I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the order of the superior court denying the California Coastal Commission (hereinafter Commission) a preliminary injunction.
Section 30106 of the California Coastal Act (hereinafter section 30106) provides: “‘Development’ means, on land, in or under water, the placement or erection of any solid material or structure; discharge or disposal of any dredged material or of any gaseous, liquid, solid, or thermal waste; grading, removing, dredging, mining, or extraction of any materials; change in the density or intensity of use of land, including, but not limited to, subdivision pursuant to the Subdivision Map Act (commencing with Section 66410 of the Government Code), and any other division of land, including lot splits, except where the land division is brought about in connection with the purchase of such land by a public agency for public recreational use; change in the intensity of use of water, or of access thereto; construction, reconstruction, demolition, or alteration of the size of any structure, including any facility of any private, public, or municipal utility; and the removal or harvesting of major vegetation other than for agricultural purposes, kelp harvesting, and timber operations which are in accordance with a timber harvesting plan submitted pursuant to the provisions of the Z’berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973 (commencing with Section 4511). [If] As used in this section, ‘structure’ includes, but is not limited to, any building, road, pipe, flume, conduit, siphon, aqueduct, telephone line, and electrical power transmission and distribution line.” (Italics added.)
The majority opinion’s reversal of the order denying a preliminary injunction to the Commission focuses on the words “any other division of *612land” in section 30106 and concludes that the creation of stock cooperatives constitutes a “division of land” within the meaning of the act which vests the Commission with jurisdiction. I disagree.
I agree with Superior Court Judge Robert I. Weil’s conclusion in denying the Commission a preliminary injunction that the word “development,” as defined in section 30106, does not include stock cooperatives nor does the creation of the stock cooperative constitute “any other division of land” within the meaning of that section.
As noted in the majority opinion, neither “division” nor “land” is defined in the Coastal Act. Absent some clear expression of legislative intent, the statute must be construed to give effect to these words in accordance with their plain, usual and ordinary import. (Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650 [147 Cal.Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1150]; Estate of Tkachuk (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 14 [139 Cal.Rptr. 55]; Addison v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 486 [138 Cal.Rptr. 185].)
The word “division” is “the act or process of dividing: the state of being divided.” (Webster’s New Collegiate Diet. (7th ed. 1970) p. 245.) “Divide” means “to separate into two or more parts, areas or groups ... to cause to be separate, distinct, or apart from one another.. . . ” (Id., at p. 244.) The 1 Oxford English Dictionary (compact ed. 1971) defines “divide” as “To separate (a thing) into parts or. . .into smaller groups; to split up, cleave, to break or cut asunder.” (P. 775.)
Applying the above definitions of “division” and “divide,” it is clear that section 30106 does not vest the Commission with jurisdiction. Stock cooperative conversions of existing structures do nothing whatever to the land underlying them and do not break up either the ownership or leasehold interests into units smaller than what existed before. Nor is anything else divided by the conversion of an existing apartment building to a stock cooperative. Both before and after, ownership of the entire project is unitary and title to all is held by a single entity. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 11003.2.) Prior to conversion, individual units are occupied separately, frequently by lease; afterward they are still occupied separately, still under lease. Neither the land nor the individual apartments is carved up into separate parcels, or separate ownerships. The various units are not divided into separate parts, i.e., bedroom, kitchen, front closet. There simply is no “division” of anything.
*613However, assuming, arguendo, the word “division” applied to the residential units involved, it is clear there is no division of land within the meaning of section 30106.
“Land” in common usage refers to “the solid part of the surface of the earth; specific: the surface of the earth and all its natural resources.” (Webster’s New Collegiate Diet., supra, p. 473, italics added.) The 1 Oxford English Dictionary, supra, defines it as “The solid portion of the earth’s surface.. . Ground or territory as owned by a person. . .. ” (Pp. 1564-1565.)
I construe the word “land” as used in section 30106 to mean the physical surface of the earth as distinguished from “real property” which includes the land and the existing structures affixed thereto. (See Civ. Code, §§ 658, 659, 660; see also Los Angeles v. Howard (1937) 23 Cal.App.2d 624 [73 P.2d 1234]; Rinaldi v. Goller (1957) 48 Cal.2d 276 [309 P.2d 451]; Kolstad v. Ghidotty (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 228 [28 Cal.Rptr. 123].)
This distinction appears in the definition of “development” in both the 1972 and 1976 Coastal Act. In 1976 the Attorney General specifically determined that a stock cooperative conversion was not a “division of land” and that the Commission does not have the jurisdiction it claims here.1 The Legislature thereafter reenacted the relevant portion of the act’s “development” definition without change. If the Legislature had wished to alter this conclusion, it would have been easy for it to say that “development” includes “Any other division of land, or the ownership or right of occupancy thereof, or change in the form of ownership or occupancy thereof, including lot splits or stock cooperative conversions . . .. ” Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to include stock cooperative conversions in the Coastal Act’s reference to “any other division of land” at the time section 30106 was enacted in 1976.
*614The language of the Coastal Act’s definition of “development” (identical in the 1972 and 1976 versions) indicates that the Legislature maintained a distinction between actions done to land itself and actions done to structures on land. After referring to division of land, the definition continues to say that “development” includes: “[construction, reconstruction, demolition or alteration of the size of any structure. ...” (Pub. Resources Code, § 30106 [formerly § 27103].) All of the foregoing activities refer to physical impact on the land by changing the physical nature or extent of what rests on it. It is logical to conclude that the Legislature did not intend the Commission to regulate the nonphysical activities, relating to structures such as the legal terms under which they are leased.
Moreover, the term “develop” or “development” used in section 30106, “. . .connotes the act.of converting a tract of land into an area suitable for residential or business uses.” (Winkelman v. City of Tiburon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 834, 843 [108 Cal.Rptr. 415], italics added.)
Of no little significance is the fact that the statute includes “lot splits” as the only example of what constitutes an “other division of land” which is evidence that the legislative focus was on the actual partitioning of the land itself, rather than every possible creation of a right of occupancy which the Commission might wish to regulate under section 30106.
In my view the same reasons that the majority opinion concludes that stock cooperatives are excluded from the coverage of the Subdivision Map Act are applicable in respect to section 30106. As noted in the majority opinion, the stock cooperative, an entity far older than the condominium and community apartment concepts, “was put under the Real Estate Commissioner’s jurisdiction in 1965, two years after the latter two concepts were mentioned in the map act. It would have been a simple matter for the Legislature to have likewise included the stock cooperative at that time as part of the map act. Its failure to do so, and the clear distinction that the Legislature consistently made between stock cooperatives and the condominium and community apartments until the advent of Senate Bill No. 823, strongly suggests that the stock cooperatives were deliberately excluded from the coverage of the map act.”
*615I fail to see the logic and consistency in the majority opinion which first concludes that the stock cooperative is not included in the map act (with which I agree) and then concludes that the stock cooperative is included in section 30106 because the words “any other division of land, including lot splits” must be interpreted in juxtaposition with the Subdivision Map Act.
Nor does the fact that an amendment of section 66424 of the Government Code became effective January 1, 1980 (Sen. Bill No. 823), making stock cooperative conversions of five or more dwellings subject to the provisions of the Subdivision Map Act, change the result in respect to the parties herein. The Commission’s regulatory powers should not be expanded by court edict unless or until the state Legislature specifically and constitutionally vests it with such powers since the Commission is tinkering with individual property and contract rights which are constitutionally protected.
Stanson v. San Diego Coast Regional Com. (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 38 [161 Cal.Rptr. 392], involved the desire of an owner of a commercial building within the protected coastal zone to remodel the building to include a second floor restaurant. (It should be noted in the instant case there is no remodeling or change in the existing structure whatsoever involved in the conversion to a stock cooperative.) The Court of Appeal reversed the superior court’s denial of plaintiff property owner’s petition for a writ of mandate following the Coastal Commission’s denial of a permit to remodel the building on the ground that the property owner had acquired a fundamental vested right rooted in the constitutional protection against deprivation of property rights without due process of law.
However, in Stanson the court also discussed the words “change in the density or intensity of use of land” contained in section 30106 indicating that “There is precedent that the policy of the [Coastal] Act requires the agency to consider cumulative impacts before granting approval of a project. [Citations.]” (101 Cal.App.3d at p. 48.) The foregoing language in Stanson is inapplicable by reason of the nature and procedural posture of the case at bench. The Commission in the instant case in seeking a preliminary injunction initially argued before the superior court that the conversion to a stock cooperative effects a “change in the density and intensity of use of Land” as a separate reason why it had jurisdiction in the first instance as distinguished from whether or not a permit should be granted assuming jurisdiction. The *616Commission later abandoned that argument before the trial court as a basis for establishing jurisdiction by asserting that while it believed the cumulative effect of such stock cooperative conversions would constitute a “change in the density and intensity of the use of land,” it “recognizefd] that any given cooperative conversion might not individually have that effect.” Since that issue was not before the trial court, it is not before this court.
By reason of the foregoing, I conclude that the cooperative conversion involved in the instant case is not a “division of land” either as that term must be generally understood or as it was intended to be used by the Legislature in section 30106 as enacted in 1976.
Petitions for a rehearing were denied January 16, 1981. Hanson (Thaxton), J., was of the opinion that the petitions should be granted. The petitions of interveners and respondents for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied February 18, 1981.
The Attorney General’s opinion that the Commission does not have jurisdiction over cooperative conversions includes the following discussion: “Since the phrase ‘any other division of land’ is not expressly defined in the Coastal Act, it must be interpreted using settled rules of statutory construction... Generally, words in a statute should be given their ordinary meaning unless otherwise clearly intended or indicated. [Citation.] The word ‘land’ in its most general sense, means any ground, soil or earth whatsoever ... Ordinarily, it connotes the subject of ownership and not the ownership itself. [Citation.] Therefore, interpreting the word ‘land’ in its ordinary sense, the conversion of an existing apartment to a stock cooperative form of ownership would not be included as a divison of land and therefore would not be a development under the Coastal Act.... (Cal. Atty. Gen. Indexed Letters, No. IL76-133 (July 21, 1976).)”