I concur in the judgment only. I write separately principally because I consider that the majority’s analysis adds an additional and unnecessary layer of complexity to the already difficult task of trying Penal Code section 1026.51 cases.
The primary issue presented in this case, also the primary issue briefed, is whether the trial court erred in allowing defendant to proceed to represent himself without making some inquiry into whether he was mentally competent to waive his right to counsel. Unlike my majority colleagues I answer that question affirmatively: the trial court erred.
The underlying rationale of the majority opinion is that the trial court had no obligation to reexamine in a genuine way whether at the time of trial defendant was mentally competent to waive his right to counsel. My colleagues’ notion apparently is that Faretta2 status once achieved is like the plague—you just must let it run its course. After all, as the trial court here explained, there had already been a Faretta hearing before another judge.
*484Notwithstanding the majority opinion’s implications to the contrary, the law of this state as spelled out repeatedly in People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal.3d 103 [151 Cal.Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773] is unmistakably clear: even after a Faretta motion has been properly granted (as it was in Teron) the trial court has a continuing obligation to monitor the defendant to determine whether he displays “indicia óf mental incapacity” and if the trial court has “some reason to suspect defendant’s mental capacity” it would be acting within its discretion in requiring a psychiatric examination to reconsider defendant’s mental competence to waive counsel. (See People v. Teron, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 114, fn., 6.) If the trial court fails to so “interrupt proceedings to order such an examination” it is subject to reversal for an abuse of discretion if the evidence of mental incapacity is “compelling.” (Ibid.) Given the Supreme Court’s repeated examination of the extent of such evidence at each stage of the proceedings in Teron (see id., at pp. 114-115 [text and fns. 6, and 7]) it is a little hard to understand how or why this court should characterize as “dictum” Justice Tobriner’s specific and explicit agreement with the rule as spelled out by the Court of Appeal in People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568, 573 [138 Cal.Rptr. 36]: “Tf there is any question in the court’s mind as to a defendant’s mental capacity it would appear obvious that a rather careful inquiry into that subject should be made—probably by way of a psychiatric examination.’” (People v. Teron, supra, at p. 114.)
Thus there are only two questions in this present proceeding: (1) was there sufficient evidence of mental incapacity to trigger what Justice Gardner in Lopez and Justice Tobriner in Teron have described as “a rather careful inquiry”; and (2) did such an inquiry take place? The majority never reach the second question.
Well, here is what actually happened. After a five-day continuance the matter—the petition of the People to extend the commitment of defendant pursuant to section 1026.5—was called for trial. At that point the deputy district attorney, to his everlasting credit, informs the court: “First of all, the defendant has had a major psychotic episode in the last weeks. I don’t believe that he is a suitable candidate for self-representation. He was hospitalized and unable to come to court for five days [as he was in San Francisco General Hospital]. ”
“The Defendant: That is an error. I have never in my life had a nervous breakdown. The toxic drugs they give me down at Atascadero. I have a strong powerful mind. I am in full—I am in control of myself at all times. I have never slugged somebody for no reason at all. They usually—I am usually the one that is—others initiate the fighting.
*485‘ ‘ The Court: You have been representing yourself previously on these 1026 proceedings?
“The Defendant: No, sir. This is the first time in all this time. I can have justice. I’m going to defend myself. My mother has paid out thousands of dollars and it’s just wasted money. Thousands of dollars for lawyers.
“The Court: How many times have you gone through a 1026 proceeding?
“The Defendant: It’s been three—about three, I believe. [¶] Let me explain to you what exactly what kept me from gaining me release before. These people from Atascadero, technicians, say they know me, observed me and they come with outright lies in court. They lie so grossly you can hardly believe just no factual thing to it at all. In fact, one thing—I will give you one example. This woman spoke. Her name is Patty. I can’t recall her last name. Let’s see. Thomhaven, was that it? I’ll tell you what she said. She said that Grant had spoken to her and told her that I wanted to kill all the Sicilian people and she said she is a Sicilian also. This is not true. I have never said that statement, never even thought of a statement like that. As a matter of fact, my wife was Sicilian, my ex-wife. And I have never wanted to kill her nor any Sciclians [sz'c] at any time. I have form [sic\ an affection for Sciclians [sz'c]. I know the family, my wife’s family. They came from Italy. And I like them. I have high respect for Sicilian people.
“The Court: You understand that if you want a lawyer and you didn’t have the money to hire a lawyer that the Court would appoint one for you?
“The Defendant: No. I will help—
“The Court: But do you understand?
“The Defendant: Yes. I do understand that very well. Thank you, sir.
“The Court: And you still wish to represent yourself?
“The Defendant: Yes. I do. Thank you, sir.
“The Court: All right. [¶] Apparently, there has been a Faretta motion made and granted, and I don’t see any reason to set it aside at this time.”
On the first question the majority find the prosecution’s statement of warning to be “conclusionary and irrelevant to the issue of effective waiver *486of counsel.” (Majority opn., ante, p. 481.) What could be more relevant than the apt description given: defendant had just suffered a major psychotic episode resulting in his hospitalization for the five days immediately preceding trial? If that description is also “conclusionary” so that it can be ignored by the trial court then any deputy district attorney who steps forward in the highest tradition of that office to let a trial judge know in no uncertain terms that a defendant is seriously impaired is now required by the majority to be an expert in the language of psychological symptoms.
The majority also points to the lack of evidence at trial regarding defendant’s competency to waive his right to counsel. The prosecutor questioned his experts about the subject on which he had the burden of proof, i.e., did defendant, “by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder” represent “a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1).) Since when does the prosecutor, at that point, have any duty to question his experts about defendant’s mental competency to waive counsel?
In my view, intelligent, probing inquiry by the trial court was compelled once the prosecutor brought the matter of defendant’s breakdown to the court’s attention. No such inquiry was even begun. Reversal is thus required under People v. Teron, supra, 23 Cal.3d 103.
It is also beyond me why the majority seeks to reverse on a theory neither raised nor briefed. What the majority holds is there was no reason to examine whether defendant at the time of trial was mentally competent to waive counsel but there was reason to examine whether he was incompetent to stand trial—a matter to be determined under the majority analysis by applying the standard of section 1367. That standard includes judging whether a defendant is “unable to . . . assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner.” (§ 1367.) What the majority appears to hold is that defendant passed the Faretta test, i.e., he was competent to make the decision to represent himself but he may have been incompetent to assist himself in the conduct of his defense in a rational manner. If it is true as the majority insist that prosecutors “hate” the Faretta decision of the United States Supreme Court, this new layer of complexity in the trial of section 1026.5 cases is unlikely to be viewed by them as an improvement.
For these reasons I, too, would reverse the judgment but would do so only on the basis of the starkly obvious Faretta-Teron error.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525].