dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on Issue II. I agree with the majority that a defendant who has complied with the terms of his bail is entitled to the return of such funds, less fees and publicly paid costs of representation. However, I do not agree that the trial court improperly applied Hendrix’s cash bail to the cost of his appeal.
It is important to note that Hendrix was represented at public expense during his trial and appeal. He posted a $1000 cash bond to be released from jail pending his trial, but he still received the benefit of public representation. IC 35-33-8-1.5 (Supp.1992) defines “publicly paid costs of representation” as “the portion of all attorney’s fees, expenses or wages incurred by the county that are: (1) directly attributable to the defendant’s defense....” The cost incurred by St. Joseph County for Hendrix’s appeal is directly attributable to his defense.
The majority is correct to point out that under IC 35-33-8-3.1(b), the trial court shall order defendant’s bail remitted, less fees and publicly paid costs of representation, within thirty days of disposition. The majority is also correct to point out that IC 35-33-8-3.1(c) states “disposition occurs when ... the defendant has been acquitted or convicted of the charges.” However, the majority fails to point out that the thirty (30) day limit imposed by IC 35-33-8-3.1 is also the time limit imposed upon the defendant for initiating an appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 2(A).
Once the defendant files his praecipe for appeal within thirty (30) days of final judgment, his case is not finally disposed of until the appellate process is completed, via dismissal or decision. Ind. Appellate Rule 15(N); App.R. 11(B)(3). At that time the trial court can determine the publicly paid costs of representation, and must remit any remaining bail money to the defendant within thirty (30) days. I see nothing to indicate a legislative intent to limit the application of the statute to the trial level.
I would affirm as to Issue II.