(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and assert that requiring strict personal service of the notice of appeal, especially when respondent had adequate notice by service on the superintendent, frustrates, the fundamental purpose of the Minnesota Veterans Preference Act (the act), which is to safeguard veterans in their employment. The remedial nature of the provisions of a veteran’s employment-benefits statute must be liberally construed in favor of veterans. See, e.g., Byrne v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 237, 305 Minn. 49, 50-51, 232 N.W.2d 432, 434 (1975) (“Underlying statutes preserving employment rights for citizens who serve the military is the basic principle that a person who serves the armed forces should not be penalized for that service in civilian life.”). And
[a] rule of civil procedure is inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of a statute if the essential purpose of the statute would be frustrated by application of the rule.
In re Pet. of Brainerd Nat’l Bank, 383 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Minn.1986).
In this case, appellant mailed two copies of the notice of appeal to the superintendent (a person upon whom proper service can be made); one copy was sent by certified mail. While certified mail does not constitute service by mail under Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05, both procedures require signing an acknowledgement of receipt. Respondent does not contend that it was prejudiced or that it lacked actual notice of the appeal. Neither did respondent petition for review of the district court’s ruling on whether the superintendent was a proper person for service. Under the circumstances, appellant substantially complied with the service requirements. See O’Sell v. Peterson, 595 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn.App.1999) (“[s]ubstantial compliance combined with actual notice will subject an individual to personal jurisdiction.”); Larson v. Hendrickson, 394 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Minn.App.1986) (“When actual notice of the action has been received by the intended recipient, ‘the rules governing such service should be liberally construed.’ ” (citation omitted)).
Ryan Contracting, Inc. v. JAG Inv., 634 N.W.2d 176 (Minn.2001), relied on by the majority, was decided by a divided court, did not involve the act, and should not control the decision in this case.
Because courts must liberally construe the provisions of the act, the district court acquired jurisdiction from the service that appellant chose. Preventing district court review of appellant’s termination based on a technicality ignores the benevolent and protective purpose of the act, which was adopted by the legislature for and on behalf of the grateful citizens of Minnesota.