People v. Focia

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I would find that the trial court was correct in holding that the rescission of a statutory summary suspension should be applied retroactively.

A rescission is by definition retroactive. The term "rescission” is the past participle of the term "rescind,” which is defined as "to void; repeal *** nullify.” American Heritage Dictionary 1105 (2d coll. ed. 1985); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1174 (5th ed. 1979) ("[t]o abrogate, annul, avoid, or cancel a contract; *** [n]ot merely to terminate *** but to abrogate it from the beginning and restore parties to relative positions which they would have occupied”).

Words used in a statute are to be given their plain, ordinary meaning. Granite City Division of National Steel Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 155 Ill. 2d 149, 181 (1993). Giving the plain, ordinary meaning to the term "rescind,” I would hold that the circuit court’s order rescinding the defendant’s statutory summary suspension rendered the suspension void and abrogated from the beginning, i.e., as if it had never been imposed. I would affirm the trial court’s order on that basis.

I also do not agree that reversing the trial court in this matter effectuates a goal of protecting the public from the risk of impaired drivers. First, I question whether the statutory summary suspension statute effectuates the goal of getting drivers likely to commit DUI off the road, particularly when the suspension does not take effect until 45 days after the individual is notified of the suspension of his or her license. 625 ILCS Ann. 5/11—501.1(g) (Michie 1995). Second, I question how this goal of the summary suspension statute can be effectuated in this situation where, by virtue of the rescission of the suspension, we must assume that the suspension should never have taken place.

For the reasons discussed, I respectfully dissent.