be reimbursed and the tortfeasor should not get a windfall.” Hueper, 314 N.W.2d at 830. We also have explained that insurance covering an injured party “is not a fact which lessens the liability of a defendant for a tort.” Solberg v. Minneapolis Willys-Knight Co., 177 Minn. 10, 12, 224 N.W. 271, 272 (1929); accord Donohue v. Acme Heating Sheet Metal & Roofing Co., 214 Minn. 424, 426, 8 N.W.2d 618, 619 (1943) (stating that a defendant “cannot escape liability for his wrong because of insurance” carried for the protection of the plaintiff). In the context of an insurance write-off, the collateral-source rule dictates that the benefit of the reduced payment “inures solely to the plaintiff,” not the tortfeasor who caused the injury. Hoffman v. Leichtfuss, 246 Wis.2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201, 210 (2001). Simply put, “Wrongdoers are not allowed the luxury of a discount on the basis of the injured’s good fortune in having secured insurance or other financial assistance.” Fred Lane & Scott Lane, 1 Lane Goldstein Trial Technique § 2:106 (3d ed. 2009).
The issue here concerns the reach of Minnesota’s collateral-source statute, Minn.Stat. § 548.251. The collateral-source statute changed the common law by allowing a tortfeasor to reduce a damages award by the amount the plaintiff received from certain “collateral sources” enumerated in the statute. See Minn.Stat. § 548.251, subd. 1 (defining “collateral sources”). Specifically, we must determine whether a negotiated discount of a *284medical bill falls within the statutory definition of “collateral sources.”
The collateral-source statute defines “collateral sources” as “payments related to the injury or disability in question made to the plaintiff, or on the plaintiffs behalf up to the date of the verdict, by or pursuant to”:
(1) a federal, state, or local income disability or Workers’ Compensation Act; or other public program providing medical expenses, disability payments, or similar benefits;
(2) health, accident and sickness, or automobile accident insurance or liability insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage; except life insurance benefits available to the plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or provided by others, payments made pursuant to the United States Social Security Act, or pension payments;
(3) a contract or agreement of a group, organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, medical, dental or other health care services; or
(4) a contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by employers or any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability, except benefits received from a private disability insurance policy where the premiums were wholly paid for by the plaintiff.
Minn.Stat. § 548.251, subd. 1. The collateral-source statute sets forth a procedure in which a party in a civil action may request that the district court determine and deduct “amounts of collateral sources that have been paid for the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise available to the plaintiff as a result of losses.” Minn.Stat. § 548.251, subd. 2.
As the majority acknowledges, the collateral-source statute only partially abrogates the common-law collateral-source rule. The enumeration of four categories of collateral sources in the statute necessarily excludes other collateral sources not listed. See Nelson v. Productive Alternatives, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 457 (Minn.2006) (explaining the canon of statutory construction that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). For example, gifts and charitable contributions are not included in the statutory definition of “collateral sources.” See Minn.Stat. § 548.251, subd. 1. Additionally, the collateral-source statute touches only upon “payments.” Id. When the collateral-source statute is not implicated, the common-law collateral-source rule applies. 27 Michael K. Steenson et ah, Minnesota Practice — Products Liability Law § 13.8 (2006).
We must decide in this case whether the collateral-source statute extends to the gap between the amount billed by medical providers and the amount paid by a health insurer. Our primary goal in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Perry, 749 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Minn.2008). We construe words “according to their common and approved usage.” Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (2008). “Generally, statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed.” Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC, 685 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Minn.2004). Under our long-established rules of statutory construction, we will not construe a statute “as altering the common law further than the language of the statute clearly and necessarily requires.” Kelly v. First Minneapolis Trust Co., 178 Minn. 215, 217, 226 N.W. 696, 696 (1929); accord Do v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 779 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn.2010) (interpreting collateral-source statute).
The majority acknowledges that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be *285strictly construed, yet blatantly disregards this principle of statutory interpretation and adopts an expansive interpretation of “payments” — an interpretation that goes beyond the ordinary meaning of the word “payments” as “[a]n amount paid.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1292 (4th ed. 2000). The majority relies on a strained construction of “payments” to reach the conclusion that “the negotiated discount was a payment because it involved the exchange of things of value to discharge Swanson’s medical bill contractual obligations.” 1 I would rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “payments” to mean “an amount paid” and hold that a tortfeasor is not entitled to benefit from a negotiated discount of a medical bill to reduce her damages under Minnesota’s collateral-source statute.2
But even applying the majority’s strained interpretation — the word “payments” as the delivery of something valuable other than money in satisfaction of an obligation — the word “payments” does not encompass an amount not paid to satisfy an obligation. The only thing that Health-Partners delivered to Swanson’s medical providers to satisfy Swanson’s debt was $17,643. The $17,643 is the only thing that qualifies under the statute as a “payment” related to the injury in question and made on the plaintiffs behalf. See MinmStat. § 548.251, subd. 1. Treating a write-off— an amount no one has paid — as a “payment” defies both logic and common sense. As the Ohio Supreme Court has reasoned, “Because no one pays the write-off, it cannot possibly constitute payment of any benefit from a collateral source.” Robinson v. Bates, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (2006).3
In any event, there is no express declaration or clear indication in Minnesota’s collateral-source statute that the Legisla*286ture intended to abrogate the common-law rule in cases involving negotiated discounts secured on a plaintiffs behalf. If the Legislature had clearly intended that a plaintiff not recover the amount of a negotiated discount as part of his tort damages, the Legislature could have expressly limited recovery of medical expenses “to the amount actually paid or actually incurred by or on behalf of the claimant, whichever amount is lower,” as an unsuccessful bill in a recent session of the Minnesota Legislature proposed. S.F. 1310, § 8, 86th Minn. Leg.2009. Furthermore, in previous published opinions, the court of appeals consistently concluded that negotiated discounts do not constitute “collateral sources” under the statute. See, e.g., Tezak v. Bachke, 698 N.W.2d 37, 41-42 (Minn.App.2005), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2005); Foust v. McFarland, 698 N.W.2d 24, 36 (Minn.App.2005), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 16, 2005).
The majority relies on the analysis of the Florida Supreme Court in Goble v. Frohman, 901 So.2d 830, 833 (Fla.2005), which concluded that a contractual discount fits within the Florida statute’s definition of collateral sources, but it is significant that at least three of the seven justices in that case believed that limiting the plaintiffs damages to the amount actually paid was consistent with Florida’s common law, id. at 833-34 (Bell, J., specially concurring).4 Only one justice expressed a contrary point of view. Id. at 835-36 (Lewis, J., concurring). Furthermore, denying the plaintiff the benefit of a negotiated insurance discount represents a distinct minority view among state courts that have considered the issue.5
*287The majority justifies its rejection of a narrow construction of “payments” by reasoning that a “broader” construction is “in harmony with the statute’s purpose.” Maust v. Maust, 222 Minn. 135, 139, 23 N.W.2d 537, 540 (1946) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But we do not consider- legislative purpose when the statutory language is clear. S.M. Hentges & Sons, Inc. v. Mousing, 777 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Minn.2010) (citing Minn.Stat. § 645.16(1)-(4) (2008)).6 Moreover, although the majority asserts that the Legislature clearly intended to abrogate the common-law collateral-sourcq rule in instances of insurance coverage, in prior cases we have construed the collateral-source statute narrowly to exclude certain forms of insurance coverage — namely insurance connected to the tortfeasor. See Do, 779 N.W.2d at 860 (holding that “liability payments made by a tortfeasor’s automobile insurer are not a collateral source for purposes of the collateral source statute”); Dean v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 535 N.W.2d 342, 345 (Minn.1995) (holding that “a tortfeasor’s liability insurance payment” does not trigger the collateral-source statute).
In concluding that there is no distinction between “negotiated discounts” and “money. payments” in Minnesota’s collateral-source statute, the majority relies on cases from other jurisdictions applying the common-law collateral-source rule to negotiated discounts. See Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Ariz. 198, 129 P.3d 487, 495 (2006); Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40 (Del.2005); Brown v. Van Noy, 879 S.W.2d 667, 676 (Mo.Ct.App.1994).7 The majority’s analysis ignores the Legislature’s specific use of the word “payments” in Minn.Stat. § 548.251,, subd. 1, to define “collateral sources.” By holding that the statute applies “in cases of benefits derived from a plaintiffs health insurance policy,” the majority effectively rewrites and broadens the definition of “collateral sources” to encompass .insurance benefits, rather than insurance payments as the language of the statute dictates. Cf. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 15-97 (West 2010) (defining collateral sources as “benefits for the injuries allegedly incurred from any other source other than a joint tortfeasor”); Or. Rev.Stat. § 31.580 (2009) (defining collateral sources in terms of “benefits” and providing that a court may not deduct from a verdict life insurance benefits; insurance benefits; retirement, disability and pension plan benefits; and federal Social Security benefits). Noting this distinction between benefits and payments, *288the Oregon Supreme Court has concluded that Medicare write-offs should not be deducted from a verdict under Oregon’s collateral-source statute, reasoning that “the legislature exempted from judicial deduction Social Security ‘benefits’; it did not exempt Social Security ‘payments.’ ” White, 219 P.3d at 576.
In addition, the majority justifies its decision on the basis that allowing Swanson to recover the amount of the negotiated discount would compensate him “for a loss he did not suffer.” This is not strictly true. While the majority suggests that the medical bills “might not be a true measure of the reasonable value of Swanson’s injury,” the reasonable value of the medical services was an issue for the jury. The jury found that $62,259 would “fairly and adequately compensate” Swanson for his past medical expenses. The jury’s finding has not been challenged on appeal, and we are not free to second-guess that decision.
Finally, in interpreting the collateral-source statute, the majority focuses on the policy goal of preventing a so-called “double recovery” for an injured plaintiff.8 However, the majority does not address or even mention the resulting windfall to the at-fault tortfeasor. Under the common law, we have never favored a windfall to a tortfeasor at the expense of an injured party, see Hueper, 314 N.W.2d at 830, and our rules of statutory construction require us to interpret the collateral-source statute consistent with the continuation of the common law absent clear language to the contrary, Shaw Acquisition Co. v. Bank of Elk River, 639 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn.2002). As a Louisiana court has explained, the tortfeasor receives a windfall, because the damages the tortfeasor must pay are reduced as the result of insurance procured by the injured party:
The argument that there is no underlying obligation for plaintiff to pay the amount of the write-offs and, therefore, the plaintiff should not be allowed to benefit from a non-existent debt, falls because the effect of this reasoning results in a diminution of the tortfeasor’s liability vis-a-vis an insured victim when compared with the same tortfeasor’s liability vis-a-vis an uninsured victim. Assuming the injury is the same, a tort-feasor’s liability to both, an insured and uninsured victim, should be the same: the full extent of the medical bills incurred.
Griffin v. La. Sheriffs Auto Risk Ass’n, 802 So.2d 691, 715 (La.Ct.App.2001); accord White, 219 P.3d at 583 (explaining that excluding write-offs from a plaintiffs recovery “creates the anomaly” that a tort-feasor may have more limited liability if the injured person is insured). In other words, the liability of similarly situated defendants should not depend “on the relative fortuity of the manner in which each plaintiffs medical expenses are financed.” Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 302 Wis.2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1, 10 (2007).
Accordingly, I would construe the collateral-source statute narrowly in favor of the continuation of the common law and in accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “payments.” I would hold that “payments” in the collateral-source statute does not extend to a negotiated discount between an insurance corn-*289pany and medical providers. This result ensures that the benefit of the negotiated discount inures to the injured party — the party that procured the insurance coverage — not the tortfeasor who caused the injury.
PAGE, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Meyer.
. Although my fundamental disagreement with the majority concerns its construction of the term "payment” in a statute that modifies the common law, I also note there is no evidence in the record of a contract between HealthPartners and Regions. Consequently, the majority is left to speculate that "[i]t appears that HealthPartners and the medical providers had some type of understanding that in exchange for HealthPartners referring its policyholders to them, they would provide medical services at a discount to these policyholders.”
. In applying the collateral-source statute, the district court determines and then reduces the jury award by "amounts of collateral sources that have been paid for the benefit of the plaintiff or are otherwise available to the plaintiff.” Minn.Stat. § 548.251, subd. 2 (emphasis added). The majority concedes that the negotiated discount — while supposedly a "payment” under subdivision 1 — "was not 'paid' to Regions as a money tender” under subdivision 2. The majority suggests that the discount falls within the scope of the collateral-source statute because "it was ‘otherwise available’ to Swanson.” The majority reasons that other interpretations of "collateral sources” would render the words "otherwise available” superfluous. Simply because the words “otherwise available” have no application here does not mean that the words do not have meaning in other situations and in other contexts. The Florida Supreme Court has interpreted the words "otherwise available” in Florida's collateral-source statute to mean "those benefits that have already been paid or that are presently due and owing.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick, 761 So.2d 289, 293 (Fla.2000).
. The Ohio Supreme Court takes the view that “[bjoth the original medical bill rendered and the amount accepted as full payment are admissible to prove the reasonableness and necessity of charges rendered for medical and hospital care.” Robinson, 857 N.E.2d at 1200; accord Stanley v. Walker, 906 N.E.2d 852, 857-58 (Ind.2009). This appeal does not involve the admissibility at trial of a negotiated discount to establish the reasonable value of medical services.
. Other courts limiting the plaintiffs recovery to the amount actually paid have used similar reasoning. See, e.g., Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 564 Pa. 156, 765 A.2d 786, 789-91 (2001) (concluding that the injured party should be limited to recovering the amount actually paid for the medical services and noting that the write-off was not "paid" by any collateral source); Hanif v. Hous. Auth. of Yolo County, 200 Cal.App.3d 635, 246 Cal.Rptr. 192, 194-95 (1988) (concluding that the proper measure of damages is the amount actually paid for medical services).
. Employing various rationales, a majority of courts that have considered the issue have concluded that an injured plaintiff is entitled to recover the full amount of reasonable medical expenses charged, including amounts later written off. See, e.g., Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Ariz. 198, 129 P.3d 487, 496 (2006); Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40 (Del.2005); Hardi v. Mezzanotte, 818 A.2d 974, 985 (D.C.2003); Olariu v. Marrero, 248 Ga.App. 824, 549 S.E.2d 121, 123 (2001); Bynum v. Magno, 106 Hawai'i 81, 101 P.3d 1149, 1160-62 (2004); Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill.2d 393, 323 Ill.Dec. 26, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1030 (2008); Bozeman v. Louisiana, 879 So.2d 692, 705-06 (La.2004); Scott v. Garfield, 454 Mass. 790, 912 N.E.2d 1000, 1009 (2009); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.2d 1135, 1139-40 (Miss.2002); Brown v. Van Noy, 879 S.W.2d 667, 676 (Mo.Ct.App.1994); White v. Jubitz Corp., 347 Or. 212, 219 P.3d 566, 580-83 (2009); Haselden v. Davis, 353 S.C. 481, 579 S.E.2d 293, 294-95 (2003); Papke v. Harbert, 738 N.W.2d 510, 535-36 (S.D.2007); Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180, 531 S.E.2d 316, 322 (2000); Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 246 Wis.2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201, 208-13 (2001). According to the Kentucky Supreme Court, “it is absurd to suggest that the tortfeasor should receive a benefit from a contractual arrangement” between an insurer and health care provider. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 683 (Ky.2005). While many of these courts are following the common law collateral-source rule, "around half the states have abolished or limited the collateral source rule for specified claims," Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 1059 (2000). In contrast to the majority's approach here, other courts have construed collateral-source statutes narrowly to preserve the common law. See, e.g., Jones v. Kramer, 267 Conn. 336, 838 A.2d 170, 177-78 (2004); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rudnick, 761 So.2d 289, 293 (Fla.2000); Oden v. Chemung County Indus. Dev. Agency, 87 N.Y.2d 81, 637 N.Y.S.2d 670, 661 N.E.2d 142, 144 (N.Y.1995). In "recognizing] only those alterations of the common law that are clearly expressed in the language of the statute,” the *287Connecticut Supreme Court explained: "The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed can be seen to serve the same policy of continuity and stability in the legal system as the doctrine of stare decisis in relation to case law.” Jones, 838 A.2d at 177 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
. We also cannot disregard “the letter of the law ... under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16. Other courts denying the plaintiff the benefit of the negotiated discount have been more transparent in their analysis. For example, while acknowledging that a write-off "technically is not a payment from a collateral source within the meaning of [Idaho's] collateral source statute,” the Idaho Supreme Court nonetheless held that a plaintiff cannot recover the amount of the write-off because "it is the type of windfall that [the statute] was designed to prevent.” Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 81 P.3d 1236, 1239 (2003) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Kastick v. U-Haul Co. of W. Mich., 292 A.D.2d 797, 740 N.Y.S.2d 167, 169 (N.Y.App.Div.2002).
. Notwithstanding the majority's reliance on these cases, they all ultimately reach the opposite conclusion as the majority and hold that a plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount of a negotiated discount in a tort action. See Lopez, 129 P.3d at 496; Mitchell, 883 A.2d at 40; Brown, 879 S.W.2d at 676.
. In discussing negotiated discount amounts, the Virginia Supreme Court has noted that the "amounts written off are as much of a benefit for which [the injured party] paid consideration as are the actual cash payments made by his health insurance carrier to the health care providers.” Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180, 531 S.E.2d 316, 323 (2000) (explaining that "[t]he wrongdoer cannot reap the benefit of a contract for which the wrongdoer paid no compensation”).