I respectfully dissent. There is in my view no reason for us to depart from the clear language of Government Code section 65858, limiting its application to enactments of a “legislative body,” defined elsewhere in the Government Code, as the majority observes, to mean “board of trustees, city council, or other governing body of a city.” (Gov. Code, § 34000.) “A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that ‘[legislative intent should be determined from the language of the statute.’ [Citations.]” (Ron Yates Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 337, 345 [230 Cal.Rptr. 629].) The Legislature must also be presumed to be aware of existing statutes when enacting new legislation. (People v. Over*1008street (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 897 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288]; Shapero v. Fliegel (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 842, 847 [236 Cal.Rptr. 696].)
In interpreting Government Code section 65858, we are further obliged to consider and harmonize all parts of the statute. (People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 638 [268 P.2d 723]; Liptak v. Diane Apartments, Inc. (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 762, 770 [167 Cal.Rptr. 440].) Pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b) of Government Code section 65858, an interim ordinance adopted as an urgency measure requires a “four-fifths vote” for adoption. Initiatives do not harmoniously lend themselves to a four-fifths vote. Subdivision (d) directs the legislative body to issue a written report describing the measures taken to alleviate the condition which led to the adoption of the ordinance, a requirement ill-suited to initiative measures, but easily applied to city councils or other municipal governing bodies. And why would the Legislature provide, as it has done in subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 65858, for a public hearing as a prerequisite to extension of an interim ordinance enacted as an initiative by the voting public?
Finally, nothing in the legislative history of Government Code section 65858 persuades me that it was intended to cover initiative measures. Amendments to the statute limiting the duration of moratorium ordinances, and requiring as a predicate a “current and immediate threat” to public health, safety or welfare, constrict the length of time during which such measures may operate, and describe with particularity the circumstances under which they may be enacted, but evince no intent that I can discern to encompass the initiative process.
Since I view Government Code section 65858 as inapplicable to Measure C, on that basis I would reverse the ruling of the trial court.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 8, 1990.