dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The thousands of instances in which defendants fail to appear for trial in the State of Maryland, which I will note later, seriously disrupt the calendars of the courts and inconvenience a multitude of jurors and witnesses. There are potentially tens of thousands of witnesses, including police officers and jurors, persons fulfilling their civic duties, whose lives and occupations and the services they perform for the public, are disrupted needlessly and seriously by the conduct of defendants who willfully fail to appear.
Although this case concerns the single witness whose life and income was seriously disrupted, the holding of the majority goes far beyond the instant case in terms of potential societal disruption caused by those who, like the defendant in this case, knowingly and voluntarily fail to appear at his or her criminal trial. We are the last arbiters of justice in this State. With all due respect for the learned and scholarly opinion of my colleague writing for the majority, I do not believe that justice is served by permitting recalcitrant and obstructive defendants to stay home voluntarily and disrupt not only the judicial system, but the lives of the civic-minded citizens of this State.
It is appropriate, I believe, to be cognizant of the nature of constitutional rights. I begin with certain relevant provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. It is important to note that it is not a Declaration of Requirements.
Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides that the “Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to ... trial by Jury.” (Emphasis added.) Article 21 states with respect to criminal cases that every person “hath a right to be informed of the accusation against him; ... to be allowed counsel; *226[and] to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” (Emphasis added.) Part of the Maryland constitutional right to be present at one’s trial is grounded in an individual’s right to confront the witnesses against him or her. Again, this is an individual’s right to confront that a court must afford a defendant; it is not a mandatory constitutional requirement of confrontation because a criminal defendant can waive that right.
Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Maryland’s due process clause, provides that no person shall be “imprisoned or ... deprived of his life, liberty or property, but ... by the Law of the land.” With respect to this due process right, we noted in the civil case of Heft v. Maryland Racing Commission, 323 Md. 257, 270-71, 592 A.2d 1110, 1117 (1991), which involved an administrative hearing, that
[e]ven though one may have a constitutional right to a particular procedure, that right may be subjected to a reasonable requirement that some action be taken within a specified time in order to exercise the right. The failure to take such action in a timely manner constitutes a waiver of the right. [Citations omitted.]
In Maryland, generally, a defendant is required to appear for a criminal trial by reason of the provisions of his arrest and subsequent release pending trial. Some relevant provisions include sections 594B to 594D of Article 27, relating to arrests; section 616)6 of Article 27, relating to bail; and Maryland Rule 4-216, regarding pretrial release of a criminal defendant. Maryland Rule 4-231, the rule affording a criminal defendant the right to be present at trial, also imposes a requirement upon a criminal defendant that he or she be present for trial. It states:
Rule 4-231. Presence of defendant.
(a) When presence required. A defendant shall be present at all times when required by the court....
(b) Right to be present—Exceptions. A defendant is entitled to be present at a preliminary hearing and every stage of the trial, except (1) at a conference or argument on *227a question of law; (2) when a nolle prosequi or stet is entered pursuant to Rules 4-247 and 4-248; or (3) at a reduction of sentence pursuant to Rules 4-344 and 4-345. [Some emphasis added.]
To transmute a criminal defendant’s right to be present into the same type of absolute requirement of presence, a direction in which I believe the majority’s opinion leads, is in my view not required by the United States and Maryland Constitutions, the Maryland statutes, or the Maryland rules.
Pinkney had a right to be present at his trial. He was afforded that right. The trial court scheduled his trial and notified him of the date, time, and place of trial. It is absolutely uncontradicted that he was aware of his trial date. The trial court provided that time and place on the date scheduled and it required the State and its witnesses to stand ready to participate in the trial, which Pinkney clearly had a constitutional right to attend. The trial court, at that point, performed all that the constitutions, statutes, and rules require; it afforded to Pinkney all that was necessary for him to assert his constitutional right of presence. It gave him a full opportunity to be present for trial. There is absolutely no evidence that any person or thing, other than Pinkney himself, interfered with the exercise of his right to be present. According to his attorney’s statement at sentencing, because Pinkney suffered some type of seizure shortly before trial, he was not in the right frame of mind on the date trial was to commence.
The concept of the right to do something connotes, if it is to be a right and not a requirement, the right not to do something. When one has a constitutional right, that right incorporates the right to do something or the constitutional right not to do something. When Pinkney voluntarily chose not to be present, he exercised his constitutional right to be present by not being present. His presence is required under other statutory and/or constitutional provisions mandating one to stand trial when charged with a criminal offense. These requirements, however, are the rights of the State generally to require presence, not the exercise of one’s right to be present. *228In considering in absentia issues, we should take great care in not confusing the two concepts.
If every time one of the tens of thousands of criminal defendants going through our court system failed to appear for trial, the trial courts were required to hold pretrial investigations and hearings on the issue of voluntariness, during which the courts required its officials to contact hospitals, doctors, offices, homes, and friends, in order to determine whether the defendant was voluntarily absent, an already beleaguered and overworked system would become more burdened. The majority notes, approvingly, that in Barnett, the trial court’s law clerk called twenty-nine hospitals in an effort to find Barnett. What happens in a county with no hospitals? Does the trial judge in Denton call hospitals in Delaware? How many hospitals is enough? How many jails should be called? How many of a defendant’s friends should be called? To impose upon the trial courts the extra burden of finding a defendant who is aware of his trial date, but is absent nonetheless, is, I respectfully suggest, neither constitutionally required nor wise.
It is possible, as I will show, to fully protect the right of a defendant to be present without imposing an extensive obligation on the trial courts to guarantee the voluntariness of all defendants’ non-appearances and to balance an almost unlimited number of public interests, a virtually impossible task. In that respect, I believe it helpful to discuss how other jurisdictions have addressed this problem and then attempt to place their efforts into different classifications. At least twenty-three state courts addressed the issue recently: Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. Additionally, numerous federal circuit courts of appeal, as well as the Supreme Court of the United States, have addressed this issue relatively recently.
*229This case law elsewhere, however, does not coalesce into any single standard with respect to the voluntariness aspect of in absentia trials. It is left to this Court to compartmentalize the decisions and select from the several standards that are constitutional, or a combination of their holdings, what is appropriate for Maryland defendants and for Maryland.
In this discussion of a criminal defendant’s right to be present at trial, I will address three concepts. The first two, which are interrelated, concern the holding of in absentia trials and the finding that a criminal defendant waived his or her right to be present at trial. These two issues will be discussed together. The third issue relates to the remedy to which a criminal defendant may be entitled when he or she was tried in absentia and later asserts he or she did not voluntarily waive his or her constitutional right to be present at trial.
TRIAL IN ABSENTIA, VOLUNTARINESS, AND WAIVER
The holding of a criminal trial without the defendant’s presence and the waiver of one’s constitutional right to be present at trial are two interrelated and inseparable concepts. No trial can be held in absentia unless a determination is made that a criminal defendant waived his or her right to be present at trial by voluntarily absenting himself or herself from the proceedings. The relevant inquiry, then, is under what circumstances will a voluntary waiver be found such that a trial in absentia may take place.
In addition to a defendant’s constitutional right to be present at trial, most states, including Maryland, and the federal courts have enacted rules or statutes regarding the right of a criminal defendant to be present at trial. These rules or statutes affect, to some extent, a court’s ability to find that a criminal defendant waived his or her right to be present. For purposes of this discussion, the case law regarding these rules and statutes with regard to in absentia trials can be divided into two general classifications: (A) jurisdictions in which the *230defendant’s presence is required at the commencement of the proceedings, and (B) jurisdictions in which the defendant’s presence is not required at the commencement of the proceedings.
Within each of these two broad classifications, there are further distinctions regarding the circumstances under which a waiver of a defendant’s constitutional right to be present at trial may be found. These distinctions with respect to waiver will be examined along with the discussion regarding the two general classifications.
A. Presence Required at Commencement of Proceedings
The federal courts and some state courts interpret their rules or statutes regarding the presence of the defendant at a criminal trial as prohibiting the commencement of a trial without the criminal defendant’s presence. Stated another way, in these jurisdictions no finding of waiver of a criminal defendant’s right to be present at trial can be found when the defendant fails to show up at the commencement of the trial.
Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 113 S.Ct. 748, 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993), is the leading case in those jurisdictions requiring that a trial be in progress with the defendant present in order to find a subsequent waiver of a defendant’s right to be present when he absconds later during the proceedings. Although these cases are not directly relevant in that the trial in the case sub judice commenced in absentia, the cases discussing this view are helpful in their treatment of the issue of voluntariness and waiver.
The Supreme Court in Crosby interpreted Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as requiring the trial to have commenced with the defendant present for the trial to continue in absentia after the defendant had absconded. Prior to Crosby, several federal circuit courts interpreting Rule 43 construed it more broadly. See, e.g., United-States v. Houtchens, 926 F.2d 824, 826-27 (9th Cir.1991) (‘We ... hold that a defendant may be tried in absentia when, after sufficient notice, he or she knowingly and voluntarily fails to *231appear for trial. To hold otherwise, ‘would allow an accused at large upon bail to immobilize the commencement of a criminal trial and frustrate an already overtaxed judicial system until the trial date meets, if ever, with his pleasure and convenience.’” (quoting Government of Virgin Islands v. Brown, 507 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir.1975))); Brewer v. Raines, 670 F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir.1982) (rejecting argument that defendant can waive right to be present at trial only if the defendant absconds after the trial has commenced).
In Crosby, the defendant attended several preliminary hearings during which he received notice of his trial date, but failed to appear at the commencement of his trial. On the day of trial, codefendants and numerous witnesses were present. The trial court received some indication that day that Crosby may have absconded.
After waiting several days for the defendant to appear, the trial court, finding that Crosby had waived his right to be present by voluntarily absenting himself from the commencement of trial, ordered the trial to begin five days after its initial scheduled date. Crosby’s attorney was present and objected to a trial in absentia. Crosby ultimately was convicted.
The Supreme Court reversed based upon its interpretation of the federal rule. That rule provided:
(a) PRESENCE REQUIRED. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial ... except as otherwise provided by this rule.
(b) CONTINUED PRESENCE NOT REQUIRED. The further progress of the trial to and including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and the defendant shall be considered to have waived the right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present,
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 258, 113 S.Ct. at 751, 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (emphasis added).
Although basing its decision on the language of the rule, the Supreme Court, in rejecting the government’s argument that *232the rule was intended merely to restate the common law, noted that the Court had modified the common law in Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912), only as to ongoing trials. In Diaz, the defendant voluntarily absented himself on two occasions from a trial in progress.
The Supreme Court also addressed the lower court’s reasoning, which had stated that “ ‘[i]t would be anomalous to attach more significance to a defendant’s absence at commencement than to absence during more important substantive portions of the trial’ ” Crosby, 506 U.S. at 261, 113 S.Ct. at 752, 122 L.Ed.2d 25(quoting United States v. Crosby, 917 F.2d 362, 365 (8th Cir.1990)). The Supreme Court responded: “While it may be true that there are no ‘talismonic properties which differentiate the commencement of a trial from later stages,’ we do not find the distinction between pretrial and midtrial flight so farfetched as to convince us that Rule 43 cannot mean what it says.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court explained its reasons for its interpretation of the rule:
There are additional practical reasons for distinguishing between flight before and flight during a trial. As did Diaz, the Rule treats midtrial flight as a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to be present. Whether or not the right constitutionally may be waived in other circumstances— and we express no opinion here on that subject—the defendant’s initial presence serves to assure that any waiver is indeed knowing.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court then concluded:
The language, history, and logic of Rule 43 supports a straight forward interpretation that prohibits the trial in absentia of a defendant who is not present at the beginning of trial. Because we find Rule 43 dispositive, we do not reach Crosby’s claim that his trial in absentia was also prohibited by the Constitution.
Id. at 262, 113 S.Ct. at 753, 122 L.Ed.2d 25.
The federal circuits have, of course, followed the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Crosby. Some state courts also have *233followed Crosby in interpreting their rules or statutes. Cases following a similar rule with regard to waiver at the commencement of the proceedings include: United States v. Lacey, 990 F.2d 586, 586 (10th Cir.1993); United, States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139, 1141-42 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 979, 932, 113 S.Ct. 2979, 3062, 125 L.Ed.2d 676, 744 (1993); Meadows v. State, 644 So.2d 1342, 1345-46 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); Reece v. State, 325 Ark. 465, 467-68, 928 S.W.2d 334, 335-36 (1996); Jarrett v. State, 654 So.2d 973, 975 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995); Villaverde v. State, 673 So.2d 745 (Miss.1996); State v. Meade, 80 Ohio St.3d 419, 687 N.E.2d 278 (1997); State v. Hammond, 121 Wash.2d 787, 791-92, 854 P.2d 637, 639-40 (1993); State v. Crafton, 72 Wash.App. 98, 101-02, 863 P.2d 620, 622 (1993).
Although these cases and others following Crosby may not be relevant to the extent that they prohibit the commencement of a criminal trial when the defendant fails to appear, they are relevant to the extent they discuss waiver of the right to be present after the proceedings have commenced. They also are relevant as to the procedure to be utilized by the trial courts in determining whether a criminal defendant waived his or her right to be present at trial and as to the procedural requirements a criminal defendant must undertake to challenge the trial court’s decision to proceed in absentia.
B. Presence Not Required at Commencement of Proceedings
A number of jurisdictions interpret their rules or statutes regarding a criminal defendant’s presence at trial so as to make no distinction between the absence of a criminal defendant at the commencement of trial and the absence of a defendant at some point during the trial. These jurisdictions do not interpret their rules or statutes as restricting the holding of a trial in absentia only when a defendant absconds after his or her trial has commenced. It is this group to which Maryland belongs.
*234Walker v. State, 338 Md. 253, 658 A.2d 239 (1997).
This Court in Walker explicitly rejected the Crosby reasoning in interpreting Maryland Rule 4-231(c). In Walker, the defendants were released on bond prior to trial. Eight days before their trial was to begin, they disappeared from their apartment in Montgomery County. The cases were called for trial on the scheduled date, and the defendants failed to appear. After a discussion with the defendants’ attorneys, the trial court found that the defendants had notice of the trial date and location of the trial. It then ruled that the defendants would be tried in absentia.
After the defendants were convicted, they were apprehended in Zambia. They were returned to the United States and after sentencing, appealed their convictions. We set forth the issue and contentions of the parties:
This case presents the question of whether a trial court may permit a criminal trial to proceed in the defendant’s absence if the defendant is informed of when the trial will commence and then voluntarily fails to appear on that date. We answer in the affirmative.
Walter and Lee argue that Barnett should be overruled, on the basis that this Court misconstrued Rule 4-231(c). They contend that, contrary to our holding in Barnett, this Rule permits trial in absentia only when a defendant absconds after trial has commenced.
... The appellants suggest that this Rule [Md. Rule 4-231(c) ] was modeled after Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43, and that our interpretation of the Maryland provision should therefore be guided by federal court pronouncements regarding the Federal Rule. In Crosby v. United States, [506] U.S. [255], 113 S.Ct. 748, 122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993), decided after Barnett, the United States Supreme Court held that Federal Rule 43 does not permit a trial in absentia when the defendant absconds prior to the commencement of trial. Walker and Lee argue that this interpretation undermines the continued vitality of Barnett.
*235Walker, 338 Md. at 255-60, 658 A.2d at 240-42 (footnotes omitted).
We initially noted that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a federal rule does not bind this Court in its interpretation of a Maryland Rule, even if the Maryland Rule is patterned after the federal rule. We then held:
This reasoning [of the Supreme Court in Crosby ] is inapposite to our interpretation of Maryland Rule 4-231(c). Rule 4-231(c)(3), which has no analog in the federal rule, permits the trial court to find a waiver of the right to be present whenever the defendant, “personally or through counsel, agrees to or acquiesces in being absent.” We relied on this provision to find a waiver of common-law rights in Barnett. 307 Md. at 204, 512 A.2d at 1076. We see nothing in Crosby that invites a reexamination of that conclusion.
Id. at 261, 658 A.2d at 242 (emphasis added).
Within this category of cases that permit in absentia trials when a defendant is not present at the commencement, some states require an additional hurdle for a trial to commence without the presence of a criminal defendant. These states require that the defendant have knowledge that the trial may commence in his or her absence in order for the trial to proceed.
Notice That Trial In Absentia May Be Held
All jurisdictions require that a defendant have notice of the trial date in order to find the defendant waived his or her right to be present at trial. Some jurisdictions also require that the defendant have notice of the consequences, i.e., that if he or she fails to appear, he or she will be tried in absentia. For instance, the Court of Appeals of Virginia in Hunter v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 187, 409 S.E.2d 483 (1991), held that an individual, even if notified of his or her trial date and time, could not be tried in absentia unless he or she also had been advised that if he or she failed to appear, he or she would be tried in absentia. It was clear that Hunter had actual *236knowledge of the trial date. Additionally, the trial court found he had voluntarily absented himself.
The court noted that in one case1 in which the condition of a defendant’s bond stated, “Failure to appear may result in your being tried and convicted in your absence,” Id. at 191, 409 S.E.2d at 485, it had held that a defendant had waived his right to be present. In a later case,2 however, the court held that similar language in a bond was not a sufficient basis to find that a nonappearing defendant had notice he could be tried in absentia. The court then held in Hunter:
A voluntary and intelligent waiver ... could be shown by establishing that an officer of the court has explained to the defendant that failure to appear at trial could result in his being tried in his absence. Here ... no Sisk warnings were given.... We ...' hold that voluntary absence, standing alone, does not constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver.
Id. at 193, 409 S.E.2d at 486.
Similarly, in Cruz v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 454, 482 S.E.2d 880 (1997), the defendant, after his arrest, was released on his own recognizance. The recognizance form he signed provided that if he failed to appear for trial, the court could try and convict him in his absence. He signed another form at his arraignment acknowledging the same information and furnishing the exact trial date. The defendant subsequently failed to appear for trial and was tried in absentia over his counsel’s objection. The trial court, reasoning that the trial should continue, stated: “[S]o we don’t have witnesses coming in here. We don’t have everybody ready for trial. We don’t have a jury sitting around and a defendant decides that he prefers to be somewhere else.” Id. at 459, 482 S.E.2d at 882.
The trial court further stated that Cruz’s absence did not mean “the witnesses, the Commonwealth, the Jury and the *237Court should suffer any further prejudice.” Id. When Cruz appeared for sentencing, his counsel again objected to the in absentia trial, proffering that Cruz drank too much the night before trial and had overslept.
The court noted that under Virginia law, “an accused can waive the right to be present for the entire trial.” Id. at 461, 482 S.E.2d at 888. The court, however, noted that a defendant must be notified of his trial date and that he will be tried even if he does not appear for trial:
“[Vjoluntary waiver ... cannot be shown unless the defendant (1) has been given notice of his trial date; and (2) has been warned that his failure to appear could result in a trial in his absence.
Cruz’s explanation that he missed trial because he drank too much and overslept clearly supports the trial court’s finding that his absence was, indeed, voluntary.”
Id. at 463, 482 S.E.2d at 884.
Arizona imposes similar requirements. In State v. Muniz-Caudilto, 185 Ariz. 261, 914 P.2d 1353, 1354 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1996), the Arizona Court of Appeals noted: “The trial court may infer that a defendant’s absence is voluntary if the defendant had personal knowledge of the time of his proceeding, his right to be present, and the warning that the proceeding would take place in his absence if he failed to appear.” See also State v. Sainz, 186 Ariz. 470, 924 P.2d 474 (Ariz.Ct.App.1996).
Voluntary Absence Sufficient to Find a Waiver
A number of state courts are of the view that a trial may commence without the defendant’s presence if the defendant voluntarily absents himself or herself from the trial. The Supreme Court of Indiana in Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, modified in part on reh’g, 685 N.E.2d 698 (Ind.1997), examined a situation in which the defendant, who was present for his initial hearing, failed to appear for the scheduled trial date. The trial court rescheduled the trial, and the defendant again failed to appear. The defendant then was tried in absentia.
*238On appeal, the defendant asserted that because he did not have notice of the rescheduled trial date, he was tried improperly in absentia. The court disagreed stating:
A defendant may ... be tried in absentia if the trial court determines that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived that right. The best evidence that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her right to be present at trial is the [absent] “defendant’s presence in court on the day the matter is set for trial.”
... The fact that he knew of his trial date and failed to appear ... is evidence that he knowingly and voluntarily was absent.
Id. at 1273 (citations omitted).
In State v. Finklea, 147 N.J. 211, 686 A.2d 322, 323 (1996), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 110, 139 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that “once a defendant has been given actual notice of a scheduled trial date, nonappearance on the scheduled or adjourned trial date is deemed a waiver of the right to be present during the trial.” See also State v. Hudson, 119 N.J. 165, 574 A.2d 434 (1990)(upholding defendants’ convictions in absentia where both defendants had knowledge of the time and place of trial and their reasons for not showing up were inexcusable); State v. Ellis, 299 N.J.Super. 440, 691 A.2d 403, cert. denied, 151 N.J. 74, 697 A.2d 546 (1997)(upholding defendant’s conviction in absentia where he had knowledge of the trial date, time, and location and failed to proffer a valid reason for his absence).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed an intermediate appellate court’s decision, which had held that an accused did not waive his right to be present if he failed to appear for trial in Commonwealth v. Sullens, 533 Pa. 99, 619 A.2d 1349 (1992). That court said:
The Superior Court [an intermediate appellate court] reasoned that to permit a defendant to halt the proceedings by absconding during trial would encourage him to avoid an expected verdict of guilt. It is equally apparent that apply*239ing a different rule when a defendant fails to appear at all, ... has precisely the same effect: it encourages a defendant to ignore his summons to trial if he thinks a guilty verdict is likely, secure in the knowledge that he cannot be convicted until he is apprehended. In the words of the late Mr. Justice McDermott: “No society on earth offers more than we do to preserve and protect the rights of those held for trial. It is more than simple discourtesy not to attend. It is an anarchical contempt of everything that so many have died to preserve.”
... We hold that when a defendant is absent without cause at the time his trial is scheduled to begin, he may be tried in absentia.
Id. at 103-04, 619 A.2d at 1351-52. See also Commonwealth v. Martinez, 413 Pa.Super. 454, 457, 605 A.2d 811, 813, cert. denied, 533 Pa. 608, 618 A.2d 399 (1992) (“The effect of this Court allowing appellant to abscond without explanation and to reintroduce herself to the judicial process at her convenience would be to place appellant in command of the legal system.”).
This line of cases demonstrates that a voluntary waiver may be found any time, either before trial commences or during trial, when a criminal defendant voluntarily absents himself or herself from the proceedings provided the defendant has notice of the time and place of trial.
FINDING WAIVER OF RIGHT OF PRESENCE
The next issue that must be examined is how a trial court is to make the determination that a criminal defendant voluntarily waived his or her right to be present at trial. I have already discussed the line of cases requiring defendants to be notified the trial may proceed in his or her absence for courts to find that he or she voluntarily waived his or her right to be present at trial. In Barnett, the defendant asserted he could not be tried in absentia unless he had “been informed in some manner of the consequences of failure to appear for trial.” *240307 Md. at 206, 512 A.2d at 1077. We rejected that contention, stating: “We are not persuaded that those Supreme Court decisions are authority for the proposition that the waiver of rights involving presence at trial requires knowledge of ‘the consequences of failing to appear for trial[.]’ ” Id. at 211, 512 A.2d at 1080. Accordingly, in Maryland, a trial court may find that the defendant voluntarily absented himself or herself from trial, and therefore waived his or her right to be present, despite the defendant’s lack of knowledge of the consequences of failing to appear.
Voluntary waiver of a defendant’s right to be present at trial may be shown where the defendant has notice of the time and place of trial and he or her she fails to appear. Moreover, the federal cases prior to Federal Rule 43, and even those since Crosby, in which defendants abscond after their trial commences, seem, as to voluntariness, to be compatible with the position of many state courts: (1) that the voluntariness of a defendant’s absence can be shown by the absence itself, if not satisfactorily explained, and (2) that a defendant’s post conviction failure to assert properly reasons why his absence was involuntary may be a further waiver of his right to be present.
In United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied sub nom. Jefferson v. United States, 516 U.S. 1135, 116 S.Ct. 961, 133 L.Ed.2d 883 (1996), one of Davis’s codefendants, McBride, was present when the trial commenced. She was absent, however, during the second week of trial because, as was known to all parties and to the court, she was hospitalized as a result of a suicide attempt. The remainder of the trial was held, as to McBride, in absentia. The trial court had found that McBride’s ingestment of the pills during her suicide attempt was voluntary. Therefore, the court held that her absence due to the resulting hospitalization also was voluntary.3 After the jury returned a verdict, a hearing was *241held on McBride’s “Motion for New Trial” based upon her absence from trial and whether her absence was voluntary. McBride chose not to testify. Evidence was presented during the hearing that she had said on the Friday before her Monday absence from court that she was not coming back.
The Fifth Circuit, after noting the federal rule, quoted the Second Circuit case of Tortora, 464 F.2d at 1208, for the policy behind the voluntary absence rule:
The deliberate absence of a defendant who knows that he stands accused in a criminal case and that the trial will begin on a day certain indicates nothing less than an intention to obstruct the orderly processes of justice. No defendant has a unilateral right to set the time or circumstances under which cases will be tried....
Without this obligation on the accused the disposition of criminal cases would be subject to the whims of defendants who could frustrate the speedy satisfaction of justice by absenting themselves from their trials.
Davis, 61 F.3d at 302.
The court, in adopting the Second Circuit’s position, discussed the procedure to be used in order to continue in absentia:
[I]n deciding whether to proceed ... despite the defendants’ absence the [trial] court must determine (1) whether the defendant’s absence is knowing and voluntary, and (2) if so, whether the public interest in the need to proceed clearly outweighs that of the voluntarily absent defendant in attending the trial. We review the district court’s finding that the defendant’s absence is voluntary for clear error. The decision to proceed without a voluntarily absent defendant is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 302 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Davis court observed factually, as to the first step:
*242The record evidence reveals that McBride was depressed and did not wish to face trial and the prospect of a conviction. A defendant cannot disrupt a trial for these reasons. McBride’s refusal to attend the trial was knowing and voluntary and constitutes a waiver of her right to be present.
Id. at 303.
The contention that a trial court should take evidence or make some inquiry as to a defendant’s absence in order to determine whether a defendant voluntarily waived his or her right to be present at trial has been rejected by some courts. In State v. Galloway, 16 Kan.App.2d 54, 817 P.2d 1124 (1991), the defendant failed to appear on the last day of his trial. His trial and conviction in absentia were upheld. An issue on appeal was that the trial court had found Galloway to be voluntarily absent but had not made “sufficient inquiry as to the circumstances causing the absence.” Id. at 55, 817 P.2d at 1125. At a post trial hearing on defendant’s motion for acquittal or new trial, the defendant asserted he was absent because he had gone to a hospital on the day of trial. There was, however, no evidence in the record that Galloway had gone to the hospital because Galloway failed to notify the court or his attorney of his whereabouts. The trial court denied the defendant’s motions.
In discussing the trial court’s finding of waiver, the appellate court noted:
[Vjoluntary absence can be found when the defendant, released on bond, is not in custody and was not prevented from being present. There does not appear to be any requirement that the court inquire as to why the defendant is absent or whether someone has tried to contact or locate the defendant.
Id. at 57, 817 P.2d at 1126.
The Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Harris, 291 Or. 179, 630 P.2d 332 (1981), also rejected such a contention, stating:
Neither the defendant nor the Court of Appeals has suggested that the trial court had to take evidence to afford *243a basis for the decision that defendant had voluntarily absented himself. The trial court’s decision to proceed was obviously not based upon sworn testimony or other evidence, as such. Rather, it was based upon the trial judge’s own knowledge of what had transpired before him, the statements of defendant’s counsel, the trial judge’s own judicial experience in matters of this kind and, we believe, a certain measure of common sense and judgment.
Id. at 185-86, 630 P.2d at 335 (footnote omitted).
See also Donta v. Commonwealth, 858 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Ky.Ct.App.1993) (“[Although the commonwealth has the burden [as to voluntariness] ... it may be inferred that a defendant’s absence met this standard where it is shown that such defendant had knowledge of the trial date and failed to appear.”) (emphasis added); Finklea, 147 N.J. at 220, 686 A.2d at 327 (rejecting contention that trial court was required to hold a hearing as to the issue of waiver prior to proceeding in absentia).
I believe that the view espoused in these cases is the appropriate course for Maryland. Trial courts should not be burdened with the requirement to take evidence or make some type of inquiry into the defendant’s absence. Voluntary absence may be inferred from the defendant’s failure to appear for trial if he or she has notice of the time and date of the trial. Once the trial court has found that the defendant voluntarily absented himself or herself from trial, the court should be able, if it chooses, to proceed to try the defendant in absentia.
DEFENDANT’S REMEDY
Although a holding that allows a trial to proceed in absentia whenever a criminal defendant is found to have absented himself or herself voluntarily from trial may seem unusual, it is not unconstitutional. Moreover, its effect has been tempered in other jurisdictions by allowing a defendant who was absent from trial to present evidence at a later hearing, either on a motion for mistrial or motion for new trial, or other *244appropriate pleading, that his or her absence was not voluntary.
For instance, in Finklea, 147 N.J. at 220-21, 686 A.2d at 327, the New Jersey Supreme Court, discussing its court rules and voluntary waiver, stated:
Rule 3:20-2 requires a defendant who wishes to assert that he or she did not waive his or her appearance for trial to make a motion for new trial prior to sentencing. At a hearing on the motion, a defendant has the burden to show why the defendant’s voluntary absence ... after receiving actual notice ... does not constitute a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to be present.... Where, as here, ... a defendant ... fails to file the appropriate motion challenging the waiver, the failure to make the appropriate motion ... constitutes a second waiver pursuant to Rule 3:16(b). [Some emphasis added.]
See also Sainz, 186 Ariz. at 473, 924 P.2d at 477 (“If subsequently discovered facts show that a defendant’s absence was not voluntary, then it is error to ignore the reality of the situation and adhere to the limited facts known to the trial court at the time of the defendant’s absence.”); Sullens, 533 Pa. at 106, 619 A.2d at 1353 (Papadakos, J., concurring)(“At sentencing, when the defendant appears, if he can establish that he had good cause for his absence at trial, he would be entitled to a new trial.”); People v. Reyna, 289 Ill.App.3d 835, 838, 225 Ill.Dec. 114, 116, 682 N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (1997)(“A defendant who is tried in absentia is entitled to a new proceeding if he establishes that his failure to appear was both not his fault and caused by circumstances beyond his control.”); Cruz, 24 Va.App. at 466, 482 S.E.2d at 886(“No prejudice would result to a defendant who was absent as a result of a medical or other unanticipated emergency---Sentencing would have been stayed ... until he ... was accorded the opportunity to justify his absence from the guilt stage of trial. Upon hearing, if the Court was satisfied that the defendant’s absence did not constitute a waiver, a new trial could be ordered.”).
*245CONCLUSION
The approach I have last illustrated is what I believe to be the better practice given the magnitude of the failure to appear problem.4 I proffer that the trial courts should be *246permitted to proceed in absentia if they can establish from the record that (1) the defendant had actual notice of the time, date, and place of trial; (2) the defendant did not appear at the time, date and place of trial; (3) the trial court knew of no reason, such as inclement weather, why a defendant’s absence was involuntary; and (4) the trial court was presented with no evidence that would create an inference that the absence was involuntary. If voluntariness is established, I believe no other inquiry or balancing test is necessary. At that point, the defendant has waived his right to be present and no balancing test can undo, nor should undo, that waiver. Upon a defendant’s subsequent appearance, he or she could seek a new trial by filing motions for mistrial, new trial, reconsideration, etc., in which he or she could proffer any evidence relating to voluntariness.
I conclude by noting again that I have no quarrel with the majority’s power to create the policy it today establishes. I am, however, compelled to respectfully dissent, as I perceive it to be an inappropriate policy, given, what I believe to be, the magnitude of the failure to appear problem in this State.
. Head v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App. 163, 348 S.E.2d 423 (1986), overruled, Cruz v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 454, 482 S.E.2d 880 (1997).
. Sisk v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App. 459, 350 S.E.2d 676 (1986).
. The trial court continued McBride’s portion of the case for two days and requested that McBride’s lawyers visit her in the hospital to *241impress upon her the importance of being in attendance at trial and that it would proceed even in her absence.
. I have been unable to obtain any exact statistics relating to the number of Failures to Appear occurring on a state-wide basis in the circuit courts, although I later shall attempt to estimate. Nor have I been able to obtain the number of Failures to Appear that occur in "must appear” traffic cases in the District Court. Nonetheless, even without these figures, the potential magnitude of the problem can be surmised from the number of Failures to Appear reflected in the District Court Criminal Filing and Disposition Statistics for July of 1996 through June of 1997 and by estimating, on a statewide basis, the circuit court figures from available statistics from Wicomico County.
During the period from July 1996 to June 1997, there were 11,661 Failures to Appear in criminal cases out of approximately 170,000 cases heard in the District Court, approximately seven percent. (The statistics may not be perfectly accurate. If a defendant was to stand trial in two cases on the same day two Failures to Appear, one in each case, would be entered.) Additionally, almost certainly, there would be a substantial number of Failures to Appear in District Court “must appear” traffic cases, and also in circuit court criminal cases, where generally penalties are more severe.
As an example of the potential problems at the circuit court level, I have obtained Failure to Appear statistics in Wicomico County. In calendar year 1997, there were 260 Failures to Appear in criminal cases alone in Wicomico County. The 1996-1997 Annual Report of the Judiciary indicates that in the period from 1 July 1996 through 30 June 1997, a total of 1922 criminal cases were filed in that county. For the purpose of estimating, I will presume that calendar year statistics approximate 1996-1997 statistics. If so, in Wicomico County, the Failure to Appear rate was 13.5% of the rate of filings. Interestingly, Wicomico County had more Failures to Appear in 1997(260) than trials in 1996-1997(117). Again, this 13.5% figure as to criminal trials may not include other Failures to Appear. When the 13.5% rate of 1997 Failures to Appear is extended to the 1996-1997 statewide circuit court 69,121 criminal filings, the figure is staggering. We can expect there to be 9,331 Failures to Appear in circuit court criminal cases. Accordingly, one can expect over 20,000 Failures to Appear in the District Courts and circuit courts each year. (9,331 + 11,661 = 20,992).
The majority notes that the substance of this footnote is not apparent from the record in this case. The data discussed in this footnote was obtained from either the Administrative Office of the Courts, the records of the District Court of Maryland, the records of the Clerk of Court for Wicomico County and/or from The Annual Report of tile Maryland Judiciciary. Realizing that they were not part of the record below, I have discussed them in a footnote, and consider it appropriate to do so.
*246Moreover, we have taken judicial notice of similar facts in the past. For instance, in In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 682, 304 A.2d 587, 599 (1973), cert. denied sub nom. Broccolino v. Maryland Comm’n on Judicial Disabilities, 415 U.S. 989, 94 S.Ct. 1586, 39 L.Ed.2d 885 (1974), we stated: "We should be closing our eyes to reality were we to fail or refuse to take judicial notice of the fact that the Traffic Division of the Municipal Court, even the Parking Court, was the place where the average citizen was likely to have, if not his first, certainly his most frequent contact with our judicial system.” Other courts similarly have taken judicial notice of such facts. See Renard v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 673 A.2d 1274, 1276 (D.C.App.1996) ("The contents of a court’s records are readily ascertainable facts, particularly appropriate for judicial notice. Thus, generally, a court may take judicial notice of its own records.”(citations omitted)); District of Columbia v. Howie, 230 A.2d 715, 718 (D.C.1967) ( ”[I]t is common knowledge that the Juvenile Court handles a tremendous number of various proceedings .”).