I dissent. There are limits to our power to cure legislative oversights. The majority’s transplant of the words “the obtaining of an official act of a public officer,” into section 524 of the Penal Code and, by implication, into sections 520 and 523, goes too far. The cases cited —People v. Barksdale (1972) 8 Cal.3d 320, 334 [105 Cal.Rptr. 1, 503 P.2d 257], People v. Carroll (1970) 1 Cal.3d 581, 584 [83 Cal.Rptr. 176, 463 P.2d 400] and People v. Medina (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 845 [93 Cal.Rptr. 560]—do not help. Barksdale involved an interpretation of section 25953 of the Health and Safety Code which provided, with respect to therapeutic abortions that “[i]n no event shall the termination be *265approved after the 20th week of pregnancy.” The Supreme Court interpreted this language to mean that the abortion itself had to be performed within 20 weeks of the time of conception.1 Carroll involved a contention that the enhanced punishment for great bodily injury inflicted “in the course of commission of the robbery . . .” (Pen. Code, § 213) applied only if the robbery was still in progress. The Supreme Court held that the purpose of the legislation-Aleterrence of robbers from inflicting great bodily injury on their victims—permitted a broader interpretation of the statute than contended for by the defendant.
In People v. Medina (1971) 15 CaI.App.3d 845 [93 Cal.Rptr. 560], where the court reversed the dismissal of an information charging a violation of section 647 of the Penal Code although the version of the section in effect at the time of the alleged violation failed to contain the introductory declaration: “Every person who commits any of the following acts shall be guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor:” The Medina court reasoned that other provisions of the Penal Code adequately informed the defendant that the conduct described in the various subdivisions of section 647 was criminal. Analogizing Medina to this case, I would concede that section 518 of the Penal Code, read similarly in context, advises one that the obtaining of an official act by a public officer through the wrongful use of force or fear is frowned upon. This does not solve our problem. In Medina the omitted phrase was mere legislative throatclearing which preceded several precisely defined acts. The majority’s opinion in this case, however, vastly enlarges the very scope of the acts prohibited by section 524. Further, it reads the words “the obtaining of an official act of a public officer” into one of several code sections to which they might apply.2 While it is true that the 1939 amendment to section 518 may have been suggested by People v. Robinson (1933) 130 Cal.App. 664 [20 P.2d 369], a section 524 case, neither I nor, with respect, the majority really know whether the 1939 Legislature forgot to insert the omitted words into section 520, section 523, section 524 or all three.
*266Rather than completing the work of the 1939 Legislature, what we should do is to suggest to the Legislative Counsel that he submit a draft measure correcting the 1939 oversight or oversights, whichever it is, to the present Legislature. (Gov. Code, §§ 10237-10241.)
In any event, a dismissal of count 1 would not mean that defendant should go untried on the conduct revealed in the transcript of the preliminary hearing. Very briefly: In count 2 defendant was charged with a violation of section 71 of the Penal Code which, as relevant, prohibits attempts to cause a public officer to do, or refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his duties, by means of a threat to inflict an unlawful injury upon him, if it reasonably appears to the recipient that the threat could be carried out. In connection with that count defendant sought certain discovery which the People refused to furnish. The trial court then dismissed count 2.
While the propriety of that dismissal is not before us, it seems clear to me that dismissal was far too radical a sanction under the circumstances. Without going into my reasons, I would strongly urge the People to test the water by refiling.
Petitioner’s application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 25, 1978.
The court then went on to hold that the validity of the 20-week limitation was not at issue.
As far as People v. Massengale (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 689, 692 [89 Cal.Rptr. 237] is concerned, the opinion does contain an offhand statement that “[attempted extortion, under section 524, requires an intent to obtain property or an official act (see Pen. Code, § 518 defining extortion . . .).” The facts—related in People v. Massengale (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 758, 759-762 [68 Cal.Rptr. 415]—had nothing to do with any attempt to extort an official act. The court obviously never considered the effect of the oversight of the 1939 Legislature.