dissenting.
I disagree with the Court’s holding that although the State House Commission took no “action in respect of the ALJ’s Initial Decision until the forty-five day period” mandated by N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10c had expired, the decision should not be deemed adopted pursuant to that statutory provision. Ante at 380, 802 A.2d at 503. There is neither statutory nor decisional law to support that holding. The statute contains no exception to its forty-five day requirement. King v. New Jersey Racing Commission, relied on by the Court, provides that the ALJ’s decision should be deemed approved where the agency completely fails to respond to the Initial Decision within the forty-five days. King, supra, 103 N.J. at 421, 511 A.2d 615. Here, the agency completely failed to respond to the ALJ’s decision for more than sixty days. I would hold that the ALJ’s decision should be deemed approved by the Commission.
On the merits, I would reverse the final decision of the State House Commission for the reasons expressed by Administrative Law Judge Springer in his well-reasoned Initial Decision. After carefully examining the legislative history of N.J.S.A 43:6A-17 and -18 of the Judicial Retirement System Act (Act) and pertinent legal precedents, he concluded that the plain language of the Act contemplates an escalator clause, thereby requiring recalculation of survivorship benefits to reflect increases in judicial salaries after a judge dies.
*387I fully subscribe to the following analysis and reasoning of Administrative Law Judge Springer.
Several rules of statutory construction strongly support petitioners’ view of the statutory meaning. When interpreting any statute, the overriding goal is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent. Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 158 N.J. 404, 418, 730 A.2d 327 (1999). The analysis begins with the language of the statute. State v. Kittrell, 145 N.J. 112, 122-23, 678 A.2d 209 (1996). If the statute is clear, that language ordinarily governs. Neptune Bd. of Educ. v. Neptune Educ. Ass’n, 144 N.J. 16, 25, 675 A.2d 611 (1996). If the text, however, is susceptible to different interpretations, the court should consider extrinsic factors, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and statutory context, to ascertain the Legislature’s intent. State, Township of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170, 733 A.2d 1159 (1999). Unwilling to rely on the general definition of final salary, the Legislature saw fit to adopt a unique definition for purposes of Sections 17 and 18 of the Act alone. Whenever the Legislature specifically defines a term, courts are bound by that definition. Febbi v. Division of Employment See., 35 N.J. 601, 606, 174 A.2d 481 (1961); accord Eagle Truck Transp., Inc. v. Board of Review, 29 N.J. 280, 289, 148 A.2d 822 (1959).
Here the language of the statute appears clear and unambiguous on its face. Words will be given their ordinary and well-understood meaning, unless a contrary meaning is expressly indicated. In re Barnert Mem. Hosp., 92 N.J. 31, 40, 455 A.2d 469 (1983); Stevenson v. Keene Corp., 254 N.J.Super. 310, 317-18, 603 A.2d 521 (App.Div.1992). “Current” [salary, as used in subsection 17(c),] conveys the sense of periodic change or updating to keep abreast of modem trends. Webster’s New International Dictionary 557 (3d ed.1976) defines “current” in terms of “flowing easily and smoothly; presently elapsing; occurring in or belonging to the present time.” Use of such word implies that the Legislature did not intend survivors’ benefits to remain static, but to adjust with changes in judicial salaries.
Insertion of the adjective “current” next to “salary” indicates that salaries are not to be fixed at date of death. Otherwise it would have been unnecessary to add the extra word. Legislative language must not, if reasonably avoidable, be found to be inoperative, superfluous or meaningless. Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 613, 725 A.2d 1104 (1999). Each word in a statute should be given effect, and it should not be assumed that the Legislature employed meaningless language. Verniero v. Beverly Hills, Ltd,, 316 N.J.Super. 121, 127, 719 A.2d 713 (App.Div.1998).
Moreover, it is an established rule of construction that words of relation presumptively refer to the nearest antecedent. State ex rel. S.Z., 177 N.J.Super. 32, 35, 424 A.2d 855 (App.Div.1981). Qualifying phrases refer solely to the last antecedent, unless a contrary intention appears. State v. Congdon, 76 N.J.Super. 493, 502, 185 A.2d 21 (App.Div.1962). Since the phrase “at the time of death” in Section 17 is located nearer to “judicial position” than to “current salary,” it qualifies the former rather than the latter. The same relationship exists for the phrase “at retirement” in Section 18. Thus, final salary is measured by the amount of salary received by persons presently holding the last judicial position in which the member served at time of death or retirement.
*388Further, the Division contends that treating “final salary” as a variable amount would contradict other parts of Section 17 by subjecting life insurance benefits to continuous supplementation. Subsection (b) provides that, in addition to the periodic survivor’s benefit, “there shall also be paid in one mm to the member’s beneficiary an amount equal to one and one-half times the final salary received by the member.” (Emphasis added). Since the special definition of “final salary” in subsection (e) applies to the entire section, the Division worries that life insurance “would also be subject to continuous adjustment.” Such fears, however, are unwarranted. Read in context, life insurance is a one-time payment tied directly to the final salary “received by the member.” It so happens that the salary of a judge who dies in active service is equivalent to the current salary payable to his judicial colleagues (unlike a retired judge who no longer participates in salary increases). The issue of future adjustment simply never arises, since subsection (b) calls for a single lump-sum payment.
Ordinarily, the language of the statute is the surest indicator of the Legislature’s intent. Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 231, 708 A.2d 401 (1998). Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court “need delve no deeper than the act’s literal terms to divine the Legislature’s intent.” State v. Butler, 89 N.J. 220, 226, 445 A.2d 399 (1982); Gallo v. Sphere Constr. Corp., 293 N.J.Super. 558, 562-63, 681 A.2d 1237 (Ch.Div.1996). If the language plainly and clearly reveals the statute’s meaning, the court’s sole function is to enforce the statute as written. Bunk v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 144 N.J. 176, 194, 676 A.2d 118 (1996).
Given the plain language of Sections 17 and 18, there is no need to resort to extrinsic aids in order to ascertain legislative intent. Clearly, the Legislature intended survivors’ benefits to be based on “current” judicial salary levels.
Cases from sister jurisdictions have made similar interpretations of comparable language in their statutes. In Joseph v. Roebuck, 672 F.Supp. 219 (D.C.V.I.1987), for example, a federal district court interpreted the term “current salary” as used in a judicial pension statute to create an “escalator clause,” requiring a retired judge’s salary to be calculated upon the present salary of territorial court judges. There too, the government unsuccessfully argued that the retiree’s pension ought to be based on the salary that he had earned when he left the bench.
Likewise, in Kozak v. Retirement Bd. of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, [447 N.E.2d 394 (Ill.1983),] the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the words “current annual salary” in a pension law benefiting spouses of firefighters lolled in the line of duty meant that the annuity would increase with changes in fire department salaries from time to time. Rejecting the retirement board’s objection that such outcome would necessitate a doubling of the fund’s reserves, the [c]ourt assumed that the Legislature “was cognizant of the increased expense of the type of open-ended and fluctuating public pension benefit it was adopting.” [M at 398.] Accordingly, the [e]ourt found that such additional expense “does not justify our attempting to rewrite the statute.” [Ibid.]
Although the Division attempts to distinguish the Virgin Islands and Illinois eases on the basis that New Jersey has a separate mechanism for dealing with inflationary pressures, the risk of inflation was only one of many factors considered *389by the courts. The rationale of both these holdings is that the plain language of the statutes dictated the result.
Even if one examines extrinsic aids as a guide to legislative intent, such exercise only strengthens petitioners’ argument. Unfortunately, the legislative history, comprised of a terse sponsor’s statement attached to Senate Bill No. 536, a statement of the Senate Judiciary Committee and a press release by the Office of Governor Byrne, does not provide any useful insight into these particular sections of the Act. As a general proposition, pension laws are regarded as remedial social legislation and “must be liberally construed in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.” Bumfaco proposition, pension laws are regarded as remedial social legislation and “must be liberally construed in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.” Bumbaco v. Board of Trustees of the Public Employees’ Retirement Sys., 325 N.J.Super. 90, 94, 737 A.2d 1147 (App.Div.l999)[certif. denied, 163 N.J. 75, 747 A.
Nonetheless, the Division maintains that the Act must be read together with the Pension Adjustment Act, N.J.S.A. 43.-3B-1 to -10, to gain a fuller understanding of its purpose and effect. Statutes should be considered in light of other statutory provisions and the nature of the subject matter. G.S. v. Department of Human Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 172, 723 A.2d 612 (1999). Applicable generally to all public retirement systems “administered by the Division,” N.J.S.A 43:3B-1, the adjustment provisions are designed to protect pension and survivorship benefits against being eroded by inflation. The Pension Adjustment Act achieves this purpose by providing for an annual adjustment or cost-of-living allowance at the rate of 60% of the change in the consumer price index from its level in the year of a member’s retirement or death. N.J.S.A. 43:3B-7.
Contrasted with an increase of 100% of the rate of change in judicial salaries that survivors would receive under the statutory interpretation advocated by petitioners, the Division emphasizes the unfairness of giving survivors in other retirement systems only 60% of the rate of change in the consumer price index. Nothing in Sections 17 and 18 of the Act, however, is inconsistent with the provisions of the general pension adjustment legislation. Although the Division utilizes common practices to promote uniform and economical administration of all state retirement systems, the substantive benefits available under the various systems are not necessarily equal.
Retirement benefits under the JRS are in many respects more generous than those offered under other state retirement systems, such as the Public Employees’ Retirement System (“PERS”), N.J.S.A 43:15A-1 to 141. See, e.g„ the rate of employee contributions (3% of salary for newly enrolled members under the JRS, N.J.S.A. 43:6A-34.1(b), compared to 5% of salary for newly enrolled members under the PERS, N.J.S.A 43:15A-25.) See also, the formula for calculating pension benefits (75% of final salary for members with ten years of service under the JRS, N.J.S.A. 43:6A-8, compared to 16.66% of final salary for members with ten years of service under the PERS, N.J.S.A. 43:15A-48(b)).
*390Moreover, as the Division points out, the Pension Adjustment Act contemplates that survivorship benefits may be subject to blanket increases resulting from future legislative measures, such as judicial salary increases. When there is a legislated blanket increase, N.J.S.A 43:3B-8 provides that the cost-of-living allowance will not be payable until the original benefit plus cost-of-living increases will exceed the new benefit granted by such other legislation. The Legislature intended that surviving dependents of judges receive either the blanket increase or the cost-of-living allowance — whichever is greater — but not both. Hence, the two related statutory schemes can be read harmoniously to supplement each other.
[Footnotes omitted.]
For all of the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the decision of the State House Commission.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ, and Justices STEIN, LONG, VERNIERO, and ZAZZALI — 5.
For reversal — Justice COLEMAN — 1.