concurring.
I join the majority opinion subject to the following reservations.
The majority indicates that requests for rules to show cause are commonly made ex parte. See Majority Opinion, op. at 418-19. I believe that, where reasonably practical, prior notice should be given to opposing parties, and thus, I would not endorse ex parte practice as normative.
Separately, I differ with the majority’s conclusion that the jury charge, taken as a whole, satisfied the requirements of Commonwealth v. Huffman, 536 Pa. 196, 638 A.2d 961 (1994). As I find this case to be on all fours with Commonwealth v. Speight, 578 Pa. 520, 854 A.2d 450 (2004), however, I join the majority’s ultimate disposition of the jury-instruction claim *45based upon precedent. See generally Commonwealth v. Cox, 581 Pa. 107, 149 n. 3, 863 A.2d 536, 561 n. 3 (2004) (Saylor, J., dissenting) (expressing the view that Speight implicitly overruled Huffman in these circumstances); Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 250, 912 A.2d 268, 297 (2006) (Saylor, J. concurring) (“[A]fter Cox, it seems to me that the only surviving vestige of Huffman is that which remains to be litigated in the federal courts under due process theory.” (citing Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419, 425-28 (3d Cir.2005))).