*262Opinion
ASHBY, J.Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate to compel respondent court to grant petitioner’s demurrer (Pen. Code, § 1004) to count I of a pending information, on the grounds the information fails to state a public offense and fails to comply with Penal Code sections 950-952. We issued an alternative writ and temporarily stayed the proceedings.
Count I of the information charges petitioner with “Attempted Extortion, in violation of Section 664/518, Penal Code,” in that on or about May 12, 1976, she “did willfully and unlawfully attempt to obtain an official act of a public officer, to wit, Chief of Police, by the wrongful use of force or fear.” The preliminary hearing evidence indicates that petitioner sent a letter to the Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles threatening him with bodily harm if he did not release William and Emily Harris, two individuals then in custody.
The relevant provisions of the Penal Code regarding the crime of extortion are contained in part 1, title 13, chapter 7 (§§ 518-527). Penal Code section 518 provides: “Extortion is the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, or the obtaining of an official act of a public officer, induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.”
Petitioner contends that section 518 is definitional only, that such section alone does not declare whether the crime is a felony or misdemeanor or provide a punishment, and that therefore the reference in the information to Penal Code sections 664/518 literally fails to charge her with an offense. This contention is without merit.
There is no requirement that the information name the statute which the accused is charged with violating, so long as the charging language adequately informs the accused of the act which she is charged with committing. {People v. Schueren, 10 Cal.3d 553, 558 [111 Cal.Rptr. 129, 516 P.2d 833]; People v. Severino, 122 Cal.App.2d 172, 179 [264 P.2d 656].) Here the charging language informed petitioner that she is charged with an “attempt to obtain an official act of a public officer, to wit, Chief of Police, by the wrongful use of force or fear.” This adequately states an offense under Penal Code section 524, which provides: “Every person who attempts, by means of any threat, such as is specified in Section 519 of this code, to extort money or other property from another is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not longer *263than one year or in the state prison or by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
Two possible issues suggest themselves. First, the information erroneously designates the general attempt statute, section 664, rather than the specific attempted extortion statute, section 524. Petitioner suffers absolutely no prejudice or confusion, however, from the erroneous designation of section 664 in the information, since the charging language clearly refers to attempted extortion. (People v. Winning, 191 Cal.App.2d 763, 768-769 [12 Cal.Rptr. 885]; People v. Siegel, 198 Cal.App.2d 676, 683-684 [18 Cal.Rptr. 268]; see also People v. Ramirez, 27 Cal.App.3d 660, 664-665 [104 Cal.Rptr. 102]; Patterson v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal.App.3d 84, 88-90 [94 Cal.Rptr. 449].)
Second, section 524, like section 520, dealing with extortion,1 and section 523 dealing with sending threatening letters with intent to extort,2 has since 1872 referred only to extorting “money or other property.” However, in 1939 the Legislature broadened the definition of extortion in section 518 to include “the obtaining of an official act of a public officer . ...” A brief reference to the legislative history shows that the Legislature intended this broadened definition of extortion to apply to sections 520, 523, and 524.
In People v. Robinson, 130 Cal.App. 664 [20 P.2d 369], decided in 1933, the defendant threatened to disgrace a judge unless the judge would appoint the defendant as receiver in a pending action. The defendant was found guilty of violating section 524, but on appeal the court held that a receivership was not “property” within the meaning of that section as it then read. The Robinson decision was criticized in a note in 22 Cal.L. Rev. 225, which suggested that section 518 be amended. In 1939, in order to correct Robinson, the Legislature amended section 518 by adding to the definition of extortion the obtaining of an official act of a public officer. (See Note, 13 So.CaLL.Rev. 35.) Inasmuch as sections 520, 523, and 524 are dealing with the crime of extortion, the Legislature by *264enlarging the definition of the crime, obviously believed it was unnecessary to change the wording of the other sections. The definition of extortion is clearly controlling and must modify sections 520, 523, and 524, otherwise the amendment would be meaningless. Where the legislative intent is clear, penal statutes must be construed reasonably to effectuate such intent. They should not be read literally where to do so would lead to absurd consequences. (People v. Barksdale, 8 Cal.3d 320, 334 [105 Cal.Rptr. 1, 503 P.2d 257]; People v. Carroll, 1 Cal.3d 581, 584 [83 Cal.Rptr. 176, 463 P.2d 400]; People v. Medina, 15 Cal.App.3d 845, 848-849 [93 Cal.Rptr. 560].) We hold that the 1939 amendment to section 518 effected an expansion of the scope of the other sections in part 1, title 13, chapter 7, to include obtaining an official act by a public officer. Another court, in dictum, has so indicated. {People v. Massengale, 10 Cal.App.3d 689, 692 [89 Cal.Rptr. 237].)
Thus the existing information in count I adequately charges petitioner with violation of section 524, and petitioner suffers no prejudice from the erroneous designation of section 664.3 The trial court properly overruled the demurrer.
The petition for writ of mandate is denied and the alternative writ is discharged. The temporary stay order is vacated.
Hastings, J., concurred.
Section 520 provides: “Every person who extorts any money or other property from another, under circumstances not amounting to robbery, by means of force, or any threat, such as is mentioned in the preceding section, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three or four years.”
Section 523 provides: “Every person who, with intent to extort any money or other property from another, sends or delivers to any person any letter or other writing, whether subscribed or not, expressing or implying, or adapted to imply, any threat such as is specified in section five hundred and nineteen is punishable in the same manner as if such money or property were actually obtained by means of such threat.”
We do not reach the issue suggested by the People’s supplemental points and authorities as to whether petitioner may or must be prosecuted under section 523 rather than section 524. We hold only that the information adequately sets forth a charge of violating section 524.