dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Department of Transportation (Department) may suspend William L. Folsom’s license pursuant to Article IV of the Driver’s License Compact (Compact), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581, Art. IV, based upon his out-of-state conviction under the Maine driving under the influence (DUI) statute, Me.Rev.Stat. Tit. 29, § 2411.
In order for the Department to suspend a drivers’ license pursuant to Article IV of the Compact for an out-of-state DUI conviction, among other things, the language of the out-of-state DUI statute must have an effect substantially similar to a requirement that the driver be impaired to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle. Petrovich v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 559 Pa. 614, 741 A.2d 1264 (1999). The courts of Maine have interpreted the Maine DUI statute to require only that the driver’s senses be “impaired however slightly” or “to any extent” by the intoxicant. Maine v. Webster, 754 A.2d 976, 978 (Me.2000); see also Maine v. Bean, 430 A.2d 1109 (Me.1981).
The majority recognizes that Article IV mandates a greater level of impairment than the Maine DUI statute. The majority nevertheless concludes that the Department may suspend Folsom’s license under the Compact because of the enactment of Section 1586 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1586, which the majority concludes has amended the Compact in Pennsylvania such that an out-of-state DUI statute need require only that the driver’s ability to operate a motor vehicle be impaired to any degree in order to provide a basis for reciprocal suspension for purposes of Article IV of the Compact. I cannot agree that Section 1586 has wrought such a sweeping change.
The relevant language of Section 1586 provides merely that a difference in the *123degree of impairment between the out-of-state DUI statute and the Pennsylvania DUI statute, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, may not provide a basis for determining that the out-of-state DUI statute is not substantially similar for purposes of analysis under Article IV of the Compact. Nothing in Section 1586 eliminates the Compact’s requirement that the language of the out-of-state DUI statute be substantially similar in nature to Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact. The Maine DUI statute is not substantially similar to Article IV(a)(2), and therefore it cannot provide a basis for reciprocal suspension. Petrovich. Accordingly, I dissent.