(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur on Issues I and II. As against Henry Hagemeyer, I dissent on Issue III, defamation, and on intentional infliction of emotional distress, which was not discussed in the majority opinion.
As indicated in the majority opinion, Councilman Hagemeyer called Finck names and insulted him by using words or charac*638terizing him as a “dumb son of a bitch” and “incompetent.” Some of these statements were made at city council meetings and all were made in the presence of third persons and tended to injure Finck in respect to his office or profession as a police officer.
SDCL 20-11-4 states in pertinent part: Slander is a false and unprivileged publication, other than libel, which:
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(3) Tends directly to injure [a person] in respect to his office, profession, trade, or business, either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profit[.]
“The law has always been very tender of the reputation of tradesmen, and therefore words spoken of them in the way of their trade will bear an action that will not be actionable in the case of another person.” Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 112 at 790-91 (5th ed.1984) (quoting Harman v. Delany, 2 Strange 898, 93 Eng.Rptr. 925 (1731)). See also Groseth International, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 276, 281 (S.D.1989) (Sabers, J., dissenting).
The correct procedure for determining the meaning and defamatory character of a communication is set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 614 (1977) which provides:
(1) The court determines
(a) whether communication is capable of bearing a particular meaning, and
(b) whether that meaning is defamatory.
(2) The jury determines whether a communication, capable of a defamatory meaning, was so understood by its recipient.
Groseth, supra at 279, 283.* Likewise, in Bego v. Gordon, 407 N.W.2d 801, 812 (S.D.1987), we held concerning defamation: “Whether a tort was committed is a question of fact for the jury.” Although the words “son of a bitch” alone may come within the majority’s conclusion of non-actionable opinion rather than fact, when determining whether a statement constitutes opinion or fact the court must “examine the statement in its totality in the context in which it was uttered or published.” Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir.1980); see also Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir.1983). In the context that these words were spoken (at city council meetings and at a cafe in the presence of third persons), the words “dumb son of a bitch” and “incompetent” ridicule Finck in his business or profession because the public may think there is nothing worse than a “dumb cop.” This statement is actionable and not privileged and malice is presumed. See SDCL 20-11-4; Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community Sch. Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1984); Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252 (Minn.1980). Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court in granting summary judgment on this matter. Groseth International, Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 172 (S.D.1987); Bego, supra. Contrary to the majority, I see nothing to be gained by permitting an individual in a situation like this to injure a person in his business or office such as this with impunity. I believe that it is a proper question for the jury to determine the extent of damages sustained, if any. See Blessum v. Howard Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 295 N.W.2d 836 (Iowa 1980) (court held that whether county supervisor’s disparagement of county engineer constituted slander was proper jury question).
Likewise, whether Hagemeyer's conduct constitutes intentional infliction of emotional distress is a proper question for the jury. Pickering v. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758 (S.D.1989); French v. Dell Rapids Community Hospital, Inc., 432 N.W.2d 285 (S.D.1988); Wangen v. Knudson, 428 N.W.2d 242 (S.D.1988); Wright v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 414 N.W.2d 608 (S.D.1987). In French, supra at 289, this court concluded that it was proper for the jury to determine whether an employer’s treat*639ment and discharge of an employee was sufficiently egregious to result in liability. Finck should be granted the same opportunity to take his case to a jury.
Quotation appears in both majority and dissenting opinion.