(dissenting).
Forewarned, but undaunted by our original judicial foray into the political jungle two years ago in Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.Supp. 704 (W.D.Tex. 1972), the majority of this Court again sallies forth on another legislative reapportionment expedition. Contrary to my *664fellow travelers on the Panel, I do not find the scythe of the recent jurisprudence adequate to cleave a path through a myriad of thorny legal precepts. Initially, it may have been a relatively easy search to find a clearing in Dallas and Bexar Counties. However, the remaining multimember districts are shrouded, submerged and enveloped in cultural chasms, demographic densities, torrents of sociological theory and political pitfalls. The once simplistic course toward the goal of “one man, one vote” now appears as elusive as the source of the Nile.
With the exception of Hidalgo County, where it is conceded by all parties that constitutional standards are satisfied, I respectfully dissent to the Opinion of the Court.
In light of the Supreme Court’s Opinion in White v. Register et al., 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314, affirming in effect my dissent therein, I am of the mind that the instant case to a large degree merely asserts the same objections initially raised by the plaintiffs and that my original dissent is more appropriate now than it was two years ago. For these reasons and in the interest of brevity, I hereby incorporate for the purposes of this dissent my Opinion filed in White, supra.
Because I believe the majority of this Court to have strayed so far afield from the spirit and letter of the Supreme Court’s decision governing reapportionment in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 1971, 403 U.S. 124, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363, it is essential to set out certain of those pertinent guidelines at this juncture. At the outset, the challenger must carry the burden of proving that multimember districts unconstitutionally operate to dilute or cancel the voting strength of racial or political elements (Whitcomb, at page 144, 91 S.Ct. 1858). The plaintiffs, therefore, must scale the bulwark of presumed constitutionality of the State’s legislative scheme for it is clear beyond dispute that multimember districts are not per se unconstitutional, nor is their use in conjunction with single member districts impermissible (Whitcomb, at page 142, 91 S.Ct. 1858).
So much of this record is replete with opinion and conjecture that multimember districts are the root of all political ills allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs and that the only effective poultice is single member reapportionment. This Court does not sit as a body of political scientists weighing the efficacy of varying theories of political representation. In fact, such a practice is specifically condemned under Whitcomb. Further, the Supreme Court has declared that multimember districts may be suspect or subject to challenge only under a very limited criteria. Chances of a successful attack on such districts is further lessened where the district is small and does not comprise a substantial portion of the total legislative seats. (Whitcomb, at pages 143, 144, 91 S.Ct. 1858) The Court acknowledged, therefore, that there are significant differences between extremely large multimember districts, such as Tarrant County with approximately 675,000 residents with nine legislative seats and those small multimember districts at the opposite end of the spectrum.1
*665Having thus examined the general admonitions of the Supreme Court concerning reapportionment, it is essential to consider the more specific guidelines from which the majority of this Panel have further departed. In Whitcomb, supra, as well as White, supra, the criteria and burden of the plaintiffs is to:
“ . . . produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in question — that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.” (White, supra, 412 U.S. at page 766, 93 S.Ct. at page 2339.)
In applying this standard, Whitcomb, supra, specifies that Courts should take special note of districts where the minority is not allowed (1) to register or vote, (2) to choose the political party they desire to support, (3) to participate in the affairs of the political party they desire to support, (4) to be equally represented on those occasions when legislative candidates are chosen by the party they choose to support, or (5) are regularly excluded from the slates of both major parties, thus denying them the chance of occupying legislative seats.
The Supreme Court in White, supra, set out the additional requirement that the Court must consider the continuing effects of past discrimination on the minority group’s ability to participate in the political process as a factor in the aggregation of circumstances indicating vote dilution.
The constitutional barometer in these cases is not calibrated by actual victory at the polls, but is rather based on concepts of equity and fairness where minority candidates and party members have at least a chance of winning or significantly influencing intraparty fights and issue-oriented elections. (Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at page 159, 91 S.Ct. 1858)
In addition, the Supreme Court declared that plaintiffs must show intent by the State to adopt a multimember district scheme which was conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial or economic discrimination or designed to dilute the vote of minorities. (Whitcomb, supra, at page 149, 91 S.Ct. 1858)
Furthermore, Justice White concludes in Whitcomb, supra, that there must be an effective remedy available which will alleviate the problems found in an unconstitutional multimember district. The Court in Whitcomb notes on pages 160 and 161, 91 S.Ct. on page 1878:
“Moreover, if the problems of multi-member districts are unbearable or even unconstitutional it is not at all clear that the remedy is a single member district system with its lines carefully drawn to ensure representation to sizeable racial, ethnic, economic, or religious groups and with its own capacity for overrepresenting and underrepresenting parties and interests and even for permitting a minority of the voters to control the legislature and government of a State.”
* *X* *X- 'X* -X- *
“The remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task, but they are not unlimited.”
Not only must there be an equitable remedy at law, but the Supreme Court has gone one step further in Whitcomb, supra, by requiring the Court to explore and fashion where possible a less burdensome plan than ordering an entire single member district reapportionment. Commenting on the District Courts’ failure to consider such alternatives, Justice White stated in Whitcomb at page 160, 91 S.Ct. at page 1878:
“The Court entered judgment without expressly putting aside on supportable grounds the alternative of creating single-member districts in the ghetto and leaving the district otherwise intact, as well as the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment could be satisfied by the simple re*666quirement that some of the at-large candidates each year must reside in the ghetto.”
In essence, the Supreme Court has recognized that there must be some element of intent by the State, substantiated by factual findings, of minority political disenfranchisement or vote dilution with an available and effective remedy before a Three Judge Court may order reapportionment of State legislative districts.
It is especially interesting to examine those factors which may not be considered or are irrelevant and immaterial to a consideration of the multimember district dilemma. First, the fact that the number of ghetto residents who were legislators was not in proportion to ghetto population does not prove discrimination absent evidence that such residents lacked participation in the political process. (Whitcomb, p. 149, 91 S.Ct. 1858) Second, the fact that each member of a bloc-voting delegation has more influence than legislators from single member districts is not a compelling reason to redraw multimember districts absent a finding that such representatives counted for more in the legislature than did representatives from single member districts. (Whitcomb, page 147, 91 S.Ct. 1858) Third, where minorities or ghetto residents have equal access to the political process, the fact that their candidates are defeated at the polls does not mandate a finding against multimember districts. (Whitcomb, page 153, 91 S.Ct. 1858) Fourth, it is not a denial of equal protection to deny legislative seats to losing candidates, even in those so-called “safe” districts where the same party wins year after year providing there was effective access to the political process. The mere fact that one interest group finds itself outvoted and without legislative seats of its own is no basis for invoking constitutional remedies. (Whitcomb, pages 154, 155, 91 S.Ct. 1858) Fifth, it is not sufficient to claim that the ghetto’s or minority’s special interests were not heeded by the multimember delegation or that they were underrepresented absent their own legislative voice to further .their own policy views without proof that the outcome would have been different if the representatives had been chosen from single member districts. (Whitcomb, page 155, 91 S.Ct. ■ 1858) Sixth, the fact that one group with distinctive interests must be represented in the legislature if it is numerous enough to command at least one seat, and represents a majority living in an area sufficiently compact to constitute a single member district, is rejected as grounds for redistricting in Whitcomb at page 156, 91 S.Ct. 1858.
Turning now to the majority opinion and the cases relied upon therein from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,2 it becomes apparent that the Court has seriously eroded the “Whitcomb test” governing reapportionment and has improperly considered or failed to consider certain of the Supreme Court mandates set out herein.
The majority of this Panel declares ab initio that “the Supreme Court has liberated us from any dichotomy of de facto and de jure”. (Majority Opinion, page 643) My reading of White and Whitcomb is to the contrary. It has been conceded that in White the Supreme Court added another dimension to the totality of circumstances which must be considered in these cases — that of cultural incompatability combined with the continuing effects of past discrimination and treatment against minorities. However, it is imperative to note that White also stressed the history of official racial discrimination in Texas, citing instances where Texas law had instituted or fostered majority vote in primary elections, the so-called “place” rule and voter registration procedures which, while not improper per se, had nevertheless operated to enhance racial discrimi*667nation. This is intentional State action pure and simple and as such amounts to an affirmance of the de jure concept. Justice White citing from the Graves v. Barnes opinion declared that the Mexican-American in Bexar County was denied political access when cultural incompatibility was conjoined with the poll tax and the most restrictive voter registration procedures in the nation to dilute the Chicano vote. {White, supra, 412 U.S. at page 768, 93 S.Ct. 2332) Again, the Supreme Court reiterates that there must be State action coupled with other circumstances before dismantling of multimember districts is required.
The specific language of Whitcomb, supra, cited in this dissent further corroborates the necessity for a de jure finding in the following passage:
“But there is no suggestion here that Marion County’s multi-member district, or similar districts throughout the State, were conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial or economic discrimination. As plaintiffs concede, ‘there was no basis for asserting that the legislative districts in Indiana were designed to dilute the vote of minorities.’ ” (Emphasis added) {Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at page 149, 91 S.Ct. at page 1872)
In light of these clear and unequivocal statements in both Whitcomb and White, a finding by the majority of this Court that they have been somehow “liberated” from the de facto-de jure dichotomy is wholly without foundation. To find the unshackled freedom to dispense with the specific mandates of the Supreme Court is surely to rely on gossamer, even diaphanous, interpretations which I am unable to perceive under any construction of these two opinions.
The majority refers to their concept of the sine qua non of reapportionment in the following language:
“No one element is a sine qua non of a finding of denial of access; nor must all be present in any given County . . . ; however', a combination of these factors must have the effect of fencing the minority out.”
I find this at odds with the relevant case law. My reading of Whitcomb and White, supra, indicates that the sine qua non can be distilled into the following conjunctive and trinary elements without too much over-simplification: (1) that the sovereign State of Texas “conceived or operated” its nine multimember districts as “purposeful devices to further racial or economic discrimination . . . designed to dilute the vote of minorities”; and (2) that the “de jure” plans accomplish the purpose and intent of the State of Texas and in fact did dilute and cancel out the voting rights of minorities and prevent effective access to the political process; and (3) single member districts as distinguished from multimember districts, pluralitarian or other plans, would either solve or tend to solve these problems since it is academic that the law will not undertake a useless thing and impose a plan which does not offer a remedy.
Just as in many other areas of law and especially in the Civil Rights field where State action is involved by virtue of legislation, policy, practice or procedure, the Supreme Court has held legislative or de jure intent is an essential element to be proven prior to Federal Court intervention. This has been recently borne out in school desegregation litigation in Keyes v. Denver Independent School District (1973), 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548, and further relied upon in my Opinion in Morales et al. v. Shannon et al., 366 F.Supp. 813 (1973, W.D.Tex.) It appears beyond dispute, therefore, that the “de jure-de facto” dichotomy remains an important legal concept which is clearly applicable and reasonable to State action in legislative reapportionment cases.
The County-by-County analysis of the evidence discussed in this dissent will show unquestionably that any history of past discrimination in those Counties has been rendered impotent by minority *668political activity at least the last decade. There is also an absolute dearth of evidence indicating that Texas election laws or procedures or any other State action, either overtly or covertly, were designed or operate to dilute the minority vote. The Majority Opinion goes on to find also that the “place system” rule “serves no function but to reduce the election to a series of head-to-head contests with a consequent emphasis on the racial element where it appears” (Majority Opinion, page 643) and that the State has no rational policy explaining the use of any multimember districts. (Majority Opinion, page 643) My perusal of the record, depositions and evidence discloses little, if any, mention of the “place system” either pro or con, nor was any testimony elicited concerning the State’s policy for the adoption of multimember districts at the turn of the century. The burden is on the plaintiffs to come forward with tangible proof of a discriminatory “place system” or of an irrational State policy. This is not a fit subject for judicial notice.
Summarizing the “aggregate of factors” to be considered by the Court, the Majority relies on the paraphrasing of these precepts in the Fifth Circuit Opinions in Zimmer and Turner, supra. Obviously, a side-by-side analysis of Whit-comb and White, on the one hand, and Zimmer and Turner, on the other, amply demonstrates the whittling down of Supreme Court guidelines at the hands of master craftsmen. In Zimmer, there is no mention of State action or intent, no requirement that the Court consider viable alternatives prior to single member reapportionment and no mention that there must be an effective remedy as equity law requires prior to dismantling multimember districts. Having seemingly deleted these factors, the Majority adds several of their own to take up the slack. Unfortunately, the additions are specifically excluded under Whitcomb as pointed out herein. “Indifference or hostility of the district-wide representatives to particularized minority interests” and “the inability of minority groups to obtain representation in proportion to their percentage of district population” are condemned by Whitcomb, 403 U.S. on pages 155 and 149, 91 S.Ct. 1858, respectively, absent specific findings of a denial of political access.
While the foregoing analysis of Whit-comb and White may perhaps be a needless repetition or restatement of the language and principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, I am of the opinion that a specific listing of all factors comprising minority vote dilution as well as all factors which may not be considered by this Court under those rulings has been essential. My purpose in this endeavor is twofold. First, a cursory reading of the numerous guidelines and admonitions digested from lengthy opinions indicates the complexity of the redistricting problem and the multi-faceted viewpoint from which a Court must judge the virtues of a political scheme. To state that the light of truth emanating from the “burning bush”, since White, Zimmer and Turner is now there for all to see, does not comport with the limited vision of this field so often admitted by the parties’ counsel and Courts, and ignores the trepidation of the Supreme Court itself in ever entering this political thicket. Secondly, I feel my Brothers on the majority of this Panel have either oversimplified the problem and solution, or else have failed to consider much of what I deem important, if not imperative, in the Supreme Court mandate in reaching their decision and that it is the responsibility of the dissent to respectfully illustrate these differences of opinion.
The succeeding portions of this dissent will focus on a County-by-County analysis of the facts, testimony and evidence in an effort to show that the existing multimember scheme is not infirm nor is it in need of redistrieting by the Court now or by the legislature pursuant to judicial order.
DISTRICT 32: TARRANT COUNTY
As stated in the majority opinion, Tarrant County comprises District 32 *669with a population of approximately 675,368. Of this figure, the ethnic breakdown indicates 82% of the County is White, 12% Black, and 6% Brown. The Court has made a thorough analysis of the economic, demographic and residential patterns in the various Census Tracts, and it is conceded that there exists a ghetto area of heavy Black concentration in the County. There are also allegations in the record of past discriminatory attitudes on the part of members of the Anglo community especially as regards residential and educational policies and practices.
The similarities found by the Court in Tarrant County when compared to those made by the District Court in Marion County, Indiana are striking indeed. Like Tarrant, the plaintiffs of Marion County alleged and the Court found that residents of the ghetto area had particular demographic characteristics rendering them cognizable as a minority interest group with distinctive interests. {Whitcomb, supra, 403 U.S. p. 129, 91 S.Ct. 1858) It was further concluded that “the mechanism of political party organization and the influence of party chairmen in nominating candidates were additional factors alleged to frustrate the exercise of power by residents of the ghetto area.” {Whitcomb, supra, p. 129, 91 S.Ct. p. 1862) The Three Judge Court in Whitcomb also found: “Strong differences ... in terms of housing conditions, income and educational levels, rates of unemployment, juvenile crime, and welfare assistance.” That Court went on to find that the ghetto area suffered from “gross inequity of representation, as determined by residence of legislators” and “characterized Marion County’s general assembly delegation as tending to coalesce and take common positions on proposed legislation” which obviated “. . . representation of a substantial, though minority, interest group”. {Whitcomb, supra, p. 133, 91 S.Ct. p. 1864)
It is important to note the Supreme Court’s summation and conclusory comments on these findings in Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, pages 148, 149, 91 S.Ct. page 1871:
“The Court identified an area of the city as a ghetto, found it predominately inhabited by poor Negroes with distinctive substantive-law interests and thought this group unconstitutionally underrepresented because the proportion of legislators with residences in the ghetto elected from 1960 to 1968 was less than the ghetto’s proportion of the population, less than the proportion of legislators elected from ... a less populous district, and less than the ghetto would likely have elected had the county consisted of single-member districts. We find major deficiencies in this approach.”
Throughout Whitcomb, the Supreme Court struck down as inapplicable to the central issue most of the District Court’s findings enumerated above. They held that proportionate numbers of legislators, block voting of delegations, unresponsiveness to the ghetto’s particularized legislative needs were improper criteria for reapportionment absent findings that single member districts would cure those problems and a definitive showing that Negroes were not allowed to register to vote, choose their political party, participate in its affairs and to be considered or represented in the candidate choosing process. It must also be.shown that ghetto residents were excluded from the slates of major parties.
Much of the findings made under the majority opinion parallel those made by the District Court in Whitcomb which were distinguished or declared inapposite with more compelling criteria. As concerns the majority’s evaluation of the political structure, it is further apparent that the facts are susceptible to varying interpretations. To find, for instance, that Black candidates are doomed to failure regardless of an endorsement vel non of the labor-liberal coalition is not a finding of non-access to the political process by minority voters. Rather, this is an attempt to indicate vote dilution by *670failure at the polls. What more can an endorsing group do than endorse? If Union members choose to ignore the endorsement by their leadership, can this be characterized as denial of political access to minorities? I think not. The majority goes on to illustrate their point by stating that a leaflet campaign concerning student bussing issues was a racial tactic employed in races between Whites. Granted, bussing by its very definition, focuses on race, but to imply that it is an unpopular topic solely in the White community or that, as an issue between two White candidates demonstrates undertones of racial bigotry, is simply without basis in fact or reason and ignores the national poll results showing conclusively that bussing is unpopular within all groups of American society. Furthermore, it is no indication of minimization or cancellation of minority voting strength.
As concerns the slating of Black candidates, several evidentiary facts must be considered. The deposition of plaintiff’s witness, Mr. Joyce Wendell Sifford, indicates that the Tarrant County Central Labor Council is the political slating arm of organized labor which is aware of and relies upon the Black community to vote for and support their candidates. Labor supported a Black candidate in 1968, but denied endorsement to Mr. R. C. Johnson, a Black legislative candidate in 1970. In 1972, the Labor Council combined with other political organizations to screen party nominees. Among those groups, it is interesting to note that PASO, a Mexican-American organization, and the Precinct Workers Council, a Black organization, where included. These political groups endorsed Mr. Bobby Webber, a Black, among others though his race was not targeted as one likely to win.
The majority opinion describes Mr. Webber as a wealthy businessman who spent much time, money and effort in an unsuccessful bid for a legislative seat. Mr. Webber apparently attempted to escape any racial bias which might hurt him by not appearing on television and by advocating popular White issues. While these facts are no doubt true, it should be remembered that Mr. 'Webber placed second in the primary race against three White opponents. He garnered approximately 46-47 % of the vote. In a County of 12% Blacks and a total of 18% minority population, it needs only simple mathematics to realize that Mr. Webber was not only a popular candidate, but also one who had very substantial Anglo support. To imply that the White community was totally ignorant of Mr. Webber’s race does the Tarrant County news media and electorate a disservice. Mr. Webber’s political career amply illustrates an active and effective participation and access by minorities in the County and his legislative race cannot and should not be easily discounted.
Charles Gaskins, a Black candidate, ran unsuccessfully for office in 1972. He failed to gain the endorsement of the Precinct Workers Council which apparently opted for nonendorsement of his race or else supported his well-known and popular White opponent.
Noteworthy also in Mr. Sifford’s testimony was the fact that Black candidates have been chosen and have run on the Republican ticket for legislative seats in Tarrant County. It might be stated that the Republican Party has only elected one office holder — State Senator, Mrs. Betty Andujar — in Tar-rant County in the Party’s recent history.
Though no Blacks have been politically victorious, it is .difficult to conceive of their denial to intraparty politics in either party in the selection of candidates or their endorsement or as official party workers at the precinct level and elsewhere. Testimony concerning the so-called “Seventh Street Group” is conflicting at best. No witness was able to identify a single member of the group except to say it was a business oriented, conservative political organization; No one knew of any time, or any place, where the group allegedly convened and in fact Representative Gibson Lewis de*671scribed it as “mythical”. Lewis stated he’d never been approached by such a group, solicited funds from them, nor seen a slate card. Lewis also testified that in his political experience there was no group of “kingmakers” in Tarrant County, but rather that the political arena was a free-for-all evidenced by the election of Senator Andujar — a non-endorsed, female Republican. When questioned about voter apathy, Lewis remarked that voters, regardless of race or political ideology, simply lacked interest in the State Legislature and ofttimes show their ignorance of his own political office by asking, “Why aren’t you in Washington?” He was of the opinion that single member districts would not change this attitude.
The majority of this Panel goes into some detail in an effort to prove the Tarrant County delegation unresponsive to minority interests. Of course, responsiveness to particular interest groups is not a criteria under Whitcomb as long as there is effective political access by that group. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that most of the Tarrant County delegation voted for an “open meeting” bill, bi-lingual education, posting of prices for prescription drugs (introduced by Mr. Leland, a Black representative), licensing requirements for child care centers, and a crime and narcotics educational program. (See Lewis deposition, pages 192-199) Obviously, these legislative enactments have appeal to minority interests as well as to Tar-rant County as a whole. There was no evidence analyzing the entire history of the last legislative session, but a cursory glance does not indicate the “indifference” to ethnic interests by the delegation of which they are accused in the majority opinion. The racial connotation in the statement that one legislator voted against the creation of a State holiday honoring Dr. Martin Luther King pales by the fact that he favored instead a holiday in memory of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President of the United States from Texas.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court had before it in Whitcomb a multimember legislative district of over twice the relative size and strength as the one now before this Court in Tar-rant County (Marion County, Indiana— 15 legislators of a total of 100, or 15%; Tarrant County, Texas — 9 legislators of a total of 150, or 6%).
A multimember district which is “large and elects a substantial proportion of the seats in either house of a bicameral legislature . . . ”, Whit-comb v. Chavis, supra, page 143, 91 S.Ct. page 1869, is more susceptible to successful challenge by virtue of its size. However, though the size of the challenged district may lighten the plaintiffs’ burden somewhat, they must still prove “that multi-member districts unconstitutionally operate to dilute or cancel the voting strength of racial or political elements.” Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, page 144, 91 S.Ct. page 1869.
Rather than to preponderate in favor of plaintiffs’ burden in their challenge to District 32, the evidence shows the minority has had effective access to the political process. As with Marion County, Indiana (see Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra) there has been a showing in Tar-rant County of a well defined ghetto area. There has been a showing that residents of this area are numerous enough to be entitled to at least one legislator if the area were segregated into a single member district; and there has been proof offered to show that the number of ghetto residents of Tarrant County who have been elected to the legislature is not in proportion to ghetto population. No showing has been made, however, that the minority has not been allowed to register to vote, or vote, to choose a political party, and to participate in its affairs. No showing has been made that the minority has been excluded from slate-making and other candidate selection processes. (In fact, some of the slate-making groups whose endorsements are sought and thought important are minority groups.) Plain*672tiffs have failed to carry their burden to show that the multimember district operates to deny effective access to or anything less than full participation in the political process in District 32. The only substantiable finding that can be made is that, having full access to the political process, the minority has been relatively unsuccessful at the polls. Such lack of success is not sufficient to support a finding of invidious discrimination. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, pages 159-160, 91 S.Ct. 1858.
DISTRICT 7: JEFFERSON COUNTY
District 7, located within Jefferson County, is a multimember district containing approximately 221,000 population electing a three member legislative delegation. Approximately 30% of the district is Black.
While it is relatively undisputed that there has been an aura of racially motivated discrimination in Jefferson County, particularly as regards, and perhaps even limited to, the operation of area labor unions, the plaintiffs have not carried their burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that such discrimination has motivated the operation of the small multimember district in such a way as to deny the Black minority effective access to the political process.
Blacks have been elected on a district-wide basis to City Council positions in both Beaumont and Port Arthur (the two major population centers of the County). Blacks have also been elected to the Port Arthur and South Park School Boards.
The one example used by Dr. Cotrell to show the relative isolation and political ineffectiveness of the Black community is the legislative race undertaken by a Black, A1 Price. A significant point overlooked by Dr. Cotrell, however, is that the disparity between the first three candidates ranged from approximately 9,600 for the first place candidate to approximately 7,200 for the third place candidate, Mr. Price. While second or third place in a primary election is not a victory, neither is it, in such a close race, evidence of political impotence and, as the Supreme Court has said in Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra:
“The chance of winning or significantly influencing intraparty fights and issue-oriented elections has seemed to some (as discussed herein supra) inadequate protection to minorities, political, racial, or economic; rather, their voice, it is said, should also be heard in the legislative forum where public policy is finally fashioned. In our view, however, experience and insight have not_yet demonstrated that multi-member districts are inherently invidious and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
The most significant political force in the County as regards any slating activity is the Labor Council. Mr. Price, in his attempt in 1970, gained acceptance as one of the three permissible candidates. Such endorsement is admittedly a significant achievement in Jefferson County (testimony of Dr. Charles Cotrell, Trial Transcript, page 645). However, such endorsement is not an absolute guarantee of victory, nor is failure to gain it the precursor of frustration and defeat. Messrs. Doyle and Powers were victorious without it.
As has been conceded herein, there has been an aura of racial discrimination in Jefferson County in the past, particularly as regards the operation of local labor unions. At the deposition of Cleveland Nisby of Beaumont, it was stipulated by plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr. Richards, that none of these conditions would have been changed by single member districts in Jefferson County. In other words, single member districts will not correct these conditions.
In addition, it must be recalled that District 7 is a small three member district. Even if the Supreme Court mandate to be “color blind” in fashioning a single member district were to be overlooked and a “safe” district were drawn, it is inconceivable that the Black minori*673ty would be better served by perhaps one lone voice in the 150 man State Legislature.
The increasing political activity of the minority community combined with the lack of evidence to the contrary confirm a finding that the plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden in challenging the existing multimember district. Plaintiffs have, in effect, admitted that a change to a single member district plan might very well achieve nothing.
DISTRICT 35: McLENNAN COUNTY
District 35, encompassing all of Mc-Lennan County, has a population of approximately 147,500 and elects a two man multimember delegation to the Legislature. Of the total population, 16% (approximately 25,600) are Black and 7% (approximately 10,300) are Mexican-American.
As the minority points out, there is a geographically defined Black community in Waco, the major city in the County, representing approximately 20% of that city’s population.
It is conceded that a racially biased attitude has existed in McLennan County in the past. Whether that attitude has motivated the operation of the existing multimember legislative district in such a way as to deny the racial minority effective access to the political process is not, however, conceded. It is on this pivotal point that I disagree with the majority. Plaintiff’s burden is to show more than a history of racially biased attitudes in District 35.
One instance cited by the majority opinion which could be characterized as motivated to deny the Black minority equal access to the political process is related to the City Council election process. In 1948, Waco City Council elections were held for the first time on a ward, or single member district basis. In 1950, a Black ran for the City Council from one of the wards and fell only slightly short of victory. The newly elected Council, acting by resolution, changed the voting system back to the old at-large one which remains in effect at present. Such action is indeed curious. It is, however, equally curious to note, as the majority points out, that'the present at-large system incorporates use of a geographic place system; that is, candidates for various places must reside in geographically defined wards. Such a system is seriously deficient if the desired result was to deny minorities effective access to the political process. This geographic place system is one of the alternative remedies recommended by the Supreme Court in Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at page 160, 91 S.Ct. 1858. Indeed, in 1970 a Black was elected to the City Council and another currently serves on it.
In spite of such evidence, the majority takes the position that institution of this system, which has produced two Black City Councilmen in the last two elections, is “curious” on the one hand and ample evidence of the desirability of single member districts on the other.
The majority, faced with such a factual setting, attempts to negate and weaken it by commenting that “Black councilmen, however, apparently have not acted as effective spokesmen for black and minority interests.” The majority further seeks to dilute the significance of these election results by observing that one of the Black Councilmen was elected in a race against another Black, losing by approximately three to one in Black polling places and winning in White areas. Thus, it is concluded he was elected by Whites and owed them a political debt and was, therefore, not an effective representative for his fellow minority group members. The fact is, however, that in that race a Black candidate received a substantial vote from the White electorate. This race represented not a Black/White racial voting pattern, but more probably the liberal/ conservative competition referred to by the witness, Tom Moore, Jr., infra.
The testimony of plaintiffs’ witness, Robert L. Gilbert, a Black active in McLennan County politics, indicates that there is a healthy atmosphere of differing political views in the Black commu*674nity. Mr. Gilbert testified that in the recent school cases the NAACP issued a statement favoring neighborhood schools.3 He pointed out that that organization and the Black Federation were split over the neighborhood school concept as well as along political lines generally. (Deposition of Robert L. Gilbert)
It is conceded by the majority that there is no evidence that the legislative delegation from District 35 has been unresponsive to the particularized needs of the minorities. Even if such showing were dispositive of the issues herein, or even of great moment, the plaintiffs have failed on this point. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that minorities in McLennan County have been denied effective access to the political process.
Further, in the opinion of Tom Moore, Jr., a defense witness who served in the Legislature from District 35 until 1972 and classifies himself as a liberal, the strength and political effectiveness of the Black minority in McLennan County rests in its position as a swing vote in close elections. In Mr. Moore’s opinion, the division in the County is much more appropriately described as one along traditional liberal/conservative lines than along Black/White lines. Further, in Mr. Moore’s opinion, a division of the present two man multimember district into single member districts could result in polarization of this liberal/conservative split to such a degree that the delegation would present no unified front and would lose much of its present effectiveness. The plaintiffs stipulate that the voting record of Tom Moore, Jr. while he was in the Legislature was excellent. (Moore deposition, page 16)
The clear evidence is that, amid an atmosphere of racial bias on the part of some in the County, the minorities have not been denied the right to register to vote, vote, or run for political office. (There is no slating of candidates. See Majority Opinion.) Nor have minorities been excluded from participating in the inner workings of the Democratic Party (the only effective political party in McLennan County as in so much of the State). In fact, Blacks participate fully in the Democratic Party holding many of the precinct positions. (Deposition of Tom Moore, Jr.)
Again, plaintiffs have attempted to carry their burden of proof by reference to past attitudes of racial bias in the challenged district. Plaintiffs have failed utterly to meet the tests of Whit-comb v. Chavis, supra.
DISTRICT 37: TRAVIS COUNTY
The district encompasses the entire County, having a population of approximately 300,000 and electing a four-member delegation to the Legislature. The minority population of the district, located primarily in what is called East Austin, comprises approximately 32% of the total population (20% Mexican-American, 12% Black).
The only witnesses who could be categorized as political experts on the district were Mr. Frank L. Wright, who helped organize and has served as Chairman of the West Austin Democrats, and Representative Sarah Weddington.
Mr. Wright acknowledged being characterized as a liberal (Trial Transcript, page 709). He was, as said, a prime organizer of the West Austin Democrats, a geographical political action group, and has helped organize and has worked with several other such geographical political action groups (Trial Transcript, page 708). In addition, he has done considerable work with various Black and Mexiean-American groups, his own theory being the time honored one that the most effective political force is well organized grass roots activity. In his view, the Blacks and Mexican-Americans are currently weakened by a growing internal bifurcation resulting from in*675creasing pressures for shifts in leadership and direction. Such continuing division has had a significant effect on the lack of numerous candidates from these communities. “One is that the community itself, . . . and I’m speaking really in general about both, have remained so divided and up in pieces that they did not tend to think of exerting themselves toward candidacy.” (Trial Transcript, page 712) Mr. Wright further feels that it is no longer impossible for a Black or Mexican-American to win in the present at-large multimember district (Trial Transcript, page 717). Indeed, Mr. Berl Handcox, a Black, has won election twice and is currently serving on the Austin City Council and a Black woman serves on the School Board. In addition, there is currently a Mexican-American serving as one of the four County Commissioners. In recent years, a Mr. Garcia ran for the School Board and a Mr. Ruiz made the run-off against another liberal candidate in one of the State Legislature races. Mr. Gonzalo Barrientos, running against a fourteen year incumbent, came within 1,000 votes of winning out of 80,000 votes cast. Furthermore, the evidence fails to establish the existence of significant slate-making groups in this district. Indeed, many of those that do exist are in the minority community. In addition to these efforts, the minorities have been successful in directly gaining access to the workings of the Democratic Party, the most consistently potent political force in the district, by securing several party offices.
All of the above demonstrates the great degree of increasing political activism and awareness and the effectiveness of the minorities’ access to the political process in District 37.
Representative Sarah Weddington, who won election in 1972 and is generally characterized a liberal, testified that she actively campaigned in and sought the support of the minority communities in District 37. She expressed concern that she cannot give the attention to minority needs she feels she should. A close appraisal of her testimony reveals that rather than out of fear of alienating some other part of her constituency by giving close attention to the particularized needs of her minority constituency, her difficulties arise from the same problem plaguing all other legislators— the voluminous workload of the Legislature (Trial Transcript; pages 503-505). In addition, Ms. Weddington testified that the other members of the District 37 delegation feel a definite commitment to the needs of the minority community (Trial Transcript, page 510).
When met with the direct question of whether the minorities in District 37 have, by use of the multimember district system, been denied equal access to the political process, Ms. Weddington responded in the affirmative. Her reasons, however, were that, given well drawn single member districts, they would have a better chance of electing one of their own. Again, as previously stated, the ability to win is not the criteria determining effective access to the political process. While Ms. Wedding-ton’s reasons may be persuasive conclusions, they are not controlling in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Whit-comb v. Chavis, supra.
The overwhelming weight of the credible evidence preponderates in favor of defendants in District 37. No evidence has been presented to show that the minorities in District 37 are denied effective access to the political process. They register to vote, vote, influence their legislators, run for political office, and win. Indeed, for this Court to blindfold itself to the clear mandates and guidelines of the Supreme Court and require a restructuring into single member districts might well frustrate and defeat the significant political impact currently displayed by the minority communities.
DISTRICT 75: LUBBOCK COUNTY
The next challenge on our tour finds us in District 75, which includes Lubbock County and has an approximate population of 147,000 served by a two-*676man multimember delegation. The total minority population of the district is approximately 36,000 or less than half of an ideal single member legislative district of 75,000 population.
While the majority opinion dwells almost exclusively on evidence of past and recent discrimination in the public school system and other public facilities and on the socio-economic condition of the Mexican-American minority in Lubbock County, little, if any, evidence is shown in the record, and none is referred to by the majority, which indicates that the minority in District 75 has been prevented effective access to the political process. Plaintiffs have sought to carry the burden of their challenge by a showing of past discrimination in areas other than access to the political process.
That few minority members have sought or been elected to office in the district is not determinative of the issue. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, pages 148, 149, 91 S.Ct. 1858. As has been said, winning is not the equivalent of political access. Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra. The fact is, however, that minority members have run for office and have on occasion won. Ms. Joan Irving, a Black, currently serves on the Lubbock County School Board. In 1972, plaintiffs’ witness, Froy Salinas, a Mexican-American, ran for the School Board, and in a four man race, came within 250 votes of the winner. In 1968, Ms. Paulina Jacovo, a Mexican-American, ran for County Commissioner and lost. Much is made by plaintiffs of her defeat. In their view, her loss was primarily the result of a racist feeling within her precinct. A closer analysis of the election reveals, however, that a more appropriate description of Ms. Jacovo’s defeat would be urban versus rural rather than Mexican-American versus Anglo. Indeed, some Mexican-Americans outside of Ms. Jacovo’s urban residence actively campaigned against her (Sowder deposition, pages 20, 21). Ms. Jacovo’s major obstacle, it seems, was that she was an urbanite running for an office traditionally held by a member of the rural community.
It is also uncontested that there is no slating process in the choosing of candidates for public office in Lubbock County. The Legislative race at the primary level was described by the immediate past Chairman of the Democratic Party, Madison Sowder (1969-1973), as a “free-for-all” (Sowder Deposition).
The evidence shows further that the voting records of delegates from District 75 support a finding that these delegates have generally voted for issues presented to them along the same lines as Mexican-American and Black legislators. In short, the evidence shows that District 75 legislators have been sensitive, rather than callous, to the particularized political needs of their minority constituents.
It is admitted and uncontested by this dissent that there have been incidences of racial discrimination in Lubbock County in the past on the social and public facilities plane, but no evidence has been adduced which would support a finding that the existing multimember district is operated to deny the minority effective access to the political process.
Once again, the only evidence in the record on this point is the uncorroborated opinion of plaintiffs’ witness, Dr. Cotrell, to the effect that he feels, after a whirlwind tour of two days and the analysis of some voting statistics, that the minority is just not doing as well as it should. Such testimony, in the absence of corroborative evidence, falls far short of carrying plaintiffs’ burden to support their challenge to the District 75 multimember district.
DISTRICT 72: EL PASO COUNTY
The plaintiffs would have this Court draw the parallel between El Paso and Bexar Counties as concerns demographic and cultural patterns yielding similar political results. Employing analogy as their cornerstone, plaintiffs maintain that El Paso, like Bexar, is composed of a Mexican-American majority of 56.-87%. Plaintiffs have attempted to show *677a heavy concentration of Chícanos in what is known as the South Side of El Paso who have been deprived of political access by virtue of the language barrier, economics, past discriminatory practices and political repression in the form of the now defunct Poll Tax. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Charles Cotrell, spent all of two days and an extensive taxi tour of the City before reaching these profound, but wholly unsupported conclusions. Dr. Cotrell further testified that voting patterns were similar to Bexar County in that the average voter turn-out in El Paso was 30% Mexican-American and 60% Anglo in an effort to prove that the “numerically smaller Anglo population still controls through the legal device of the multimember district”. (TR. p. 605) The plaintiffs also presented the elected Chairmen of the Democratic and Republican Parties to substantiate Dr. CotrelPs ultimate findings. Both witnesses testified that campaign expenditures for a State legislative seat amount to $15,000-$20,000 in the present multimember district. Although no witness testified that minority candidates had been unable to raise such amounts, the political Chairman opined that single member districts would lower campaign costs and encourage more Mexican-American candidates.4 They further testified that although there was no overt racial campaigning conducted in El Paso, nor was there any slating in State House races, there was, however, a nebulous sort of “whisper campaign” conducted in the Anglo community and some business groups that helped finance and endorse candidates. An objective appraisal of this evidence hardly presents the mental image of the smoke filled room of political bossism of which the DCRG in Dallas was accused or of the invidious type of political/racial discrimination found by the Fifth Circuit in Ouachita Parish, Louisiana. (See Turner, supra)
The only Mexican-American to testify from El Paso County was David Morales on behalf of the State. Morales, who has been active in political campaigns for several years, testified that “We (Chícanos) have been active in running and we’ve been successful in taking some of the offices.” (TR. p. 419) He further concluded that though there had been some past acts of racial discrimination, the Mexican-American community has been able to overcome this to the extent that they are not prohibited from taking an active political role. As opposed to plaintiffs’ witnesses, Morales stated he favored the present multimember district plan fearful that single member districts would serve to both polarize and disenfranchise the Chicano vote and virtually destroy their political effectiveness or voting strength. Where it is now conceivable and very possible for the Mexican-American community to carry every county-wide elective office, single member districts would almost certainly dilute thi¡ political opportunity.
Also testifying for the State of Texas was Sen. Frank Owen who had served as a State Representative from El Paso from 1950-1954 and later as State Senator until 1965. The former Senator stated that he could never have been elected to political office nor remained there without substantial Chicano support. Given the demographic make-up of the County, Owen stated that it would be impossible for any candidate, past, present or future, to successfully run without a goodly portion of the Mexican-American vote. Like Mr. Morales, Senator Owen favors the present plan in effect in El Paso, again fearing polarization of the races and the creation of Ward heeler politics. While there are no slating groups for statewide races nor powerful political cliques in El Paso, the witness testified there were many Mexican-American attorneys and profes*678sionals who were politically active and provided leadership in that community. It is perhaps most interesting and compelling to note that Mr. Owen lost his recent bid for a State Senate seat to a Mexican-American named Santiestaban who won over three Anglo candidates and one Chicano.
Throughout this ease, the application of the Whitcomb test to determine the constitutional issues has been a difficult task indeed. To find “access (or lack thereof) to the political process” where there has been no actual political victory at the polls is much akin to divining how many angels can stand on the head of a pin. In El Paso County, however, the task is not so intricate nor the proof so elusive. Without question, political participation by minorities at all levels of government is both active and effective.
As concerns the attempted analogy between El Paso and Bexar Counties by plaintiffs, it should first be noted that there is an apparent and significant population disparity. Bexar County is approximately 830,000, whereas the El Paso multimember district contains only about 290,000. The Supreme Court in Whitcomb, supra, specifically stated that multimember districts may be subject to challenge where circumstances show minimizing or cancelling out of voting strength and that such districts are especially justiciable “. . . when the district is large and elects a substantial portion of the seats in either house of a’ bicameral legislature . . .” (Emphasis added) Surely, it can be conceded that El Paso County alone (pop. 347,000) does not even have sufficient population to warrant a Senate seat, but must share a Senator with several surrounding counties. Furthermore, the multimember district at issue does not encompass the entire County and is only large enough to require four State Representatives. Obviously, this is not the populous kind of district nor the legislatively powerful delegation contemplated by the Supreme Court as suspect under Whitcomb, supra.
The testimony by the expert witness and others as regards the disadvantaged South Side of El Paso is hardly the fact filled type of evidence originally presented to this Court on Bexar County which was replete with Civil Rights studies and reports on specific income tabulations, living conditions, educational achievements ad infinitum to provide a complete picture of the Barrio area. Simply to say that there is a concentration of Chícanos in one area of the City combined with the unsubstantiated and subjective statements that they are disadvantaged should not be the sort of compelling proof for this Court to draw the parallel to the San Antonio Barrio. Arguendo, even if all these generalizations are taken as true, the absolute statistics indicate political access to the governing process as shown below in the following paragraph.
In 1960, El Paso elected its first Mexiean-American Mayor, Raymond Telles. Four years ago, there were three Mexican-Americans elected from El Paso to the State Legislature: At present, Senator Santiestaban represents El Paso in the Texas Senate after a hotly contested election between three Anglos and one other Mexican-American candidate. Parenthetically, the Anglo candidates did not even carry the Anglo community. Two County Commissioners currently in office are Mexican-American and have so held their posts since 1962. There are also two Mexican-Americans presently on the El Paso City Council who won office in City-wide elections. As if this were not proof enough, it should be noted that El Paso Mexican-Americans now occupy the following elective offices in the designated numbers: Two District Court Judges, three Justices of the Peace, Three Constables, one Domestic Relations Court Judge, one County Court at Law Judge and one Corporation Court Judge.
It is inconceivable how the majority of this Court can successfully ignore or circumnavigate the cold, hard, undisputed statistical evidence so overwhelming in El Paso County to arrive at the conclu*679sion requiring single member districts. Whatever racial discrimination may have been prevalent in the past, the great weight of statistics alone would show it persists only as an inaudible whisper at the cocktail parties of a few politically frustrated bigots which is no evidence of probative force to establish that the multimember district is unconstitutional. There is simply no compelling or other solid evidence in El Paso that past discrimination has a “continuing effect ... on the minority group’s ability to participate in the political process”. Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191 (Fifth Cir., 1973, No. 71-2221)
Furthermore, even the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Cotrell, testified that El Paso did not pursue a “slate-making” type of politics on the State level as in Dallas and Bexar Counties. There was no evidence whatever of any existing politically domineering endorsement group which strives to eliminate or discourage minority candidates or prevent them from participating in the candidate selection process.
There is also absolutely no evidence in the record tending to show that the elected officials of El Paso are unresponsive to the particular concerns of the minority group. Indeed the opposite appears to be the case. What with a plethora of Chicano elected officials at every governmental level, a claim of “tokenism” evinces the grossest naiveté.
I must concur with the opinions expressed by the witnesses, Morales and Owen, that a redistricting of El Paso County may only serve to frustrate what is a politically viable majority — the Mexican-Ameriean vote. Certainly the single member district concept is a two edged sword and one which could sever, segregate and polarize a numerical majority into a district that would provide less representation than now possible in a county-wide election. Where there is no evidence of present racial discrimination or the lingering effects of past discrimination plus abundant proof of effective access to the political process, it must be inevitably concluded that an ethnic group representing 58% of the population is and has exhibited the ability to be the political catalyst of El Paso, Texas.
Other than the broadest of hearsay generalities and subjective opinion heard by this Court in favor of single member districts in El Paso, there is simply no factual evidence of a constitutional violation or dilution of the minority voting strength which would necessitate Federal Court intervention and reapportionment and I stand in respectful, but firm, opposition to the majority opinion of this Court on the matter of El Paso County.
DISTRICT 48: NUECES COUNTY
The next stop on our expedition is District 48 encompassing the major portion of Nueces County. This multimember district has an approximate population of 220,000 electing a three man legislative delegation. It is currently served by Representatives DeWitt Hale (Anglo), Carlos Truan (Mexican-American) and Joe Salem (Lebanese — a member of the “other” group in demographic terminology).
Dr. Cotrell’s taxi tour of Texas allowed him three days in the fair coastal city of Corpus Christi and Nueces County.
One thing' should be clarified at the outset. Plaintiffs’ witness, Dr. Chas. Cotrell, and their witness, Representative Carlos Truan of Nueces County, as well as others, are philosophically opposed to multimember districts as a method of representation. As has been said in White v. Register et al., supra, however, multimember districts, even when used in conjunction and combination with single member districts in a legislative apportionment plan are not unconstitutional per se.
Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Cotrell, makes the clear and contradictory assertion that on the one hand the fact that no Black has been elected to the Legislature from Galveston County is of little or no *680significance because the Blacks in Galveston County have been adequately represented by the legislators who have been elected; on the other hand, Dr. Cotrell asserts that the fact that few Mexican-Americans have been elected from a County such as Nueces is and should be an important consideration tending to support his conclusion that the existing multimember district has and does operate to deny this minority effective access to the political process. This conclusion is made in the face of the clear and undisputed fact that for eight of the last ten years one-third of the legislative delegation from Nueces County has been, as it is now, composed of a Mexican-American Representative who is serving his third consecutive term. (Plaintiffs’ witness, Representative Carlos Truan; Hale — Anglo; and Salem- — Lebanese)
The testimony of plaintiffs’ witnesses and of defendants’ witness, Representative DeWitt Hale, is unanimous in expressing the observation that while there may have been some discrimination in Nueces County in the past any current racial polarization that may exist is in large part'due to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, 324 F.Supp. 599 (S.D., Tex.1970), affirmed in part, modified in part and remanded, 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir., 1972). Plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Cotrell, personally considers an antagonistic feeling towards forced busing to be a racially identifiable attitude evincing a generally discriminatory feeling in the Anglo community toward minority groups. This blanket indictment overlooks extensive recent nationwide polls indicating that forced busing as a means of achieving a racially balanced school system is generally unpopular with all segments of our society — no one seems to like or want it. (See also Transcript at page 731)
Much is made of opinions by plaintiffs’ witnesses that there remain residual effects from past discrimination; that minority voters are yet unused to being able to vote because of a hangover from the poll tax (abolished in Texas in 1966); and that minorities, because of the cumulative effects of - an historical pattern of discrimination, feel ineffective and frustrated and are, therefore, denied effective access to the political process. In outlining his opinion on this point, plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Cotrell, reasoned that had minorities in the past been successful in their efforts to elect or seriously influence the election of public office holders and had, for some reason, been unsuccessful in the last ten years, then such situation would obviously signal a rise in the effects of discrimination. In Dr. Cotrell’s opinion, such evidence would clearly show the need for change to single member districts.
The situation in Nueces County is quite the converse, however. The undisputed evidence clearly outlines the marked success and political potency of the Mexican-American in Nueces County in the last ten years. As previously noted, one-third of the multimember legislative delegation has been Mexican-American for eight of the last ten years. Further, at the present time three of a six member City Council, elected at large in the major city, Corpus Christi, are Mexican-American; one is a Black and two are Anglo with an Anglo May- or. Other at-large elections have produced the following current situation: District Clerk, Oscar Solis, defeated an incumbent Anglo (Transcript, page 730); County Court at Law Judges Margarito Garza (who defeated an Anglo for the post; Transcript, page 544 —testimony of Representative Carlos Truan), and Hector Pena (the only two such positions in the County); County Commissioner Solmon Ortiz (one of four single member districts in the County); Justices of the Peace Armando Flores, Manuel Cantu and Jose Lopes; and one Mexican-American Constable (testimony of State Representative Carlos Truan, Transcript, page 544).
In spite of these overwhelming facts, Dr. Cotrell expresses the opinion that such recent conditions of the last ten years should count for naught. Rather, *681the “historical discrimination” preceding this period of obvious political potency should be the controlling consideration in reaching his conclusion that the Mexican-American minority in Nueces County is denied effective access to the political process.
In addition to the clear evidence of political effectiveness currently displayed by the minority population of Nueces County, the evidence is also clear that the particularized needs of these groups have been not only adequately but admirably advanced in the Legislature for some twenty years by Representative Hale and, as indicated, he has more recently been joined in his efforts in the last ten years by Representatives Bonilla (1964) and Truan (1968 to date). (See the testimony of Representative Hale, Transcript, pages 725, et seq., and Representative Truan, Transcript, page 519, et seq.) Indeed, Representative Hale has been such a paragon of the pioneering progressive in advancing legislation vital to the particularized needs of his longtime Mexican-American constituency that the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) made him an honorary member for his efforts. Today, Representative Hale carries the Mexican-American areas by larger margins than the Anglo areas.
Dr. Cotrell’s opinion that Representative Truan, having won by a lesser margin of victory in 1972 than in 1970 or 1968, no doubt suffering from the slings and arrows of outrageous racial polarization and discrimination, lacks probative weight. (Transcript, pages 668, et seq.) This Court feels secure in taking judicial knowledge of the heavy influence of the Roman Catholic Church in the Corpus Christi area. An important factor left out of Dr. Cotrell’s unsupported conclusions is that Representative Truan had a rather serious “falling out with the Bishop of Corpus Christi” in 1972. He was, in fact, publicly criticized rather severely by the Bishop.5 (Transcript, page 736) Further, due to legislative redistricting in 1972, all members of this multimember district lost the northern and western part of Nueces County and all of Kleberg County. Representative Truan, while living in and representing Nueces County, grew up in Kleberg County and understandably had carried it almost unanimously (Mexican-American, Anglo and Black voters) in previous elections. (Transcript, page 735) Further, Dr. Cotrell’s opinion, following his three day tour, that the clear early signs of the heartbreak of polarity exists in Nueces County is diametrically opposed by Representative Hale whose occupation over the last twenty years has been running for political office in Nueces County (Transcript, pages 729-730)
The issue of slate-making tactics, as a method of discriminatory control (as in the Dallas case) by the majority (the Anglo community) is clearly not a part of the case in Nueces County. The only evidence of any slate-making attempt at any level is the testimony of Dr. Cotrell that there were two slates for City Council in Corpus Christi in the 1971 election. Given the current composition of the Council (as previously noted) it can be assumed that the role of slate-making has been minor, if not non-existent, as regards any attempt at discriminatory control by the Anglo community. In the opinion of defendants’ witness, Travis Peeler (deposition), Nueces County Democratic Executive Committee Chairman, there is no slating in Nueces County. As regards the State Legislative level, he is joined in this opinion by plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Cotrell:
“. . . I don’t think we could describe Nueces and El Paso as a so-called slate-making state legislative level.” (Transcript, page 645)
In conclusion, the only thing plaintiffs have succeeded in showing by a preponderance of the evidence is that if racial polarization does exist and if such polarization to any degree denies effective access to the political process by the Mexican-American (and Black) minority (such contention being contrary to the *682overwhelming weight and preponderance of the factual evidence), such racial polarization, rather than being the product of a long history and current condition of racial discrimination, is the immediate, recent and direct result of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in the Cisneros school opinion, supra. (See depositions and transcript testimony of Travis Peeler, Apolonco Montemayor, Representative Carlos Truan and Representative DeWitt Hale.)
DISTRICTS 17 AND 19: GALVESTON COUNTY
The challenge to Galveston County is limited to an attack on the recent redistricting which took Census Tract 1219 from District 19 and placed it into District 17. Plaintiffs allege the change was made because of Tract 1219’s heavy concentration of Blacks in an affirmative effort to dilute and minimize their voting strength in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 399, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960). It is conceded by plaintiffs’ counsel, Mr. Richards, and by plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Charles Cotrell, that there is no evidence that multimember districts as used in Galveston operate to deny minorities effective access to the political process. (Trial Transcript, pp. 626 and 666) What this Court is concerned with in Galveston County then is a claim of racially motivated gerrymandering.
The paramount inquiry in this regard is the motivation of the Legislative Redistricting Board in taking Tract 1219 from District 19 and placing it into District 17.
As the majority opinion points out, the 1970 census revealed that the previous two-member multimember district contained approximately 20,000 population in excess of the ideal two-member district. Faced with this fact, the Board had no alternative but to correct the imbalance through a redistricting. The plan adopted placed Census Tract 1219 into District 17. It is this action which plaintiffs claim to have been racially motivated.
The evidence presented on this point is indeed concise. It consists of the uncorroborated opinion of Representative Ed Harris of District 19 (Trial Transcript, page 240). In his opinion, the intent of the Board was to influence the outcome of the legislative races in District 19 encompassing the major portion of Galveston County. The plan adopted by the Board, while excising Tract 1219’s approximately 5,500 Blacks (total population in Tract 1219 is 8,575 by 1970 Census), leaves untouched the remaining 28,000 Black population of Galveston County. Further, a cursory glance at the 1970 Census Tract map-for Districts 17 and 19 reveals the monumental task faced by the Board in their efforts to conform to the “one man, one vote” mandates of the Constitution. The area includes mainland, peninsula and island land masses in the meandering fashion of nature.
The bare opinion of Representative Harris in light of the extreme geographical obstacles of nature faced by the Board in its efforts belies the efficacy of a rush to judgment. Much more must be shown by plaintiffs to support their challenge to the good faith efforts, of the Legislative Redistricting Board. The dearth of evidence presented does not overcome the presumption of the constitutionality of the Board’s action and compel change.
CONCLUSION
“From the beginning, we have recognized- that ‘reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination, and that judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.’ (citing cases) We have adhered to the view that state legislators have ‘primary jurisdiction’ over legislative reapportionment.” White v. Weiser (1973), 412 U.S. 783, at pages 794, 795, 93 S.Ct. 2348, at page 2354, 37 L.Ed.2d 335.
*683This language is a virtual summation of the attitude of the Supreme Court in most all of the reapportionment suits ever to come before that esteemed body. It stands as a warning and directive at the threshold of the political jungle admonishing lower Courts to be wary and surefooted before attempting intrusion into the sovereign state forest of political activity.
Having thoroughly examined the evidence presented for each County, it is inconceivable that Federal judicial intervention is required in those Counties at issue. There is absolutely no preponderating evidence in this record to establish that in any of the nine Counties involved that a single member district would afford Blacks, Browns and Republicans, the parties to this case, greater access to the political process than the present multimember districts.
The only evidence in this case of any real probative force is that in certain multimember districts (1) Blacks, Browns and Republicans have not been elected in some of the districts; or (2) members of these groups have not been elected in other districts in direct proportion to their population. These are improper considerations under Whit-comb and overlook the undisputed evidence that in certain cities and counties of multimember districts these groups have in the past and still do elect at large officeholders. Certainly there is no evidence in any of these that there has been a diminution or cancellation of the rights of these groups to participate in the political process.
As Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at pages 156, 157, 91 S.Ct. at page 1876 has warned us, if judicial remedy were provided for political failure such as this, it would be difficult to reject claims of any political organization or identifiable interest groups and “would spawn endless litigation concerning the multi-member district systems now widely employed in this country.”
The Supreme Court in this very case and in Whitcomb v. Chavis held that, absent “purposeful” racial discrimination, minority groups have no right to be assured or guaranteed that they can or will elect any officials. Further, such evidence is of no value to establish the contention of plaintiffs that the division of these nine multimember districts into single member districts would be the panacea for all of the complaints or would even tend to improve the alleged discrimination. This is true even assuming that the State of Texas had an improper design and motive to minimize, cancel out and dilute the rights of these minority groups in political affairs which the evidence in this case utterly fails to support.
The Supreme Court in White, supra, acknowledged that this Court had “its own special vantage point” and had made an “intensely local appraisal” of the political situation in Bexar and Dallas Counties. Those same plaudits cannot be cast in the case at Bar. Plaintiffs’ argument and proof was based primarily on a subjective appraisal and a most cursory study of the Counties involved with the apparent motive of having this Court, rather than the legislature, gerrymander in reverse to specifically promote and elect politically acceptable representatives. The ultimate conclusions reached by the members of the majority of this Panel, to my mind, ignore or misinterpret the guidelines spelled out in the several treatises handed down by the Supreme Court in previous reapportionment litigation, and discard much of the factual evidence in favor of “expert opinion” in their valiant efforts to crush the cause and effect of an allegedly infirm and discriminatory political process. It cannot be denied that the legislative reapportionment type of civil rights case is an emotionally charged suit in which competing political philosophies and methods often clash unrestrained and electrify charges of racial or other ethnic discrimination. This is an area into which the Federal Judiciary must, indeed, proceed with extreme caution. For, while emotion may preponderate clearly in favor of a plaintiff’s challenge, the importance of a factual showing to support that challenge by a preponderance of the evidence can*684not and must not be sidestepped or overlooked.
The remedy of imposing Court drawn single member districts is the most radical that equity could require and is one which should be imposed only after setting aside on supportable grounds other alternatives found inadequate. Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, 403 U.S. at page 160, 91 S.Ct. 1858.
The majority, however, having found unconstitutional the challenged multimember legislative districts and having found an unconstitutional gerrymandering in Galveston County, takes up its compass and marches myoptically and irrevocably towards the remedy of Court imposed single member districts by passing without thought such recommended alternatives as are mentioned by the Supreme Court in Whitcomb. Indeed, the only evidence before this Court on the question is that much less radical and disruptive corrective surgery would be a more than adequate cure.
There is uncontroverted testimony that adoption of an all single member plan would in many districts operate only to submerge the political effectiveness now enjoyed by minorities. The evidence further shows that in certain of the districts plans submitted to this Court by some plaintiffs are attacked as being unconstitutional by other plaintiffs. Such disagreement illustrates the lack of proof presented that any one single member district plan offers a better remedy than another or than any of the other alternative remedies available for this Court’s consideration.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished that District Courts “ . . . should not pre-empt the legislative task nor ‘intrude upon state policy more than necessary. . . ’ ” White v. Weiser, supra, 412 U.S. at page 795, 93 S.Ct. at page 2355. Further, as I have noted above in this dissent, it is only when the legislature fails to act to remedy a constitutionally impermissible condition that judicial relief becomes appropriate. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). See also White v. Weiser, supra, 412 U.S. at pages 794-795, 93 S.Ct. 2348.
The initial attack on the herein challenged multimember districts was discarded by the Supreme Court as inadequate. See White v. Register, supra. The Texas State Legislature was, therefore, not under any judicial pressure to strike down these remaining districts in favor of an all single-member district legislative plan.6 In fact, an attorney for plaintiffs admitted that the smaller, less populous multimember districts (now challenged in the case at Bar) did not present the same degree of constitutional infirmity nor applicability under the Whitcomb tests as Dallas and Bexar Counties in these words:
“Yes, we do have some multimember districts with two or three representatives. Perhaps we may not have yet reached the point population-wise in those particular districts to think about giving them single member districts. I certainly don’t want to advocate that at this point, but I think I recognize what the Court has in mind when he raises this question, but, certainly, regardless of what we may conclude as to these two or three multimember district counties, I believe that the same thing does not apply to one that has 11 representatives, as Bexar County, and another one that has 18, as Dallas County.”
I, therefore, reiterate the thoughts expressed in my original dissent that this Court should exercise as much judicial restraint as possible in declaring the challenged districts unconstitutional. However, where, as here, the majority of this Court has deemed it necessary, the Legislature should have every opportunity to correct its alleged mistakes. I firmly believe that such is the approach mandated by the Supreme Court.
Such approach carries special emphasis where, as in this case, the various *685competing plans proposed by the plaintiffs represent a clear and open attempt to obviate the Supreme Court’s requirement that the District Court be “color blind” in fashioning a remedy. Indeed, (based upon various political and color conscious considerations) plaintiffs have found some difficulty in agreeing on satisfactory plans. There is, on the other hand, ample evidence that, but for procedural failings, some of the delegations from the now challenged districts could have succeeded in having the previous legislative session adopt single member plans for their districts. In the light of such activity, it must be conceded that given a mandate by the judiciary to do so, the Legislature would accept the task and fashion the constitutional remedy required.7 There is no basis in reason or in the evidence presented to reach a contrary conclusion.
Pursuant to this Court’s request, the State of Texas submitted plans for its consideration. The plan for Tarrant County was recommended and approved by its present legislative delegation— seven supporting the plan, one against it and one undecided. The delegations from the following Counties were unanimous in their support of the State offered plans: Jefferson, Lubbock and McLennan. The three member delegation from Nueces County split two for and one against and the State submitted for the Court’s consideration the plan approved by the majority. The State also submitted a plan proposed by the Mexican-Ameriean plaintiffs and approved by the dissenting Representative Carlos Truan.
The approval of these plans by the representatives from each district is a clear expression of legislative intent. Assuming even that the Supreme Court affirms the holding of the majority that these multimember districts are unconstitutional, legislative courtesy would require the adoption of these single member district plans and is thus the equiva- ■ lent of legislative intent.
The majority of this Court arbitrarily and without stating their reasons totally ignored all of these plans even though they were also approved and endorsed by the party defendant, Honorable Dolph Briscoe, the democratically elected Governor of the State of Texas. In this connection, it should be noted that in comparison to the plans submitted by the legislative delegations those submitted by the plaintiffs and adopted by this Court constitute an unabashed gerrymandering in reverse to insure the election of the plaintiff ethnic groups to the exclusion of all others.
The majority disregards .White v. Weiser, supra, Whitcomb, supra, and all the other Supreme Court cases which compel deference to the State performance of this purely “legislative” function, and orders immediate imposition of specific single member plans in seven of the challenged districts. Yet, for reasons either totally illogical or unexplained, the State is permitted by this Court to have its normal, constitutionally reserved prerogative of legislatively redistricting Galveston County. Again, the reasons for this obvious discrimination against the other seven districts is not susceptible to satisfactory illumination or support. It clearly follows that if there is no urgency for the Court to redistrict Galveston County, there likewise is no urgency for the Court to assume this purely unauthorized legislative function for the other Counties.
There must surely be a level of “preference” which falls short of “prejudice” that will forever affect the relative chances of candidates, whether they be Black, Brown, Oriental, Arabic, Democratic, Republican, La Raza Unida, John Birch Society, male, female, Catholic, Protestant, Jew, young, old, handsome, homely or other. It seems unlikely that our society and the laws of human na*686ture will ever reach a point of total blindness to differences in color, ethnic background, affluence, poverty, political and religious affiliation, sex, age, or a variety of other human and emotional considerations. Those persons who fall into a particular category of this type and who comprise less than 50% of the electorate of a given district can never be assured of the absolute ability to elect one of their own to represent them in legislative halls or in any other multimember governmental body. This is not a fact that can be changed by a judicial decree eliminating multimember districts or by substituting single member districts with lines arbitrarily drawn by uninitiated life tenured Federal Judges. The Courts and Legislature simply cannot change or repeal the inherent laws of human nature. Rather, as the Supreme Court has reasoned, our only task and ultimate goal is to provide all the body politic with effective access to the political process. I submit that in Texas, as the districts now exist, voters have attained the goal and it is time for the surrogate Federal Court to step aside and let Democracy run its course.
. Proximate population and legislative seats for the remaining Counties at issue are as follows:
Population Representatives
Dist. 72 (El Paso) 297.000 4
Dist. 37 (Travis) 290.000 4
Dist. 48 (Nueces) 234.000 3
Dist. 7 (Jefferson) 221.000 3
Dist. 19 (Galveston) 150.000 2
Dist. 59 (Hidalgo) 150.000 2
Dist. 75 (Lubbock) 149.000 2
Dist. 35 (McLennan) 147.000 2
8. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (Fifth Cir., 1973); Turner v. McKeithen, 490 F.2d 191 (Fifth Cir., 1973).
. This fact coalesces with the indications of nationwide poll data on the question of busing v. the neighborhood school previously referred to in this dissent.
. In District 72 (El Paso) the four successful Candidates spent amounts ranging from $17,000 to $3,000, indicating that Campaign costs vary so much even within a given multimember district as to be an unreliable barometer of constitutionality.
. The exact phraseology was: “The Bishop was jumping all over Mr. Traun down there
. Since the State has not in any manner acted in bad faith or been under any mandate to reapportion its legislative districts, I cannot conceive nor condone a granting of attorney’s fees to plaintiffs regardless of the final outcome of this case.
. The Texas Constitutional Convention is currently in session considering a complete revision of the State’s voluminous constitution. One of the items specifically before it is a recommendation by the Constitutional Revision Commission that the State, in its revised constitution, adopt statewide an all single-member legislative plan-.