concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the result reached by that portion of the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court upholding appellant’s convictions. However, I dissent to the affirmance of the death penalty and I would vacate that sentence and remand the case for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth attempted to establish the existence of two aggravating circumstances contained in the Sentencing Code, namely that the “defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony” and that the “defendant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d)(6) and (d)(9), respectively. Appellant offered evidence, by his own testimony, *478under the “general” category of mitigating circumstances of subsection (e)(8) of the Code, which provides that mitigating circumstances include “[a]ny other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(e)(8). Such “other evidence” offered to the jury included appellant’s military service and tour of duty in Korea, his employment history, his father’s death when he was three years old, his problems with alcohol, and that he had three children, the youngest of which was fifteen months old.
Following closing arguments and instructions by the court, the jury returned a sentence of death based upon its finding of “one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances.” The jury had been instructed by the court, in accordance with the Sentencing Code, to list on a verdict slip the aggravating circumstances it found to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the Commonwealth. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(f). On the verdict slip provided by the court, the jury recorded the “aggravating circumstances” it found as “willfully taking the life of another,” “repeated offenses,” and “failure of rehabilitation.”
Our death penalty sentencing procedures, unlike those of some other states, strictly limit the “aggravating circumstances” that may be presented by the Commonwealth and considered by the jury or judge to the ten enumerated circumstances set forth in subsection (d), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d) (“Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following____”). See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(a)(2) and (c)(1)(i). Those ten aggravating circumstances established by the legislature are, therefore, the exclusive bases upon which a jury or judge may predicate a sentence of death.
It is clear that at least two of the three “aggravating circumstances” found by the jury in this case are not among those exclusive statutory circumstances. “Willfully taking the life of another” is, obviously, a circumstance which is present in any case of murder of the first degree *479and cannot provide a legitimate basis upon which a jury could return a sentence of death. Neither is “failure of rehabilitation” one of the statutory aggravating circumstances. While “failure of rehabilitation” could conceivably be an unarticulated concern addressed by the legislature in subsection (d)(9) (significant history of felony convictions involving violence), it would be improper for this Court to speculate as to such unarticulated intent or to guess at what the jury might have meant by this finding.1
Moreover, none of the jury’s “aggravating circumstances” bear even a remote resemblance to the statutory circumstance of subsection (d)(6) which the Commonwealth attempted to demonstrate — thus, we must conclude that the Commonwealth failed to present (to the satisfaction of the jury) sufficient evidence that appellant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony. Therefore, only “repeated offenses” can arguably be viewed as a jury finding of one of the statutory aggravating circumstances, if we accept Mr. Justice Hutchinson’s premise that “repeated offenses” is laymen’s terminology for “significant history of felony convictions involving ... violence.” That premise is certainly plausible, perhaps even likely. However, even accepting the validity of the premise, the sentence of death should not be allowed to stand.
Initially, it is quite apparent that the jury improperly considered non-statutory circumstances as aggravating factors warranting the imposition of the death penalty. The jury’s obvious confusion in finding “willfully taking the life of another” and “failure of rehabilitation” as “aggravating circumstances” probably resulted from the court’s less than clear instructions. The court did instruct the jury that aggravating circumstances are defined by statute2 and *480that the Commonwealth had presented evidence of the two aggravating circumstances previously mentioned, (d)(6) and (d)(9). However, the court did not specifically instruct the jury that only those circumstances enumerated by statute and presented by the Commonwealth could be considered to be “aggravating circumstances” warranting the death penalty. To the contrary, the court’s instruction was liberally laced with language from which the jury could, and did, infer that it was not limited by the statute in its selection of “aggravating circumstances,” 3 as evidenced by the jury’s findings which have no counter-parts in subsection (d).
Thus despite Mr. Justice Hutchinson’s unreasoned assertion to the contrary {see note 1, supra), this case most certainly does present a situation where the jury predicated *481its sentence of death on improper aggravating circumstances. We are squarely confronted, therefore, with the question of whether, and under what circumstances, a sentence of death must be vacated where the sentence is predicated upon both proper and improper aggravating circumstances and upon a finding that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. For the reasons which follow, I would hold that such a sentence of death must be vacated unless there is no reasonable possibility that the consideration of the improper aggravating circumstances could have affected the balancing process or produced the sentence of death, i.e. unless this Court finds that the erroneous consideration of improper aggravating circumstances was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.4
In the situation wherein the jury or judge has found both proper and improper aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances, it is clear this Court need not necessarily vacate a sentence of death. As this Court quite recently stated in Commonwealth v. Morales, 508 Pa. 51, 494 A.2d 367 (1985):
We note, however, that [vacating a sentence of death] might not be required, for instance, where the jury has found (and the record supports) the existence of several aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances. Since the jury is required to return a sentence of death where it finds “at least one aggravating circumstance ... and no mitigating circumstance,” 42 Pa.C.S.A. *482§ 9711(c)(iv), the sentence of death would, it seems, retain its integrity even though one of the several aggravating circumstances is later declared to be invalid for some reason. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Beasley, [504] Pa. [485], [500 n. 3], 475 A.2d 730, 738, n. 3 (1984) (“The presence of, and correctness of, a jury’s finding of a second aggravating circumstance is not relevant in a case such as this where there have been found no mitigating circumstances, since one aggravating circumstance alone requires a verdict of death.”); Zant v. Stephens, [462] U.S. [862], 103 S.Ct. 2733 [77 L.Ed.2d 235] (1983) (death sentence imposed by jury supported by at least one valid aggravating circumstance need not be set aside merely because another aggravating circumstance found by jury was ultimately declared unconstitutional by state supreme court; circumstances discussed where death penalty would be vacated); Barclay v. Florida, [463] U.S. [939], 103 S.Ct. 3418 [77 L.Ed.2d 1134] (1983) (consideration by sentencing trial judge of an aggravating circumstance declared invalid under state law did not so infect process of weighing aggravating circumstances against mitigating as to require death penalty be vacated).
Id., 508 Pa. at 69, 494 A.2d at 376-77.5
Where the sentence of death is based upon a finding of “one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances,” however, and one or more of the aggravating circumstances are later declared improp*483er or not supported by sufficient evidence, the situation presents a more difficult task for this Court. While more difficult, it is certainly not “impossible to tell from the record how the jury would have decided absent the improperly presented circumstances.” Slip opinion announcing judgment of the Court at 41. Mindful that the death penalty is qualitatively unique in its severity and finality and requires the most careful appellate scrutiny by this Court, I nevertheless believe there is room for harmless error analysis in these situations.
Appellate courts are frequently called upon to determine what effect, if any, a trial court’s errors may have had upon a jury’s finding of guilt. Since the jury rarely, if ever, makes specific findings as to what evidence or arguments it found persuasive, the reviewing court is always handicapped to some extent when it examines the effect of trial error. Yet this handicap does not preclude a harmless error analysis, it merely renders the task more difficult. As this Court stated in Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978):
The harmless error rule derives from the notion that although an accused is entitled to a fair trial, he is not entitled to a perfect one____ The harmless error rule can save the time, effort and expense of unnecessary retrials where the defendant has not been prejudiced by an error---- But courts must be careful in applying the harmless error rule, for if the violation of a rule is too readily held harmless, the importance and effectiveness of the rule is denigrated. We believe that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard reaches the most reasonable balance between the consideration of judicial economy and the important policies which underlie constitutional and non-constitutional rules.
... We adopt the standard that an error cannot be held harmless unless the appellate court determines that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. Whenever there is a “ ‘reasonable possibility’ ” that an error “ ‘might have contributed to the conviction,’ ” the error is *484not harmless. Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. [171] at 178, 305 A.2d [715] at 719, quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. [18] at 24, 87 S.Ct. [824] at 828 [17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) ].
In numerous cases, this Court has focused solely on the prejudicial impact of the erroneously admitted evidence, considering other, properly admitted evidence only in relation to this inquiry. When the record reveals that an error did not prejudice the defendant, or that the prejudice was so minimal that, beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not influence the jury, we have held the error harmless. In other cases, we have reversed because the prejudice was more than de minimis.
This Court has also examined the properly admitted evidence to determine whether the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other, untainted evidence. An error which, viewed by itself, is not minimal, may nonetheless be harmless if properly admitted evidence is substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence.
Id., 476 Pa. at 408-12, 383 A.2d at 164-165 (footnotes and citation omitted).
There is no reason why such an analysis may not be applied to review of a sentence of death where the sentencer has relied upon both proper and improper aggravating circumstances and has balanced those circumstances against mitigating to arrive at a verdict of death. For purposes of this opinion, I will not engage in protracted discussion of Zant v. Stephens, supra, and Barclay v. Florida, supra, but I believe it legitimate to conclude that these cases support a harmless error analysis in this balancing of circumstances context. In Zant, the United States Supreme Court left open the question stating:
Finally, we note that in deciding this case we do not express any opinion concerning the possible significance of a holding that a particular aggravating circumstance is “invalid” under a statutory scheme in which the judge or jury is specifically instructed to weigh statutory aggra*485vating and mitigating circumstances in exercising its discretion whether to impose the death penalty.
103 S.Ct. at 2750. Nevertheless, much of the reasoning of Zant and of Barclay supports the application of a harmless error analysis where the jury has considered proper and improper aggravating circumstances and has weighted those circumstances against mitigating. In Barclay, that Court stated:
The crux of the issue, then, is whether the [sentencer’s] consideration of this improper aggravating circumstance so infects the balancing process created by the Florida statute that it is constitutionally impermissible for the Florida Supreme Court [to] let the sentence stand.
In holding that the trial court’s consideration of an improper non-statutory aggravating circumstance along with proper aggravating circumstances was harmless error, the plurality in Barclay stated:
[T]he Florida Supreme Court does not apply its harmless error analysis in an automatic or mechanical fashion, but rather upholds death sentences on the basis of this analysis only when it actually finds that the error is harmless. There is no reason why the Florida Supreme Court cannot examine the balance struck by the trial judge and decide that the elimination of improperly considered aggravating circumstances could not possibly affect the balance. See n. 9, supra. “What is important ... is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.” Zant, supra, U.S., at [879], 103 S.Ct., at 2743-2744 (emphasis in original).
103 S.Ct. at 3428.6
So too under our Sentencing Code, there is no reason why this Court cannot examine the balance struck by the jury or *486judge and decide that the consideration of improper aggravating circumstances could not possibly have affected the balance or have produced the sentence of death. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h)(3)(i).7 While the jury is not required to list mitigating circumstances it found, this Court may easily search the record to determine any and all mitigating circumstances presented to the jury. From all the foregoing, I would hold that it is appropriate to apply a harless error analysis where the sentencer has found both proper and improper aggravating circumstances which outweigh mitigating, and to uphold the validity of a sentence of death so imposed where this Court determines, beyond a reasonable doubt, that elimination of the improper aggravating circumstances could not possibly have affected the balance or produced the sentence of death.
In the instant case, however, the error in considering improper aggravating factors cannot be found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found only one circumstance, “repeated offenses”, which might possibly qualify as a statutory aggravating circumstance ((d)(9)). “Repeated offenses” is not the “strongest” of the ten enumerated circumstances of subsection (d). On the other hand, although the mitigating circumstances presented to the jury were not the most significant of those set forth in subsection (e), neither can we say they were de minimis. Since consideration of the improper “aggravating circumstances” may well have affected the jury’s balance in this *487case, I would vacate the sentence of death and remand to the court of common pleas for imposition of a life sentence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h)(2).
The opinion announcing the judgment of the Court attempts to buttress its affirmance of the sentence of death with its finding that on “this record ... this case presents the type of murder the Legislature intended to cover by [the] aggravating circumstance” set forth in subsection (d)(6), “killing while in the perpetration of a felony”. Although the Commonwealth attempted to demonstrate the existence of this aggravating circumstance, the jury made no such finding. It is manifestly improper, therefore, for this Court to examine the record and make its own contradictory finding. It is also improper to address appellant’s contention that this aggravating circumstance is overbroad and facially defective. Since the jury did not predicate its verdict on this circumstance and since appellant was not, therefore, prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s legitimate attempts to prove its existence, appellant has no standing to challenge its validity. See Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 505 Pa. 152, 477 A.2d 1309, 1318 (1984).
I must also voice my disagreement with Mr. Justice Hutchinson’s strained interpretation of subsection (d)(9). First, I disagree that “the legislative definition of this particular aggravating circumstance requires more than one prior conviction”, at 851. for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Goins, 508 Pa. 270, 495 A.2d 527 (1985). In that case, I stated my view that “for purposes of subsection (d)(9), the jury (or judge) may consider the defendant’s contemporaneous conviction for murder of the first degree as part of his or her ‘significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence,’ ” id. at 538, a view that Mr. Justice Hutchinson apparently supports. See at 462, n. 20. (“This less restrictive definition of conviction arguably could allow the kidnapping and rape in this case to constitute part of the significant history of felony convictions.”)
*488Moreover, I find indefensible and implausible the notion that the Legislature intended the applicability of subsection (d)(9) to be dependent upon the degree of similarity between the prior and current crimes, i.e. where the prior crimes had a “high degree of correlation” to the current crimes for which the defendant has just been found guilty. At 461-463. Under this interpretation, a jury is presumably to consider whether there was “a connecting thread between the nature of the crimes.” Id. This interpretation is premised on the unfounded assumption that “the term ‘significant’ ... relates to the qualitative relationship between the prior conviction and the present homicide prosecution.” Id. at 460-461.
The opinion announcing the judgment of the Court offers two examples as “guidelines”:
For example, two prior convictions, one for robbery and one for an accompanying aggravated assault, satisfy the legal test of quantity but are not necessarily factually significant in relation to a murder committed during a family quarrel. Likewise, a history of rape and indecent assault would be a less “significant history” for sentencing on a murder committed during a robbery than on one committed during a rape or sexually motivated aggravated assault.
Id. at 461.
There is not the slightest indication that the Legislature intended such a result. Any “connecting thread” established by the Legislature in subsection (d)(9) is plain — that “connecting thread” is the “thread” between “felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person”, not between “felony convictions of a similar factual nature to the current crimes.” Mr. Justice Hutchinson’s interpretation, and the result of that interpretation illustrated by the above examples, violates the common sense and cardinal principle of statutory construction that “the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.” The Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1). This interpretation is both “absurd” and “unreasonable” and it provides a wind*489fall to the creative criminal who has varied his modus operandi.
In my opinion, this Court should leave well enough alone. “Significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person” is plain and unambiguous and is just not that difficult of a concept. It should be left to the jury to determine whether such “significant history” applies in a given case.8 I have every confidence that the common sense and practical meaning given to this aggravating circumstance by a jury (or trial judge) will prove infinitely more workable and less vague than some contrived definition directing the sentencer to consider such items as “numerosity” and “factual significance,” “connecting threads,” “qualitative relationships,” “propensities towards particular types of violent aggression” and “degrees of correlation.” At 459-466. Far from “avoiding constitutional infirmity,” id. at 463-465, Mr. Justice Hutchinson’s interpretation creates a host of problems, constitutional and otherwise, for this aggravating circumstance.
There is also a more direct and desirable method of “avoiding constitutional infirmity.” This Court is required to review each sentence of death to determine whether it is “excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h)(3)(iii). To that end, we have directed the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts to compile and monitor an on-going, comprehensive death penalty study dealing with all aspects of cases of murder of the first degree. Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700, 707-08 (1984), cert. denied — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 360, 83 L.Ed.2d 296 (1984). This study greatly facilitates our obligation to ensure that the death penalty sentencing procedures achieve their purpose of limiting and channeling the discretion of the sentencer so as to minimize the risk of arbitrary and capricious sentencing. *490Zant v. Stephens, supra at 103 S.Ct. 2741. Should our review disclose arbitrary and capricious results in cases dealing with the aggravating circumstance of subsection (d)(9), this Court could then determine whether “significant history of felony convictions involving ... violence to the person” is constitutionally infirm. Until then, “if it’s not broke, don’t fix it.”
Finally, the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court demonstrates the danger inherent in attempting to cover too much territory. The opinion is advisory in many respects as it dwells at length upon non-issues or tangential issues.9 The advisory nature of the opinion distracts from *491the major problem posed by the case which the majority of this Court has failed to address, namely the consequences of the jury’s consideration of improper aggravating circumstances. (See note 4, supra).
. The opinion announcing the judgment of the Court concludes that the “aggravating circumstances” found by the jury were “proper aggravating circumstances, although express[ed] in laymen’s terms____” At 849, n. 16. There is no reason given to support this conclusion.
. The court actually told the jury that "the Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines aggravating circumstances." However, it is not the Pennsylva*480nia Crimes Code that defines aggravating circumstances, but the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9701, 9711.
. The court’s instructions contained the following language:
You will have to evaluate that evidence in your own mind and determine how aggravating you consider them to be. You are also entitled to take into consideration all of the testimony that was presented at the trial of this case which concluded yesterday with the return of your verdict. And you must weigh that testimony and determine in your own mind whether the Commonwealth has established those aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
******
Now, you must weigh all of the aggravating circumstances that you consider proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt. And you must weigh all of the mitigating circumstances which you feel have been proven to you by the fair weight and preponderance of the evidence. You must also consider the evidence that you heard and accepted as fact during the trial of this case in chief, as we call it, during the trial of Charles Holcomb in connection with the offenses lodged against him which you returned verdicts on yesterday. You are not, and I emphasize this, you are not to decide the sentence to be imposed on this Defendant out of any feeling of vengeance or prejudice. You must decide this sentence solely on the basis of what you feel to be the aggravating circumstances that are proven to your satisfaction, and the mitigating circumstances that have been established to your satisfaction. In doing so, you must remember that you, the Jury in this instance, are not recommending punishment. Yours is the power of decision. You, and you alone, not the lawyers, not the Court, not the media, you and you alone must decide whether the Defendant shall receive a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence of death.
N.T. at 27-30. (Emphasis added).
. The opinion announcing the judgment of the Court states "[tjhis is not a situation where the jury heard evidence on or found an improper aggravating circumstance.” At 456, n. 16. Despite this statement, there follows lengthy discussion of "what if’ such a situation were presented, and that, in such a situation, "we would be required to vacate the death sentence” because “there can be no meaningful appellate review of the weighing process ... to determine whether the jury’s consideration of the improper circumstance was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 456, n. 16 and 459. If it is correct that the "situation” is not presented here, then the discussion of the consequences of that "situation” in section VIII B must be regarded as dictum. As we have seen in text, however, the assessment of the “situation” as not presented here is erroneous, as is the "dictum” regarding the consequences of that "situation.”
. I note the possibility that, even where no mitigating circumstances have been found, vacating the sentence of death might be required in appropriate circumstances. For example, in Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983), the United States Supreme Court noted that the "Florida Supreme Court has not always found that consideration of improper aggravating factors is harmless, even when no mitigating circumstances exist.” Id. at 3427. In Lewis v. State, 398 So.2d 432 (Fla.1981), the trial judge who sentenced Lewis to death had found four aggravating circumstances and no mitigating. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court found that the evidence failed to support three of the aggravating circumstances and, with only one "relatively weak aggravating circumstance left standing, the Florida Supreme Court did not find harmless error, but rather remanded for resentencing.” 103 S.Ct. at 3427.
. The Florida statute is similar to the Pennsylvania statute in that Florida law "requires the sentencer to balance statutory aggravating circumstances against all mitigating circumstances and does not permit non-statutory aggravating circumstances to enter into this weighing process____ The statute does not establish any special standard *486for this weighing process.” Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. at 3426.
. See Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700 (1984), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 360, 83 L.Ed.2d 296 (1984). In Frey, we held that while the trial court’s instruction to the jury was technically erroneous, this Court would vacate a sentence of death only where the error injects "passion, prejudice or some other arbitrary factor” into the deliberative process which factor produces the sentence of death. 504 Pa. at 436, 475 A.2d at 704. Relying on the standard of review established by the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h), and upon Barclay and Zant, we stated “it is clear that the lower court's technical deviation from the exact language of the Sentencing Code ... did not impermissibly infect the balancing process nor did it inject an arbitrary factor, passion or prejudice into the deliberations.” 504 Pa. at 439-40, 475 A.2d at 705-06.
. In Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 506 Pa. 228, 238 n. 4, 484 A.2d 1365, 1370, n. 4 (1984), this Court stated:
It was placed on the record that appellant entered a plea of guilty to a charge of robbery in 1974. The court, correctly, left it to the jury to determine whether or not this constituted a ‘significant history of prior criminal convictions’ [under mitigating circumstance (e)(1) ].
. Examples include: (1) The protracted discussion (seven pages) of the interpretation of subsection (d)(9) as requiring either sufficient “numerosity” or a high degree of factual correlation between the nature of the defendant's prior and current crimes in order to "protect! 1 the statute from unconstitutional vagueness.” At 464. This "protection” is unnecessary, however, because this Court has already rejected a vagueness challenge to the quite similar subsection (e)(1), "significant history of prior criminal convictions," noting:
In reviewing an identical claim of vagueness asserted against the corresponding portion of the death penalty statute of the State of Florida, which employed virtually identical language, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the vagueness claim, noting that a jury’s evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as enumerated, requires no more line drawing than is commonly required of a factfinder in any lawsuit. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 257, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2969, 49 L.Ed.2d 913, 925-926 (1976). We agree.
Commonwealth v. Beasley, 504 Pa. 485, 475 A.2d 730, 737 (1984) (emphasis added); (2) The largely unnecessary discussion (seven pages) of the standard for determining when a person is in custody for Miranda purposes. The step-by-step run through of the law from Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964) to the present is not appropriate here. Any lingering notion that the Escobedo — "focus of the investigation” test provides an independent basis for triggering Miranda could be easily dispatched by rejecting said notion and citing to the many recent cases which similarly reject that notion and reiterate this Court’s frequently repeated test for determining when a suspect is in “custody." See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 503 Pa. 555, 470 A.2d 56 (1983); Commonwealth v. Chacko, 500 Pa. 571, 459 A.2d 311 (1983); Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 475 Pa. 97, 379 A.2d 1056 (1977); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 253 Pa.Super. 334, 385 A.2d 365 (1978) (recognizing that McLaughlin had overruled the Escobedo — focus test as an independent basis for the necessity of Miranda warnings); (3) The dictum (four pages) regard*491ing the interpretation of subsection (d)(6), as I have discussed in text, infra; and (4) The discussion (four pages) of the effect upon a sentence of death where the sentencer relied in part upon improper aggravating circumstances, despite the belief expressed in the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court that the situation was not presented in this case, (see note 4, supra ).