I respectfully dissent.
The majority would affirm a judgment of nonsuit following plaintiff’s opening statement. To do so in the light of the law surrounding and protecting a party from such a precipitous end to a judicial claim takes judicial bravery above and beyond the call of that ordinarily required of trial and appellate judges. The evidence and the applicable law does not authorize such drastic disposition of plaintiff’s rights.
The motion for a nonsuit (Code Civ. Proc., § 581c) is tantamount to a demurrer to the evidence (Reaugh v. Cudahy Packing Co. (1922) 189 Cal. 335, 339 [208 P. 125]) by which a defendant can test the sufficiency of plaintiff’s case before presenting its own. (Carson v. Facilities Development Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 830, 838 [206 Cal.Rptr. 136, 686 P.2d 656].) Such motion presents a question of law as to whether the evidence proffered before the trial court in support of the plaintiff’s case would justify judgment for plaintiff.
On appeal we are required to evaluate the plaintiff’s evidence under the same rules governing the trial court. (Carson v. Facilities Development Co., supra, at pp. 838-839.) The evidence must be accepted as true in the light most favorable to the plaintiff unless it is inherently incredible. All conflicts must be resolved and reasonable inferences drawn in the plaintiff’s favor.
*533Where as here, the nonsuit was based on the plaintiff’s opening statement we are required to assume that plaintiff can prove all favorable facts set forth. (See Smith v. Roach (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 893, 897-898 [126 Cal.Rptr. 29], and cases cited therein.) The court, as it did here, may consider the opening statement as well as the matters that would probably come into evidence at the trial. A nonsuit on the opening statement is proper only when the court concludes there will be no evidence which would support a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In Willis v. Gordon (1978) 20 Cal.3d 629, 633 [143 Cal.Rptr. 723, 574 P.2d 794], the Supreme Court held a nonsuit on the opening statement is warranted ‘“only when the court [can] conclude . . . from [all the facts and inferences] that . . . there will be no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a judgment in favor of the plaintiff[s].’ [Citations.] It is well established that ‘[w]hether a particular inference can be drawn from certain evidence is a question of law but whether the inference shall be drawn, in any given case, is a question of fact. . . .’ [Citation.]” Thus the issue squarely presented to the trial court and to this court is: Can it be said as a matter of law that the opening statement made by Isadora’s counsel is subject to no other reasonable construction other than that Isadora failed to sustain a prima facie case of negligence upon the part of the defendant County?
Facts
Michael R. L. (Michael) shot and killed his wife Cecelia. Immediately thereafter he shot and killed himself. This murder-suicide occurred one month after Michael’s treatment at the county mental health facility (CMH) by Dr. Martin Schorr and Dr. Socrates Pappas. The deaths occurred one day after Cecelia met with Sheriff’s Deputy Johnathan Logan. This action is brought by decedent’s son, Michael E. L. (Mikie), two years old at the time and witness to the killings. He brings this action through his guardian ad litem seeking damages for wrongful death and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
I
The first issue presented is whether the therapists at the CMH owed but failed to discharge their duty to use reasonable care to protect Cecelia from the murdering potential of their patient Michael. (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334].) Plaintiffs contend that Tarasoff imposes such a duty which was not relieved by the fact that Cecelia was aware of her husband’s violent propensities; nor are they protected by the immunity statutes from liability. The second issue involves the liability of Deputy Sheriff Logan. Did he *534owe a duty to act with reasonable care in responding to Cecelia’s request for assistance. (Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18 [192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137].)
Concerning the Tarasoff issue, the representations before the trial court detailed the relationship between Michael and the hospital employee/therapist(s). The proffered evidence is summarized as follows: The admitting psychiatrist at CMH observed that Michael was shaking and had been drinking. He requested in writing that the evaluating therapist investigate and rule out the explosive and paranoid personality. Michael was later seen by Dr. Pappas, a staff psychiatrist, for an interview lasting approximately 15 minutes. Pappas ordered extensive testing by Dr. Schorr, a clinical psychologist. Neither Pappas nor Schorr were ever designated as being in charge by Dr. Higgins, the professional person in charge at CMH. Schorr’s examination indicated a calm patient. A battery of tests were conducted. The Rorschach test revealed an inwardly angry explosive paranoid personality, poor self control, emotional immaturity orientation compatible with a latent type schizophrenia. Dr. Schorr concluded Michael was a dangerous person, comparable to a walking time bomb. Alcohol and other stresses could well be the fuse igniting the explosion.
Despite these findings, Schorr did not examine the police report revealing Michael’s threat toward his wife and a dog shooting incident. He simply recorded the test results and passed them on to Dr. Pappas with his conclusions. Dr. Pappas and Dr. Schorr did not discuss the results of these tests, nor did Dr. Schorr consult with the other members of his team to assure Michael received proper treatment, nor did Dr. Schorr take any protective steps to insure the safety of Cecelia or the child. He did not contact authorities nor did he attempt to advise Cecelia of Michael’s danger.
After these hours of psychological testing by Dr. Schorr, Dr. Pappas again met with Michael. Dr. Pappas had before him the results of this testing and knew from the report of the El Cajon Police that his patient had threatened to shoot and kill his wife and himself the day before. He knew Michael’s history of marital and drinking problems and abusiveness to his wife; he knew Michael, in asking for psychological help, had been found crying beside his truck with weapons and ammunition inside. Dr. Pappas was also aware of the dog shooting incident. After a 15-minute interview, Pappas observed Michael to be calm and appreciative and eager to return to work. He thereupon released him from the CMH. At no time thereafter did Dr. Pappas or Dr. Schorr contact Cecelia in any way in order to warn her. Dr. Pappas attempted to contact Cecelia to warn her that Michael was at CMH but was unable to telephone her; no further attempts were made. Michael was advised to proceed with private psychological care, but neither Dr. *535Pappas nor anyone else at CMH followed up to determine whether this was done.
Further evidence was proffered from Dr. Thomas Rusk, plaintiff’s psychiatric expert. He was of the opinion the making of no attempt to counsel Cecelia on how to handle Michael’s personality and his violent behavior, not to establish therapy for Cecelia, not to warn her to limit contact with him, and never to be alone with him, and not insuring that Michael was attending therapy on his own, fell below the standard of care, i.e., constituted negligence.
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 431, explicitly sets forth the duty in a case such as this: “When a therapist determines . . . that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger. The discharge of this duty may require the therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending upon the nature of the case. Thus it may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.” (Italics added.) To say there is not a Tarasoff duty under the facts as outlined in the opening statement of plaintiff is to ignore specific realities we are required by law to accept as fact.
It is argued since the Tarasoff case did not involve a facility established pursuant to the Lantermann-Petris-Short Act (LPS), therefore the rule of Tarasoff is not applicable. Whether this was an LPS confinement does not affect the determination of whether these doctors owed a duty under Tarasoff. The duty language of Tarasoff is not so limited. (Tarasoff, supra, at p. 431). (Mavroudis v. Superior Court (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 594, 599-600 [162 Cal.Rptr. 724].) To impose a standard of care on a CMH hospital and its therapists—other than that imposed by Tarasoff-—would undermine the important societal goals which were illustrated and expressed in Tarasoff.
II
The majority determine as a matter of law that there was a statutory immunity protecting Drs. Schorr and Pappas. This may be true as a matter of fact; but such a conclusion doesn’t derive as á reasonable inference from the opening statement of the plaintiff. Instead, plaintiff presented a picture which would allow for imposition of liability and preclude the application of the statutory immunities. The majority assumes without discussion Michael was “involuntarily committed under section 5150” and later discusses *536and analyzes the issue on the unfounded premise the commitment was in truth and in fact an involuntary commitment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150.1 Such a conclusion simply begs a most critical factual issue in this case. I conclude that whether Michael voluntarily submitted to treatment at CMH or was an involuntary transfer is a question of fact for a jury, not a basis for granting of nonsuit.
The trial court’s reasoning that without immunity “you couldn’t get people to do these jobs if they were going to be responsible for whatever happened once these people left or whatever” appears to be in violation of the Tarasoff court determination where it expressly balanced the competing policies in favor of protecting society. (Tarasoff, supra, at p. 440.) Broad immunity that would shield blatant negligent acts or omissions is contrary to very strong public policy. The Supreme Court has stated “The 1963 Torts Claims Act did not alter the basic teaching of Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211, 219 [11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457]: ‘when there is negligence, the rule is liability, immunity is the exception.”’ (Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 798 [73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352], italics added.) Thus, “[u]nless the Legislature has clearly provided for immunity, the important societal goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by willful or negligent acts must prevail.” (Ramos v. County of Madera (1971) 4 Cal.3d 685, 692 [94 Cal.Rptr. 421, 484 P.2d 93].) The Supreme Court in Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 792-793 [221 Cal.Rptr. 840, 710 P.2d 907], recently reiterated this basic principle stating: “We have also held that, ‘in governmental tort cases “the rule is liability, immunity is the exception”. . . . Unless the Legislature has clearly provided for immunity, the important societal goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by the willful or negligent acts must prevail.’ (Ramos v. County of Madera . . . .)”
We confront here proffered direct and circumstantial evidence of negligence upon the part of the CMH doctors who say there is immunity from liability in this circumstance where a patient committed to CMH, pursuant to LPS, informed his evaluating psychiatrist that at a specific place and time he was going to kill his wife with a particular weapon. The doctors assert thereafter the therapist could discharge the patient without further obligation to warn or to use reasonable care to protect the known victim. Such a view simply does not make sense in this latter part of the 20th Century. The “king can do no wrong” concept is long dead. The Tarasoff case, while not involving factually a public LPS hospital, yet discusses at length dangerous patients and cites cases involving professionals or hospitals connected *537with public entities. (See Harris, Tort Liability of the Psychotherapist (1978) 8 U.S.F. L.Rev. 405, 425.)
Ill
The critical question is in the words of Lopez, supra, 40 Cal.3d 780, whether the Legislature has clearly provided for immunity. Factually, there is no doubt the therapists at CMH owed a duty of care to Cecelia. They would be liable absent some clear grant of statutory immunity. (See also Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197 [185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894], and Johnson v. County of Los Angeles (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 298, 307 [191 Cal.Rptr. 704].)
The County’s motion for nonsuit was based in part upon the statutory immunities provided by Government Code section 855.8 and section 5154. By neither of these statutes has the Legislature “clearly” provided for immunity as a matter of law in these circumstances. Finally, as will be shown, as a matter of fact, section 5154 does not apply in this case because Michael voluntarily submitted himself for treatment at CMH.2 Here, at a minimum, the question of voluntary versus involuntary treatment is in issue as a question of fact to go to a jury.
Government Code section 855.8, subdivision (a), grants immunity from tort liability to public entities and their employees for injuries resulting from a diagnosis or failure to diagnose mental illness or addiction in a patient and for failing to prescribe for mental illness. Mental illness includes “any condition for which a person may be detained, cared for, or treated in a mental institution,” or a facility established by the County pursuant to Chapter 2 of LPS (Gov. Code, § 854.4.) This statutory immunity covers specific acts and omissions by public employees for failure to diagnose and failure to prescribe. (See Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (1980) § 4.48, p. 399.) Clearly, Government Code section 855.8, subdivision (a), would protect public entities from errors in judgment as to whether a patient was mentally ill and therefore should be confined, or whether the patient is not mentally ill and should not be confined. Here, plaintiffs are not suing because of the decision to confine or not to confine, nor for any decision relating to whether Michael was mentally ill. In Fish v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 327 [54 Cal.Rptr. 656], the immunity section was applied to the decision of the physician that a *538patient be confined for psychiatric observation. Where there has been faulty diagnosis resulting in the release of a mental patient as in Hernandez v. State of California (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 895 [90 Cal.Rptr. 205], the immunity defense prevails.
In contrast, the Tarasoff duty does not focus upon the therapists’ failure to diagnose, rather upon the dangerousness of the patient and the failure to warn. Dangerousness is not necessarily equated with mental illness. Finally, the immunity provided by Government Code section 855.8 was not raised or discussed in Tarasoff. The case did not factually involve a public entity and public employee. Thus, whether Drs. Schorr and Pappas failed to diagnose Michael correctly is not pertinent in this cause of action.
If it be assumed arguendo that the distinction between diagnosing mental illness and determining dangerousness is rejected, nevertheless Government Code section 855.8, subdivisions (c) and (d), provides specific exceptions to this grant of immunity. These parts state that this section does not exempt a public employee from liability from injuries arising from negligence or other wrongful acts while “prescribing” treatment or in “administering” prescribed treatments. The Tarasoff liability position falls squarely within these exceptions. (See Van Alstyne, supra, at p. 400.) Clearly, under Government Code section 855.8, there would be no immunity to the County of San Diego who would be vicariously liable for the therapists’ negligence under Government Code sections 855.8 and 815.2. As was said in Guess v. State of California (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 111, 119 [157 Cal.Rptr. 618], “under sections 856, 855.8 and 815.2 public entities are vicariously liable for such wrongs,” i.e., injuries proximately caused by the negligence or wrongful acts of public employees.
IV
Nor is section 5154 a shield for these therapists at CMH from liability. The trial court in granting the motion for nonsuit stated that all professionals at CMH were automatically “designees” of the professional person in charge and therefore under section 5154. The legislative history of section 5154 indicates that it was designed to protect and immunize the policymakers of a governmental entity from liability.
Section 5154 specifically provides immunity from liability for any action of a patient released from a 72-hour evaluation facility for “the professional person in charge of the facility” or “his or her designee.” This language was a marked change from the language used in former sections 5047 and 5551, the apparent precursors of sections 5150 through 5154 of the present code. The derivation of current section 5154 is both former sections 5047 *539and 5551. The former sections addressed the procedure for examination and evaluation of the alleged mentally ill person. Former sections 5047 and 5551 provided: “when a petition [for a mental examination] is filed by any such person, neither the person making or filing the petition, nor his superiors, nor the department, hospital, or institution to which he was attached nor any of its employees shall be rendered liable. ...” (Italics added.) Clearly, when the Legislature sought to protect a broad spectrum of persons it specifically listed “employees” of the facility. In contrast, the Legislature in revising the section limited the immunity provided by section 5154 by referring only to the “professional person in charge” or “his or her designee.”
Furthermore, thát the Legislature specifically sought to limit immunity to those policymaking employees the head of the institution is supported by the history of sections 5150 through 5154. As originally presented to the Assembly, section 5151 declared that a person may be provided evaluation and treatment without being detained “in the judgment of the individuals providing evaluation.” This language was replaced with “in the judgment of the professional person in charge of the facility ... or his designee, ...” When section 5154 was added the limiting language was included in that statute as well. It is abundantly clear the Legislature opted for language which granted restricted immunity to those in policymaking position. It should be further noted that under the LPS where the Legislature has intended an immunity to be all inclusive the statute was written as: “no person shall be held liable” or “any individual.” (See former § 5203 and current § 5203.) Thus, it is difficult or impossible to conclude that the “designee” is the individual doctor providing evaluation. At minimum there is an ambiguity in the statutes. Ramos, supra, 4 Cal.3d 685, and Lopez, supra, 40 Cal.3d 780, hold unless the Legislature has clearly provided for immunity, liability must prevail. Furthermore, these interpretations favoring liability of the individual doctor/nondesignee are in keeping with the legislative acts and purposes in providing immunity for discretionary acts and omissions under the Torts Claims Act of 1963, but allowing liability for ministerial or nondiscretionary functions. (Gov. Code, § 820.2; Van Alystyne, supra, at pp. 115, 139.) Thus, section 5154 should be interpreted in harmony with the Torts Claims Act of 1963 and prior judicial interpretations of this particular grant of governmental immunity.
From the foregoing analysis of the statutes in question it is clear that the immunity provided by section 5154 does not extend to Drs. Pappas and Schorr. The doctor in charge at CMH at the time of Michael’s admission was one Dr. Higgins. There is no evidence that Dr. Higgins designated either Pappas or Schorr as the person in charge of the facility or that they were in line for such a designation. Dr. Pappas was a staff psychiatrist whose function was to evaluate and determine treatment. Dr. Schorr was a *540testing psychologist. Neither were in a position to make discretionary decisions . Their immunity would not enhance the obvious legislative purposes to be found in section 5154.
V
Assuming arguendo section 5154 does apply to all professionals working in an EPS facility, it is clear this would bar recovery only if treatment was involuntary. The majority concedes there exists no statutory immunity for public entities or public employees when the patient has voluntarily admitted himself for treatment in a 72-hour evaluation facility.
Here, the evidence when viewed most favorably to the plaintiff shows a voluntary commitment. The form used by the El Cajon Police to transfer Michael for treatment to CMH was a standard form application for involuntary detainment pursuant to section 5150. However, the fact that the police officers used such a form is not irrefutable proof the admission was involuntary. There is considerable evidence to the contrary showing Michael voluntarily admitted himself to CMH. Michael made the initial contact with the police on September 6, 1977, claiming he was on his way to kill his wife; wanting to speak with a psychiatrist. Most significant is the report of the El Cajon police officer who took him into custody who stated in his report: “ The subject was then asked if he would voluntarily commit himself to CMH for observation and replied that he would be willing to talk with a psychiatrist at that location. He voluntarily accompanied Officer Hill to the El Cajon Police Department where this report and a voluntarily commitment form were prepared.” (Italics added.) The (§ 5150) form used by the police officer on its face would suggest that this was an involuntary commitment therefore arguably subject to whatever immunity is granted under section 5154. However, upon trial evidentiary matters should be produced to show why the officer used this form. No other form is available for a voluntary commitment? The officers wrote that it was a voluntary commitment in their reports; they nonetheless used the involuntary transfer form. It is reasonable to infer from the police report that the officer thought he filled out a voluntary commitment form.
There is evidence that a separate form at CMH (a voluntary commitment form) was not signed by Michael. Once again, there may be a variety of reasons advanced for this not being signed: clerical error; misunderstanding; Michael’s refusal to sign for reasons unconnected with his volunteering for treatment.
In sum, the point is that neither the section 5154 department involuntary form prepared by the police or the unsigned CMH voluntary form is at all *541consistent with Michael’s clear and unequivocal request for help and voluntarily entering the hospital. He called the CHP for help; he volunteered to accompany the El Cajon police officers; he was cooperative with the CMH staff; in fact, he was so cooperative and cordial that he lured Dr. Pappas into believing he was not a danger. In face of this evidence, the trial court determined as a matter of law this was an involuntary treatment. This was error. This was a factual decision that must be left to a jury.
VI
Finally, to interpret the Welfare and Institution Code section as the County would desire is to immediately raise the specter of a denial of equal protection. If the County is correct, under EPS, there exist two separate classes of Tarasojf tort victims. First, those who are maimed or killed by a voluntarily treated ex-patient who had been released on their own; and secondly, those who have been maimed or killed by an involuntarily treated ex-patient who had been released on his own. The former can sue but the latter cannot. Thus, the question is, from a constitutional point of view, what rational relationship is there between having two such separate classes of tort victims and any legitimate state interest.
Equal protection clauses require “that persons under like circumstances be given equal protection and security in the enjoyment of personal and civil rights, the acquisition and enjoyment of property, the enforcement of contracts and the prevention and redress of wrongs, . . .” (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Constitutional Law, § 336, p. 3630.) Once a person is released from CMH who has obtained voluntary treatment on his own, he becomes an ex-patient whether he was initially treated voluntarily or involuntarily. (See § 5152.) And the County has the same degree of control or lack of control over each type of ex-patient who is released on his own. Thus, any one potential tort victim is in precisely the same position as any other potential tort victim whether the ex-patient tortfeasor is one class or another. Thus, there exists no basis in reason for distinguishing the two classes.
In Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855 [106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212], the California Supreme Court was faced with the problem of tort immunity by reason of the guest statute. The statute was written to protect the hospitality of the host driver, to prevent collusion between the host driver and the guest passenger. The Supreme Court invalidated this statute saying in summary: “[W]e have concluded that the classifications which the guest statute creates between those denied and those permitted recovery for negligently inflicted injuries do not bear a substantial and rational relation to the statute’s purposes of protecting the hospitality of the host-driver and *542of preventing collusive lawsuits. We therefore hold that, as applied to a negligently injured guest, the guest statute violates the equal protection guarantees of the California and United States Constitutions.” (Id.., at p. 882.) Settled rule requires that a statute be interpreted if rationally possible to avoid constitutional invalidity. As applied here by the majority, section 5154 is invalid.
VII
The Williams Issue
The trial court held that Deputy Sheriff Jonathan Logan owed no duty of care to Cecelia. The rule is that a person ordinarily owes no duty to come to the aid of another unless there is a relationship between the two of them that gives rise to the duty to act. Thus, the issue here is whether factually it could be reasonably inferred by the opening statement here that Logan did owe a duty to Cecelia.
When the government, through its agents, voluntarily assumes the protective duty toward a member of the public and undertakes action on behalf of that member and thereby inducing reliance, it is held to the same standard of care as a private individual. (Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 24 [192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137]; Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 40 Cal.3d 780, 799 [221 Cal.Rptr. 840, 710 P.2d 907]; see Note, Police Liability For Negligent Failure To Prevent Crime (1980-81) 94 Harv.L.Rev. 821, 824.) The requirements of a special relationship before such duty arises applies in areas of law enforcement and police activities. (See Hartzler v. City of San Jose (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 6, 9, 10 [120 Cal.Rptr. 5].) In Williams, supra, our Supreme Court established criteria to determine whether a special relationship existed between a police officer and a citizen—thereby creating a duty of care. The requisite special relationship can be found (1) if the officer took any affirmative action which contributed to, increased or changed the risk which would have otherwise existed, or (2) the officer voluntarily assumed responsibility to protect the individual, or (3) the individual detrimentally relied on the conduct of the officer in statements made by him which induced a false sense of security thereby worsening the individual’s position. (Williams, supra, at pp. 27-28.) Without question, the first and third criteria set forth above in Williams are satisfied. Deputy Sheriff Logan responded to Cecilia’s complaint and informed her there was nothing he could do about Michael’s forcing her to submit to sexual intercourse. However, Logan recognized the potential danger imposed by Michael and he took the affirmative step of advising Cecelia to stay at her parents’ home; to lock the doors; call the sheriff’s department if Michael showed up. This increased the risk it may *543be argued factually. Isadora’s residence was perhaps the most dangerous place for her to remain. Once Logan affirmatively acted to inform Cecelia how to protect herself he had the duty to use due care in providing such information. (See Mann v. State of California (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 773, 780 [139 Cal.Rptr. 82].) He should have told her to secrete herself in a place where Michael could not find her until she had time to file charges for false imprisonment, etc.
Further, Cecelia relied to her detriment on Logan’s statement that she should stay at Isadora’s home and lock the doors and call the sheriff’s department if Michael arrived. This advice created a false sense of security it may be argued. A professional law officer was giving this advice. By advising her, he, the expert, lulled Cecelia into a false sense of security that she would be safe thereby causing her to forego seeking other forms of protection. Cecelia was in fact where Logan advised her to be when her husband killed her the next day.
Cases relied upon to reject the existence of special relationship by the County are distinguishable. In Davidson v. City of Westminster, supra, 32 Cal.3d 197, the injured party was totally unaware that the police officers were present conducting surveillance. The victim could not have relied upon the officers’ protection. Thus, there is no officer-induced reliance to be claimed. However, the Davidson court did emphasize that a special relationship could be found where the injured party depended upon the expertise and training of the police officer. (Id., at p. 207.) In Mann v. State of California, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 773, the police officer investigating a traffic accident took affirmative steps to provide assistance lulling the parties into a false sense of security to their detriment.
The plaintiffs here proffered (through an expert retired Sheriff’s Sergeant Carl) evidence that the following advice should have been given: “Don’t stay at your parents’ home because he can find you there. Go somewhere where he doesn’t know anything about. Secrete yourself. Then go to the D.A. on Monday and ask them to file a criminal complaint.” Whether Cecilia would have been killed later after having filed a criminal complaint is not relevant to the fact that she was killed on Sunday, the day following the improper advice by the police officer. The foregoing facts should have been presented to a jury in order to determine whether they fit within the requirements of the Williams rules. Finally, Logan had placed Cecelia in a dangerous position by reason of reliance upon his advice.
No rules of statutory immunity exonerate his negligence. (See Mann v. State of California, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at pp. 778-779.) There is no factual allegation to bring this case within a “failure to provide police *544protection” which is immunized under section 845 as a legitimate policy decision. Rather, this is a case involving a charge of negligence in the performance of duty by Deputy Sheriff Logan. Thus, as said in Mann, the police protection immunity does not apply. (Id., at p. 779.)
For each of the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings in the trial of this matter.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 22, 1986. Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
It may be conceded that there are factual conflicts here as to what Michael said and what the police officer did and how the medical facility responded, that it is clear section 5154 provides immunity for the professional person in charge of the facility or his designee in the instances of involuntary treatment only. Whether Drs. Pappas and Schorr were “designees” does not appear in the evidence.