(dissenting). One of the attributes of administrative tribunals which has often been thought to be *248an advantage is relative informality of procedure. It is true that there were no pleadings before the board in this case which raised the issue of the meaning of the word “rate” with the formality that would be required in a court action. It is clear from the testimony, however, that the union’s position that an employee’s rate of pay, including incentive earnings, should be protected in the event of a temporary transfer had at least been discussed between the parties. Furthermore, the appellant itself was relying upon the provision of the contract which required it to protect the employees’ “rate” as proof of its authority to make temporary transfers without regard to seniority. In the circuit court the appellant did not assert in its petition that the board had acted upon an issue which was not properly before it and it appears from the very careful opinion of the circuit court that no such proposition was argued in the circuit court. If the board’s determination of the meaning of the word “rate” were in fact a violation of the fundamental rules of fair play and requirements of due process, it can be safely assumed that the appellant would have raised that issue strongly before the circuit court and in my opinion, it, not having done so, should be foreclosed from doing so in the supreme court.
The circuit court concluded that there was ambiguity in the use of the unmodified word “rate” in the transfer clause and that the evidence before the board supported its finding as to the sense in which the parties intended to use it. I would affirm the judgments.