People v. Edwards

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The issue in this cause is not whether sending the defendant to the second staging area was part of a valid fourth amendment "seizure,” as the majority holds. Rather, the issue is whether sending the defendant to the second staging area solely because he was not wearing his seat belt violated section 12 — 603.1 of the Illinois vehicle equipment law (the statute). 625 ILCS 5/12— 603.1 (West 1992). I believe that by doing so the police violated the clear and unambiguous intent of the statute, and I would affirm the trial court on that basis.

While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant was stopped pursuant to a proper road block rather than a seat belt violation and that, therefore, he was not stopped "solely on the basis of a violation of the seat belt law,” the analysis cannot end there. The statute provides in relevant part:

"No motor vehicle, or driver or passenger of such vehicle, shall be stopped or searched *** solely on the basis of a violation or suspected violation of this Section.” (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/12 — 603.1 (West 1992).

The statute does not permit an individual to be "stopped or searched” based upon a violation of this statute, thus clearly using the verbs in the disjunctive. While disjunctive words (such as "or”) and conjunctive words (such as "and”) are sometimes misused by legislators, "the literal meaning of these terms should be followed unless it renders the statute inoperable or the meaning becomes questionable.” 1A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 21.14, at 9 (5th ed. Supp. 1995); Advincula v. United Blood Services, 274 Ill. App. 3d 573, 581 (1995).

Section 12 — 603.1 does not become inoperable or of questionable meaning by interpreting it literally to mean that an individual cannot be stopped or searched based upon the failure to wear a seat belt. In this matter, it is uncontroverted that the defendant was dispatched to the second staging area and searched because of the seat belt violation. Thus, although he was not stopped based upon his failure to wear his seat belt, he was certainly searched based upon that violation.

Because I would find that the defendant was searched based upon his failure to wear his seat belt, a search which was in violation of section 12 — 603.1 of the statute, I would affirm the trial court.

For the reasons discussed, I respectfully dissent.