I dissent. It is axiomatic that a criminal conviction may not stand unless every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. One of the elements of the crime of risking a catastrophe, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3302 (b), is the showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a catastrophe, or “widespread injury or damage,” Commonwealth v. Hughes, 468 Pa. 502, 512, 364 A.2d 306, 312 (1976) was risked. The Commonwealth did not show that the Scatena’s acts, outrageous though they were, actually put the public in jeopardy of widespread injury or damage. Therefore, the conviction should not stand.
The fundamental error underlying the majority’s view is the same as that underlying the prosecutor’s view: viz., the erroneous belief that placement in public waters of large volumes of industrial contaminants constitutes, per se, the risk of catastrophe. This view is simply wrong. That it is so can be discerned from the Hughes case, supra, the only prior case in which this Court have substantively dealt with the statute in question, where “catastrophe” is discussed and defined. In Hughes this Court noted that criminal statutes should be interpreted according to the fair import of their terms, and when statutory language is ambiguous, they shall be interpreted so as to further the general purposes of the provision involved. The Hughes Court then turned to the Comment to the Model Penal Code to elucidate the purpose of our statute:
“This section introduces a new concept in Anglo-American penal law. It is patterned on European legislation dealing with activity creating a “common danger.” Fire, dealt with by the law of arson, is the prototype of forces which the ordinary man knows must be used with special caution because of the poten*522tial for wide devastation. Modern legislation puts explosion, flood, poison gas, and avalanche in the same category, and modern technological development alerts us to possibilities of catastrophe in mishandling radioactive material.” (Footnote omitted).
It is thus apparent that the legislature recognizing the catastrophic effects that can result from the reckless use of the enumerated forces or substances determined to punish under Section 3302 (b), those who would expose the public to an unreasonable risk.because of their reckless handling of these forces or substances.
468 Pa. at 511-512, 364 A.2d at 306. (Emphasis added). The Comment to the Model Penal Code specifically mentions fire, explosion, flood, poison gas, avalanche, and possibly the handling of radioactive material as activities which, common knowledge tells us, may cause widespread devastation. It is noteworthy that the pollution of waters with industrial chemicals is not included in this list.
More fundamentally, however, virtually no hazard may be included in the list absolutely, even those mentioned in the Comment. Tossing a lighted match on the polished marble floor of a modern skyscraper, for example, is certainly an irresponsible act, and possibly even a criminal act, but without more, it cannot be said to risk a catastrophe. If the match burns, goes out, and is surrounded by 100 square feet of nonflammable marble floor, with no other flammable materials nearby, whatever other state or local regulations and statutes may have been violated, it cannot be said that the actor risked a catastrophe. On the other hand, if the Commonwealth were able to introduce evidence in this hypothetical case that the carelessly tossed match might in fact have ignited some sort of flammable material present in the lobby of the skyscraper, and that a conflagration might have resulted, then a prima facie case of risking a catastrophe would have been made out.
This hypothetical example is illustrative of the error in the majority opinion. It is not the case that every carelessly tossed match risks catastrophe, that every careless act *523while driving a school bus risks widespread damage or injury, or that every dumping of industrial waste into the waterways risks the harm contemplated by the statute. On the other hand, some acts, such as those which occurred in the Hughes case, are self-evidently catastrophic in nature when they occur. In Hughes an employee of a company which used flammable solvents in the manufacturing process, while carrying a five gallon container of the solvent, spilled a half gallon of the solvent on the floor and then, in violation of a company rule against smoking, lit a cigarette and threw a match on the floor. The spilled solvent ignited and an eight alarm fire resulted in which two lives were lost and extensive property damage occurred. This Court agreed that such conduct constituted risking a catastrophe and affirmed the conviction for risking a catastrophe:
While the section [3302(b)] does not enumerate those circumstances under which an unreasonable risk of injury or damage would exist, we do not believe such precision is required. Given the volatile nature of the substance here involved, the repeated warnings against the use of matches in the area and the obvious possible consequences of ignoring these precautions, it is clear that a person in the situation of the appellee should have been fully aware that his conduct was proscribed by the provisions of this section.
Id., 468 Pa. at 513-154, 364 A.2d at 311-312. The Hughes case, like all cases, is to be read within its context. Generally, the case may be said to stand for the proposition that when a person willfully behaves in a manner which an ordinary person would recognize as risking foreseeable widespread injury, this behavior amounts to risking a catastrophe. Lighting a match in an area containing large amounts of flammable solvent and throwing the match on the floor where solvent had been spilled would surely constitute risking a catastrophe.
But in the case at bar, unlike the Hughes case, the foreseeable harm is not so clear. It may be presumed that an ordinary person would recognize that pouring large *524quantities of industrial waste down a borehole might possibly cause some harm, but the nature or extent of the harm would surely not be known. It might, or it might not, be a catastrophe that was risked. Even that uncertainty, however, would not prevent a conviction for risking a catastrophe in the Scatena case if, after the act were committed and harm did result, the Commonwealth showed by competent evidence that the harm which resulted, if it had not been mitigated by the very commendable efforts of the DER and others, would have resulted in a catastrophe.
Unfortunately, the Commonwealth established no such evidence. Incredible as it seems, there was not even any evidence of record which established that a single fish or waterfowl was killed or injured as a consequence of the acts of the Scatenas, and we simply do not know what would have happened if the DER had not intervened. It is possible that the Danville water system would have filtered out virtually all of the harmful materials. But even if the system would have failed and Danville would have been without water for a period of time, there was no evidence as to whether that would have been a catastrophe. The majority notes that the compound dichlorobenzene was found in the Danville water supply even after the containment efforts were in effect, but there was no evidence to establish that the concentrations in which it was present were harmful or that the bioaccumulative properties of dichlorobenzene were likely to lead to the statutorily required widespread injury.
It may well be that if the DER had not intervened, the Danville water system would have failed and absolute disaster would have occurred. It is also conceivable that a large number of persons ingested the water containing small amounts of dichlorobenzene, and that these persons could have been irreversibly harmed. If these, hypothetical facts had been established at trial by competent evidence, certainly a conviction for risking catastrophe would be justified. But in the case before us, no such evidence has been offered and it should be apparent that the majority’s at*525tempt to establish a per se rule that anyone who dumps industrial waste into the waterways of the Commonwealth has risked a catastrophe simply will not withstand analysis. If a person is to be convicted of the crime of risking a catastrophe, the Commonwealth, at a minimum, must be able to show that the act which the actor committed was capable of causing widespread injury. That was not shown in this case.*
*526It is understandable that anyone who reads the facts of this case would be outraged by the criminal, thoughtless, and irresponsible acts of the Scatenas. It would be understatement to say that persons who act as the Scatenas did *527in this case are burdens, not assets to society and that they should be punished to the full extent of the law. And they have been so punished. Apart from the conviction for risking a catastrophe, Elmo Scatena has been sentenced to a jail term and fines of almost $200,000 for violation of the Clean Streams Law and of regulations prohibiting the discharge of waste into mines. His sons have been sentenced to a term of probation and each has been fined $127,500 for violations of the Clean Streams Law and the discharge regulations. It may well be that even these penalties are inadequate social responses to the criminal acts committed by the Scatenas, but if that is true, it is the business of the legislature, not of this Court to redress that deficiency. It is our responsibility and it has been this Court’s long and distinguished tradition to safeguard the due process rights of all citizens of this Commonwealth by requiring that criminal convictions may not stand unless they are grounded on the firmament of competent legal evidence which establishes beyond any reasonable doubt every element of the crime as charged. Such evidence has not been presented in this case and the conviction of risking a catastrophe should be reversed.
NIX, C.J., and ZAPPALA, J., joins this dissenting opinion.Although the majority does not discuss the totality of the Commonwealth’s case on risking a catastrophe, the Commonwealth’s theories of the case were that the Scatenas had risked catastrophe by producing one or more of the following perils: (1) the danger of explosion within the underground workings of the Butler Mine Tunnel; (2) the generation and possible release of poisonous cyanide gas from within the abandoned mine; and (3) the discharge of dangerous chemicals into the Susquehanna River.
As the foregoing discussion has indicated, the Commonwealth failed to establish that a catastrophe might have resulted from the discharge of chemicals into the river. The other Commonwealth arguments are also without merit.
As to the Commonwealth’s assertion that it established the danger of explosion within the underground workings of the mine, there is no evidence to support this claim. The Commonwealth’s expert witnesses testified that in two separate measurements of explosivity at the Butler Mine Tunnel, the level of explosivity was only approximately 30% of that required for an explosive atmosphere. Furthermore, there was no evidence at all on the potential damage of an underground explosion. It is possible, without evidence of record to the contrary, that an underground explosion would not have posed dangers to anyone. Since it was the Commonwealth's theory that the inner workings of the mine contained an explosive atmosphere and that there was a danger to the public because of this, the Commonwealth should have introduced such evidence by way of expert witnesses and hypothetical questions.
The attorney for the Commonwealth, at the close of the stated: I believe that Mr. Vincinelly [Commissioner of Deep Mine Safety, Department of Environmental Resources] and Mr. Meyer [a private consultant working for the Department of Environmental Resources] both indicated that there was combustible gasses coming out of that tunnel when they arrived there and Mr. Vincinelly did not express his opinion as to what would have gone on further up the tunnel but their opinions were limited to the mouth of the tunnel and what was occurring there; that there was a thirty per cent level of gasses at this point.
N.T. 1446. (Emphasis supplied). Although the Commonwealth’s theory was that explosive concentrations of gas existed "further up the tunnel,” the attorney for the Commonwealth did not introduce any evidence to this effect. As defense counsel later stated when he demurred to the evidence, “[I]f we take all of the evidence of the *526Commonwealth it shows just the opposite, that there was no danger.” N.T. 1448. Defense counsel’s assessment of the evidence is correct.
As to the second Commonwealth assertion, that there was evidence of the presence of poisonous cyanide gas in the mine, this contention also is without merit. The evidence establishes that cyanide gas probably was present in the mine, but nowhere is it established that the concentration of cyanide gas was lethal.
The Commonwealth’s evidence established that cyanide dissolved in water was present in the Butler Mine Tunnel outflow at levels of .31 to .02 milligrams per liter, or .31 to .02 parts per million. A defense expert testified that cyanide gas which would be formed by this concentration of cyanide dissolved in water would be 1.2 parts per million and that this is well within the maximum safe level for cyanide gas in industrial workplaces as determined by OSHA at 4 parts per million.
On cross examination, the Commonwealth established that when industrial waste cyanide was poured into acid minewater, hydrogen cyanide, or cyanide gas would be formed. It also established that, in principle, pouring cyanide liquid into an acid solution is how cyanide gas is formed in gas chambers.
However, when the Commonwealth posed a hypothetical question as to what would happen when 5,500 gallons of a 5% solution of cyanide was mixed with minewater having a pH factor of 4, the question and answer were properly stricken because there was nothing in evidence that a 5% cyanide concentration was in the case. Moreover, there was no other evidence of the strength of cyanide gas that would be formed in the mine by the dumping of industrial waste, except evidence from a defense expert that no significant toxic amounts of cyanide gas would be produced from the concentrations of cyanide that were in evidence.
Furthermore, it was not established how this gas, assuming it to exist in lethal quantity, would cause a catastrophe. Although it was stated that cyanide gas is slightly lighter than other gases and would rise, possibly through boreholes, it was not established how this rising gas might cause what the Hughes case termed "widespread injury or damage.” There was no evidence of record as to how many holes the gas might rise through, where these holes were located, or how the gas would be dispersed from the holes in such a way that widespread injury or damage might occur. Rather, what the Commonwealth established was that it was conceivable that lethal cyanide gas might escape from boreholes and cause localized injury.
Thus, the Commonwealth failed to produce the requisite evidence in any of these three areas which would establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the Scatenas risked a catastrophe. It may well be that a catastrophe was risked, but if it was, it is the prosecutor’s duty to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the risk was present. This he did not do.