I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority in its conclusion the trial court breached the attorney-client privilege by asking a defendant whether he had previously told his lawyer the same version of the facts he was testifying to on the stand. However, I see this error as fundamental and egregious. I find this error constituted a denial of the right to counsel and thus is reversible per se, or if not reversible per se is reversible under the Chapman standard.
The majority opinion repeats most, but not all of the colloquy between the trial judge, the defendant, and the defense attorney. To capture the full flavor of the exchange, I will repeat the entire dialogue.
As will be recalled, it occurred during the presentation of the defendant’s case shortly after appellant for the first time revealed that Deborah Clarke falsely accused him of robbery because he had previously sold her two ounces of bad cocaine. While Mr. Tamborrino was on the stand, the following exchange took place in front of the jury: “The Court: Did you tell your lawyer about the story you just related on the stand?
“[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, excuse me. I must object to the court’s question. That violates the attorney-client privilege.
“The Court: Did you tell your lawyer what you have testified to on the stand today?
“[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, may the record reflect my objection?
“The Court: Yes, it will so reflect.
“[Defense Counsel]: Thank you, your Honor.
*592“The Court: Did you tell your lawyer about this story that you told on the stand?
“The Witness [Appellant]: No. I just told him what it REFERRED TO. [fl] I DIDN’T TELL ALL, EXACTLY.
“The Court: When did you first tell him that?
“The Witness [Appellant]: From the very beginning.
“The Court: Well, so he knew about it at the time that Miss Clarke was on the stand; is that correct?
“[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, again my objection is that that violates the attorney-client privilege, sir.
“The Court: I know. We have heard that before. []]] Let’s get on with the case, fl[] He knew about it before he was cross-examining Miss Clarke, didn’t he?
“[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, may we be heard at the side bar, please?
“The Court: No.
“[Prosecutor]: May we approach, your Honor?
“The Court: Yes. [fl] I will withdraw the last question.”
Defense counsel subsequently moved for a mistrial which the trial court denied on grounds his questions did not violate the attorney-client privilege. This motion was renewed on several occasions later in the proceedings and was denied each time as the trial judge continued to insist he had not committed error.
The threshold question is whether a trial judge who questions a defendant on the stand regarding the disclosure of the defendant’s testimony to his attorney is violating the defendant’s privilege to maintain the confidentiality of communication with his attorney. Although the majority concedes the trial court indeed violated appellant’s privilege in this case, they understate the significance of this violation.
*593In criminal cases, the attorney-client privilege implements the Sixth Amendment guarantee of right to assistance of counsel.1 It affords a defendant adequate and competent legal representation resulting from full disclosure of the facts by the client to his attorney.2 Evidence Code section 917 presumes any communication between attorney and client to be confidential.3 At the same time, section 954 of the Evidence Code grants the client the “privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer . . . Moreover, this privilege may be claimed by either the client or the lawyer.4
In this case, there is no question the communication between appellant and his lawyer clearly fell within the confidentiality presumption in Evidence Code section 917. The respondent sought to distinguish between the relationship, which it concedes is protected, and the content of the communication between attorney and client, which respondent claims is not. The court in Barber v. Municipal Court, supra, 24 Cal. 3d 742, further elaborated the rationale behind the confidentiality presumption of the privilege. The court recognized counsel’s duty to fully investigate the facts of the case. Additionally, “[a] primary source of such information is the accused himself. Often, whether guilty or innocent of the offense charged, the accused knows facts pertinent to his defense which may tend to incriminate or embarrass him. . . . [fl] It is for this reason that the courts have recognized *594that the right to counsel guaranteed by the California Constitution embodies the right to communicate in absolute privacy with one’s attorney.”5
Thus, defense counsel rightfully objected to the court’s intrusion into the privilege. The instant case illustrates one of the vices of allowing this sort of infringement on attorney-client confidentiality. From appellant’s response to the court’s questioning it appears appellant may have confided in his attorney that he had sold a controlled substance, a criminal activity. Were it not for the absolute guarantee of confidentiality, appellant may have refrained from disclosing this vital information to his counsel. It was the “absolute privacy with one’s attorney” which prompted him to provide counsel with facts which rebutted the victim’s testimony.
Furthermore, contrary to the lower court’s holding, the defendant did not waive the privilege when he took the stand in his own defense and testified about the narcotics transaction with Ms. Clarke. According to Evidence Code section 912 a waiver of the attorney-client privilege occurs if the holder of the privilege “has disclosed a significant part of the communication” to third parties.6 “However, a client does not waive the privilege by testifying about facts which might have been discussed in confidential conversations with his or her lawyer, as such testimony is not equivalent to disclosure of the actual content of those attorney-client conversations.” *595(Maas v. Superior Court (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 601, 606 [221 Cal.Rptr. 245], citing Littlefield v. Superior Court (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 477 [186 Cal.Rptr. 368].) In Littlefield v. Superior Court, the defendant asserted the need to inquire into the attorney-client discussions of the prosecution witness who had negotiated a guilty plea to the underlying murder charges. The court found no merit whatsoever in the argument “that a client’s testimony to facts that were possibly a topic of confidential conversations with his defense counsel is equivalent to the client testifying to the actual content of those attorney/client conversations.”7
Similarly, Mr. Tamborrino did not waive his privilege when he took the stand in his own defense. Concededly, he did relate a different version of the facts than the prosecution’s chief witness, Ms. Clarke. But this was his testimony as to what happened and why allegedly the victim fingered him and his vehicle. It did not purport to be an account of his conversation with his attorney about what happened. Accordingly, under Evidence Code section 912 this testimony does not represent a disclosure of the confidential communication and therefore does not constitute a waiver. Whether appellant had possibly discussed these same events with his attorney, and whether his attorney knowingly failed to cross-examine Ms. Clarke on the stand about these events are facts within the province of the privilege and are protected from disclosure at any time—and especially in court before a jury trying the client for a criminal offense. Thus, the trial judge breached a privilege which the defendant had not waived. This was error of the most obvious and fundamental nature. And it was error of constitutional dimension.
The majority and I agree this was error. I now turn to our point of disagreement—whether this clear error was reversible. The majority admit this blatant breach of the attorney-client relationship qualifies as federal constitutional error and thus the Watson standard of review does not apply. At the same time they argue the error is not reversible per se. Instead they contend the appropriate standard is the one set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065], I believe a strong argument can be made in favor of per se reversal where a trial judge drags before the jury confidential information protected by the attorney-client relationship.8 This kind of behavior does so much harm to *596the constitutional right to counsel not just in this case but in discouraging full and open communication between defendants and their attorneys in future cases that it warrants the sharpest possible sanction. Despite this concern, however, I nonetheless apply the Chapman standard in this dissent since, properly construed, this test likewise dictates reversal of the instant case.
The Chapman standard is reserved for error, such as that in the instant case, so grievous it violates the United States Constitution. Where error of this dimension is present the appellate court is required to reverse unless it can fairly find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant would have been convicted even if the error had not been committed. “[The] beneficiary of a constitutional error [must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710].) To reach this conclusion, the reviewing court must find that after eliminating the error and assuming the jury had only heard the remainder of the trial a reasonable juror could not have entertained a reasonable doubt about defendant’s guilt.
One of my problems with the majority opinion is that it appears to misapply the Chapman standard. It presents a good closing argument for the prosecution demonstrating there was sufficient evidence to convict appellant even without the inferences which might have flowed from the trial court’s invasion of the attorney-client relationship. But the Chapman standard requires more, much more. It is not enough the remaining evidence is sufficient so a reasonable juror could find the defendant guilty after stripping away the erroneous matter. The remaining case against the defendant must be so overwhelming a reviewing court can fairly say no reasonable juror could have had a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty. Bearing that question in mind, let us review once again the evidence in this case.
The prosecution’s chief witness was Deborah Clarke. Essentially all of the prosecution’s evidence—the multicolored hat, the small gun, and the color and license plate number of the getaway car—emanated from Ms. Clarke. There were no other witnesses to the alleged crime. Ms. Clarke *597reported the alleged robbery and provided the police with the description of the robbers, their clothing, their guns and their car. The majority attempts to make much of the fact these articles all matched the descriptions Ms. Clarke gave. Actually her descriptions were so vague, except for the license number, they could have fit a wide range of guns, hats, etc., which were never even near her house to say nothing of being involved in the alleged robbery. But that is not the real point. If one accepts appellant’s explanation of her motives, she easily could have observed the car appellant was driving when stopped including its license number, the gun, the hat, and the rest on an earlier occasion. So all of this evidence, not only about the identity of the robbers but that she was robbed at all, came directly and solely from Ms. Clarke.
In fact, the only evidence independent of Ms. Clarke’s testimony was the defendant’s fingerprint on Ms. Clarke’s jewelry box. A lone fingerprint, however, does not prove appellant’s guilt. All it indicates is that the defendant touched the box at some point and for some reason. Once again we only have Ms. Clarke’s testimony suggesting the box was touched by someone who was involved in the alleged robbery.
Appellant took the stand and gave an alternate explanation for the presence of his fingerprint on the box as well as for Ms. Clarke’s testimony against him. Appellant testified Ms. Clarke falsely accused him of robbery because he had sold her some bad cocaine for $1,600 at some prior time. The sale allegedly took place at Ms. Clarke’s house. Appellant testified he must have touched the jewelry box at that time.
Thus the jury was presented with a classic credibility contest between victim and defendant. Appellant’s story, if believed, accounted for and discredited all the evidence against him. On the other hand, the victim’s story, if believed, provided sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, any error in the proceeding which tended to significantly impugn appellant’s credibility would tip the balance against him and toward conviction.
The damage was done when the trial judge, improperly, and over defense counsel’s objection, questioned appellant about his conversations with his attorney. Whether and when appellant told his trial counsel he had been selling drugs and that the victim was a dissatisfied customer is absolutely privileged. Neither prosecutor nor judge may bring this privileged information before the jury. They may not do so for any purpose and especially not when the effect would be to discredit appellant’s testimony on the stand. Yet that was the clear effect, and possibly the purpose, of this line of inquiry in the instant case.
*598No matter how appellant responded it could reflect on the credibility of his version of the facts. If he replied he had not told his attorney about these events it would suggest they never happened because why would a defendant withhold such vital evidence from his lawyer if it were true. This inference would be drawn even if defendant withheld the information from his attorney because it required admitting he was a drug trafficker or for some other good reason. Conversely, if appellant replied he had told his attorney about these events earlier, it would suggest they never happened because the attorney had not referred to them at any time earlier in the trial. This inference would be drawn even if the attorney, as a tactical matter, had decided to hold this defense in reserve in hopes the prosecution’s case would falter in some other way. After all, this defense is a two-edged sword. Appellant had to confess in open court to commission of one felony—drug trafficking—in order to urge his innocence of another—robbery. However, no matter how appellant answered these questions about the whether and when of his confidential communications with his lawyer his credibility would have been impugned.
As it was, appellant responded to this unexpected, unjustifiable intrusion into the confidential relationship between himself and his lawyer by hemming and hawing, ultimately saying he had told his lawyer something about these facts but not everything. This answer might well have hurt his credibility with the jury more than either a forthright admission or denial he had revealed these facts to his lawyer on an earlier occasion.
There would be only one way to counter these obvious inferences that appellant was lying. Appellant’s lawyer would have had to take the stand and explain to the jury his trial strategy and the reasons either he or his client failed to reveal this information earlier and why he had not cross-examined Ms. Clarke about the narcotics transaction when she was on the stand. Thus, the only way to overcome the prejudice caused by any inquiry into the whether and when of a confidential attorney-client communication is to further expand the inquiry and thus further eviscerate the attorney-client privilege.
The concerns discussed thus far support the conclusion any inquiry into the whether and when of a confidential communication about matters any defendant testifies to at trial is likely to impugn that defendant’s credibility or force further invasions of the attorney-client privilege, or both. But in the instant case the damage was compounded by what the trial judge did once appellant responded to his inquiry. The judge asked a rhetorical question which underscored for the jury that appellant’s counsel “knew about it [defendant’s version] at the time that Miss Clarke was on the stand; ...” And a few moments later he underscored this inference again. “He knew *599about it before he was cross-examining Miss Clarke; . . .” From these rhetorical questions, a reasonable juror could and probably would gather the trial court doubted the defense attorney would have refrained from cross-examining Ms. Clarke about the narcotics transaction if he indeed both knew about it and actually believed his own client.
It is indisputable “the judge is a figure of over-powering influence, . . . whose every word is received attentively and acted upon with alacrity and without question” by the jury. (Travelers Insurance Company v. Ryan (5th Cir. 1969) 416 F.2d 362, 364.) Not satisfied to allow the jurors to draw their own inferences from appellant’s responses to his improper line of inquiry, this trial judge drew their attention to his own inference not once but twice. In doing so, the judge assumed the adversarial role of the prosecutor and exhibited his personal disbelief of appellant’s testimony. Furthermore, what the judge said implied the defense counsel did not believe his own client’s testimony.
(I note this was not the first time during the trial this judge took up the cudgels for the prosecution. A half dozen times earlier he took over questioning from the prosecutor and on several of those occasions concluded with rhetorical questions which actually stated inferences to be drawn from the previous answers, incidentally all of these inferences favorable to the prosecution. However, be clear I am not arguing those incidents are grounds for reversal. Rather I am suggesting this was a very active trial judge whose questions and inferences would likely have “over-powering influence” with the jurors. They were accustomed to hearing this sort of guidance from the judge and could have been expected to give great weight to what he said, even when his questions and inferences were highly improper, indeed where they violated the Constitution.)
I find it difficult to deny that both the trial judge’s improper questions and the inferences he drew for the jury during that inquiry significantly impugned the credibility of appellant’s testimony. Especially in the context of a classic one-on-one credibility contest—as this case presents—how can one find such error harmless?
This is not a case where several witnesses gave independent accounts each corroborating the other and the error only infects one of those witnesses. Nor is it a case where appellant’s guilt is established by laboratory tests and the error only reflects on witnesses whose testimony is not essential to proof of guilt. Instead here the People’s entire case against the appellant rests ultimately on the testimony of a single person. Appellant’s testimony, if believed, fully explains why this person would testify falsely against him *600and, furthermore, accounts for the prosecution’s only other evidence, the fingerprint.
The trial judge himself recognized just how close a case this was and how much it depended on the jury’s evaluation of the credibility of these two witnesses. Before the appellant had taken the stand to present his competing version of the truth, the prosecution asked whether it could introduce appellant’s two previous felony convictions to impeach his anticipated testimony. The judge granted the request principally because he felt the case against appellant was not strong and thus his credibility was a crucial factor. “Had there been evidence which clearly indicated, in other words, if he had been caught in the act of doing the robbery it would be different. But there has been no eyewitness testimony here that he actually committed this particular offense. So all of the surrounding circumstances and considering also his background with respect to criminal activity is highly relevant in determining his guilt or innocence and I will permit the people to do that.”
Recognizing, as did the trial judge, that the instant case was essentially a credibility contest, it is even more significant the judge then embarked on an improper inquiry and pointedly used the results of that inquiry to discredit the part of appellant’s testimony which contradicted the sole witness against him. The majority emphasizes this invasion of the attorney-client privilege was innocently motivated. I do not question that, especially since the judge insisted to the end he was not violating attorney-client confidentiality and only wanted to find out if the defense counsel had deliberately avoided cross-examining Ms. Clarke about the alleged narcotics transaction. (Of course, appellant’s counsel would have been well within his rights to have held back on this defense until his client could develop it fully on the stand.) But in any event, the trial judge’s motive in asking these questions and stating these inferences is irrelevant. Whatever the motive, he committed constitutional error. And whatever the motive, that constitutional error brought out evidence and raised inferences that grievously damaged appellant’s credibility—and that of his attorney—and cast serious doubt on the genuineness of his entire account.
Were I a juror and not an appellate judge, I might well have joined the majority of this court in finding Ms. Clarke’s version more credible than appellant’s even without the evidence and inferences which emerged from the trial court’s improper inquiry into appellant’s confidential communications with his trial counsel. But that is not our role. The jurors not the appellate courts are the judges of credibility. Because of what the trial court did in this case, appellant was deprived of the opportunity to have this credibility contest decided by those charged with the responsibility of decid*601ing such contests, the jurors, without the taint of improper evidence and improper inferences the judge drew for them himself.
The majority opinion itself concedes that after stripping away the judge’s error a reasonable juror could have believed the appellant sold bad cocaine to Ms. Clarke yet also believed he returned later to rob her. But in doing so, the majority actually is conceding the error is reversible under Chapman. For, if a reasonable juror could believe the appellant indeed sold bad cocaine to Ms. Clarke, he or she could also reasonably infer Ms. Clarke sought revenge against appellant by implicating him in a robbery charge. In fact to find reversible error under Chapman it is not necessary to find a reasonable juror could actually believe the defendant’s version. It is enough such a juror could entertain a reasonable doubt that version might be true.
If ever there is a type of case where error is almost never “harmless” under Chapman, or even Watson, it is the one-on-one credibility contest. For seldom can it be said that as a matter of law, the jury must find one person credible and the other incredible. And, if there ever was a one-on-one credibility contest where the error reflected directly and prejudicially on the defendant’s credibility, it is this case. Here it was not something the prosecution said or asked or did which wrongfully impugned appellant’s credibility. A juror might tend to discount attacks, proper or improper, which come from that quarter. But here the assault on appellant’s credibility came from and bore the imprimatur of that neutral, powerful figure, the trial judge. In these circumstances, to my mind there is no responsible way a reviewing court could conclude the People have proved “beyond a reasonable doubt” that had the trial judge not committed these errors, the jury still would have reached the same verdict. Accordingly, under Chapman I would reverse.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 21, 1990.
Barber v. Municipal Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 742 [157 Cal.Rptr. 658, 598 P.2d 818].
In McMann v. Richardson (1970) 397 U.S. 759, 771, footnote 14 [25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773, 90 S.Ct. 1441], the Supreme Court has held, “It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”
“Whenever a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the course of the lawyer-client. . . relationship, the communication is presumed to have been made in confidence and the opponent of the claim of privilege has the burden of proof to establish that the communication was not confidential.” (Evid. Code, § 917.)
Evidence Code section 954 provides: “Subject to Section 912 and except as otherwise provided in this article, the client, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication between client and lawyer if the privilege is claimed by:
“(a) The holder of the privilege;
“(b) A person who is authorized to claim the privilege by the holder of the privilege; or “(c) The person who was the lawyer at the time of the confidential communication, but such person may not claim the privilege if there is no holder of the privilege in existence or if he is otherwise instructed by a person authorized to permit disclosure.
“The relationship of attorney and client shall exist between a law corporation as defined in Article 10 (commencing with Section 6160) of Chapter 4 of Division 3 of the Business and Professions Code and the persons to whom it renders professional services, as well as between such persons and members of the State Bar employed by such corporation to render services to such persons. The word ‘persons’ as used in this subdivision includes partnerships, corporations, associations and other groups and entities.”
Barber v. Municipal Court, supra, 24 Cal.3d at page 751.
Evidence Code section 912 states: “(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the right of any person to claim a privilege provided by Section 954 (lawyer-client privilege), 980 (privilege for confidential marital communications), 994 (physician-patient privilege), 1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege), 1033 (privilege of penitent), 1034 (privilege of clergyman), or 1035.8 (sexual assault victim-counselor privilege) is waived with respect to a communication protected by such privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to such disclosure made by anyone. Consent to disclosure is manifested by any statement or other conduct of the holder of the privilege indicating consent to the disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege in any proceeding in which the holder has the legal standing and opportunity to claim the privilege.
“(b) Where two or more persons are joint holders of a privilege provided by Section 954 (lawyer-client privilege), 994 (physician-patient privilege), 1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege), or 1035.8 (sexual assault victim-counselor privilege), a waiver of the right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege. In the case of the privilege provided by Section 980 (privilege for confidential marital communications), a waiver of the right of one spouse to claim the privilege does not affect the right of the other spouse to claim the privilege.
“(c) A disclosure that is itself privileged is not a waiver of any privilege.
“(d) A disclosure in confidence of a communication that is protected by a privilege provided by Section 954 (lawyer-client privilege), 994 (physician-patient privilege), 1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege), or 1035.8 (sexual assault victim-counselor privilege), when such disclosure is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer, physician, psychotherapist, or sexual assault counselor was consulted, is not a waiver of the privilege.” (Italics added.)
Id. at page 483.
I found no cases in California or the federal system which expressly consider whether a Sixth Amendment violation of the type which occurred here is reversible per se although some courts have applied the Chapman standard without discussion. (See, e.g., United States v. Arthur (4th Cir. 1979) 602 F.2d 660, 664; Wilson v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 751, 759-760 [139 Cal.Rptr. 61].) The case which most closely discusses this issue is Bishop v. Rose (6th Cir. 1983) 701 F.2d 1150.
In Bishop, the prosecution obtained a privileged communication from the defendant to his attorney. The prosecution was permitted to use the statement to attack the defendant’s credi*596bility during cross-examination. The court of appeals concluded the use of that statement violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. The court went on to consider whether such a violation warranted reversal. “Assuming without deciding that a Sixth Amendment violation by interference with the confidential relationship between a defendant and his attorney is subject to the harmless error rule, we conclude it would be impossible to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of the prosecutor did not contribute to petitioner’s conviction.” (Id. at p. 1157.)