dissenting in part.
I disagree with the majority opinion to the extent it fails to affirm the trial court’s award of damages to Smith Walbridge. I vote to affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.
The trial court awarded Smith Walbridge consequential damages representing interest it paid on two outstanding debts, for which the subject real estate was collateral, which Gary Smith testified he would have paid in full had Showalter fulfilled the purchase agreement. While the majority is correct that an award of consequential damages may not be based on “mere speculation or conjecture,” such was not the ease here. Instead, the trial court’s award was based on the uncontradicted testimony of Gary Smith that he would have paid these loans in full from the proceeds of the contract and uncontra-dicted documentary evidence of the amount of interest paid after Showalter’s default.
“Generally, the computation of damages is a matter with the discretion of the trial court.” Weisman v. Hopp-Himsel, Inc. (1989), Ind.App., 535 N.E.2d 1222, 1232 (citation omitted). We may not reverse an award of damages if it is within the scope of the evidence before the trial court, and we may not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Id. (citations omitted). Here, the majority’s holding that the trial court’s acceptance of Smith’s testimony that he would have paid the two debts if Showal-ter had not breached was merely “speculative” is clearly an example of the reviewing court placing its judgment of Smith’s credibility above that of the trial court, which we may not do. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s award of $29,309.08 in consequential damages.
Our standard of review further demands that this court affirm the judgment of the trial court awarding Smith Walbridge $4,000 for expenses it incurred in resuming the maintenance and operation of the camp after Showalter’s breach. This $4,000 award is fully supported by evidence of supplies that were purchased for more than $500 and used by Smith Walbridge in maintaining the real estate, and by evidence that it expended more than $5,800 for equipment which it purchased to maintain the camp after Show-alter’s breach and which Smith Walbridge does not continue to own. The purchase agreement between Smith Walbridge and the subsequent purchaser contained the provision that the sale price of $225,000 included Smith Walbridge’s agreement “to leave all lawn care equipment including tractors and mowers. (Seller to retain one of the riding mowers.)” Exhibit W. Neither did the trial court award Smith Walbridge double damages by considering the equipment expenditures as consequential damages. Inasmuch as the decrease in the sales price between the two agreements was exactly $225,000 it is apparent the $25,000 award represented the difference in fair market value of the real estate only and did not consider the equipment.
Therefore, I vote to affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.