specially concurring:
I agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in altering the visitation provisions of the protective order. The trial court found Catherine in contempt, stating that she sabotaged the court’s order of protection. Nevertheless, the trial court dismissed the rule to show cause upon modification of the order of protection to facilitate visitation by Thurman.
The measure of the power of the court in a civil contempt proceeding is determined by the requirements of full remedial relief. See Sauber, 199 F.2d at 523. Moreover, a party who refuses to obey the mandate of the court demonstrates her contempt for the courts and is not entitled to their affirmative assistance. See Wick v. Wick, 19 Ill. 2d 457, 459, 167 N.E.2d 207, 209 (1960).
As a result, not only did the trial court have jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, it had the power to modify the original order as a means to provide full remedial relief. The record suggests that it was Catherine’s disobedience to the original order that caused Thurman to initiate the contempt proceeding. Catherine ought not be heard to complain about the procedures employed to enforce the order of protection, particularly since she does not argue that the modification is not supported by the evidence.
No abuse of discretion was demonstrated.
A final note. Hopefully, at some stage, Catherine and Thurman will cast aside their selfish personal interests for the best interests of the child.