dissenting:
While I do not dissent from the analysis of the underlying issues set forth by my colleague, Judge Beck, I do dissent from that portion of the opinion which would have our Court assume jurisdiction over this matter.
In my view, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762, which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Commonwealth Court of certain types of appeals, definitely encompasses actions involving nonprofit corporations when dealing with the affairs of the corporations, its members, employees, or others. While it is true that neither party has objected to the Superior Court’s jurisdiction, it is my belief that in the areas reserved by the general assembly for Commonwealth Court determination, we would best serve the interest of justice by seeing to it that those issues in those areas are sent to the Commonwealth Court for disposition. We could thus prevent conflicting bodies of law developing in the intermediate appellate courts on similar issues.
For example, a panel of our Court recently filed an opinion which held that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8542 precluded municipal liability for injuries caused by the criminal acts of third persons on property under the municipality’s ownership and control. Casey v. Geiger, and the Borough of Camp Hill, 346 Pa.Super. 279, 499 A.2d 606 (1985) (Hoff*412man, J. dissenting). One month earlier, the Commonwealth Court filed an opinion which seems to reach the opposite result. Johnson v. SEPTA, 91 Pa.Cmwlth. 587, 498 A.2d 22 (1985), (Craig, J. dissenting); (Barry, J. concurring). It is this sort of problem I would hope to avoid by transferring this case.
For these reasons, I dissent from that portion of the opinion of my colleagues that retains jurisdiction in the Superior Court.