A jury found defendant guilty of violating CL 1948, § 750.479 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.747) — resisting an officer in the discharge of his duty. Defendant’s appeal makes 6 assertions of error, all bottomed on his contention that a motor carrier inspector employed by the Michigan public service commission is not a peace officer who has authority to demand production of a log hook by a private carrier and, under such driver’s refusal to produce it, to arrest him.
In People v. Bissonette (1950), 327 Mich 349, the Supreme Court held that a conservation officer is not a peace officer because: “Nothing in the act or in its title indicates that it is intended to invest conservation officers with the general powers or impose on them the general duties of peace officers.” (p 354.) Quite to the contrary, the statute having to do with the powers and duties of motor carrier inspectors expressly provides:
“The inspectors so appointed by the commission shall have all the powers conferred upon peace officers by the general laws of this state.” CL 1948, § 479.13 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 22.578).
We conclude that a motor carrier inspector having been given the powers of a peace officer is a peace officer with the duty of enforcing commission rules.
Defendant contends that even if Inspector Ritter, complainant herein, is a peace officer, he was not authorized to stop and arrest defendant without a warrant. However, the inspector did not stop defendant for the purpose of making an arrest, but rather to inspect his log book, which was specifically authorized by statute. CL 1948, § 480.2 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 9.1665[2] ).1 The arrest was made after *216defendant refused to display Ms log book, which he was required to do by law.
Defendant next contends that his conviction must be set aside because the public service commission is not authorized to fix hours of service for truck drivers of carriers not certificated by it. This proposition is without merit simply because defendant was not convicted of violating any regulations as to hours of service, but rather was convicted of resisting an officer who was attempting to perform a duty imposed and authorized by statute.
There is no merit to defendant’s assertion that his conviction was the result of the use at the trial of illegally seized evidence.
Officer Eitter testified that after defendant refused to display his log book, he showed defendant his identification and told him he was under arrest and would have to accompany Eitter to the nearest justice of the peace. Thereupon defendant put his truck in gear and drove away. Eitter got into his cruiser, overtook defendant with siren sounding and waved him to pull over, but defendant failed to obey. Inspector Eitter’s exact words describe defendant’s action upon which the complaint rests: “I waited until he, he had not slowed down, I waited until he came to a position sufficiently close to me that in my estimation either I move or got hit, I didn’t think he was able to stop. * * * I moved.”
On such testimony the jury could convict defendant of resisting an officer, under the statute.
Defendant’s contention that his motion for a directed verdict was erroneously denied because the people did not prove that the exceptions to the statute2 requiring him to display his log book were not applicable is without merit. The Supreme Court was *217faced with a similar question in People v. Baker (1952), 332 Mich 320, 323, where it held:
“We concur with the people’s claim and hold that it was not necessary to allege or prove the negative allegations.”
Having already determined that Officer Bitter was a peace officer, we can easily dispose of defendant’s final argument, i.e., that Bitter could not arrest defendánt without a warrant. Failure to display a log book upon request is a misdemeanor. CL 1948, §480.4 (Stat Ann 1960 Bev § 9.1665[4] ).3 A peace officer may arrest without a warrant any person who commits a misdemeanor in his presence. CL 1948, § 764.15 (Stat Ann 1954 Eev § 28.874).
Affirmed.
Levin, J., concurred with T. Gr. Kavanagh, J.For the current statutory provision see PA 1963, No 181, § 5, as amended (MOLA § 480.15, Stat Ann 1968 Cum Sujrp § 9.1666[5]),
See OP 1948, §480.3 (Stat Am I960 Bev § 9.1665[3]).
For eurrent provision, see PA 1963, No 181 § 7 (MCLA § 480.17, Stat Ann 1968 Cum Supp § 9.1666[7]).