(dissenting).
For nearly a century Iowa Law has provided a scheme for the selection by veterans of the persons who are to superintend veterans memorials. In providing for selection of the commissioners by city hall the majority supplants the legislative plan with one which might seem better. I believe either plan, the legislature’s or the majority’s, is constitutional. It is not for us to decide which plan is preferable. I dissent because I believe the legislative scheme can withstand the constitutional challenge. I would reverse the trial court.
The legislative plan was conceived [Acts of the 21st G.A., 1886, ch. 62, § 3] against the backdrop of a centuries-old debate. That debate was perhaps best summarized by a North Dakota trial judge, quoted in Gehrke v. Board of Com’rs., 58 N.D. 407, 415, 226 N.W. 536, 540 (1929):
“There is not general agreement as to what form a memorial or recognition should take. Many believe it should be characterized by a shaft, obelisk, or tablet, and constructed of granite or other materials that do not readily deteriorate, and that the same should contain proper inscriptions commemorative of persons and deeds. There is no doubt but what such construction would be appropriate. On the other hand, many believe that a more suitable recognition is evidenced by a structure or edifice that can be used and enjoyed by the living.
“It is not necessary to enter into an academic discussion of the merits of these different views. Suffice it to be said that, from the earliest periods of time of civilized man, memorials have frequently taken one or the other form. The instances are numerous throughout the centuries where men have erected, for the purpose of commemorating some distinguished personage, or the occurrence of some great event, memorials consisting of halls, art galleries, libraries, institutions of learning, cathedrals, and other edifices and structures designed for human habitation, enjoyment, and development.”
In allowing a functional sort of memorial, our 1886 legislature was faced with the task of striking a practical balance between the named purpose of the memorials and the public use to which they would be put. The very concept of a veterans memorial is a commingling of direct trjbute and the public funds used for the purpose. The aim is to pay tribute and to use it at the same time.
A delicate question then arose in terms both of enacting the legislation and in later gaining local public approval for specific projects. Are we really providing for veterans memorials? Or are we fishing the shifting tides of patriotism to procure public projects that would otherwise fail? Veterans are not known for their willingness to be exploited. Hence the legislature arrived at the scheme that has remained in effect until now. Veterans themselves shall superintend the memorial. More than that, veterans shall name the veterans who do.
This suit stems from the difficulty in setting up the machinery for veterans to make their selections. It would be impractical to separately register veterans as voters. So, in 1886 the legislature provided for the management of the memorials by three persons named by local posts of the Grand Army of the Republic. Changes in the Code have been made to include participation by every established war veterans organization since.
This background answers one of the criticisms of the plaintiffs. It is argued by the plaintiffs, though not held by the majority, that the work of the commissioners has little to do with war service or veterans *479affairs. The argument is misdirected; it aims at the validity of public purpose war memorials. It is true that the work of the commissioners is rather mundane, not greatly different from the work of large-scale concessionaires. To whatever extent this work is remote from the usual affairs of veterans, it is also remote from the usual affairs of government. In any event the work does have to do with our established scheme of honoring veterans.
Because our nation has depended on the raising of citizen armies we have traditionally expended public funds to foster national military service. Keogh v. Scott County, 25 Iowa 567 (1868). Iowa has often provided a reward, in the form of a bonus, for national military service in time of war. Such expenditures are constitutional. Faber v. Loveless, 249 Iowa 593, 88 N.W.2d 112 (1958). Other states are divided on the question of whether it is a proper expenditure of public funds to erect and provide a building for the exclusive use of veterans organizations. See annot., 162 A.L.R. 943. 77 Am.Jur.2d, Veterans, § 175, pp. 1077-1078; 6 C.J.S. Armed Services § 24, pp. 566-567. The auditorium in this suit is not used exclusively for veterans.
The majority holds the legislative plan for naming commissioners is an unconstitutional delegation of governmental authority. But, given the problem faced by the legislature, and in view of the unique nature and history of war veterans memorials, I fail to see why.
Restraints on delegation of governmental power were explained in Koelling v. Trustees of Skiff Hospital, 259 Iowa 1185, 1190-1191, 146 N.W.2d 484, 487-488 (1967). See also 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 242, p. 499; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 133, pp. 560-561 and § 137, pp. 566-570.
Under these authorities the legislature may lawfully delegate to private groups the administrative responsibility of carrying public purposes into effect. The majority’s finding that § 37.10 is unconstitutional is on the claim that the section delegates to private groups the authority to name persons who will expend public funds. But the function of the commission is to manage and control the memorial. § 37.9, The Code. The incidental authority to expend funds, given as one of many powers under the chapter, is only an adjunct authority, necessary for the management of a public trust. It seems likely, in view of the history of challenges to this particular memorial, that management decisions and not fiscal power, precipitated this litigation.
Time was when we paid more than passing deference to the strong presumption of constitutionality of statutes. We said:
“. . . One who challenges legislation on constitutional grounds has the burden to negate every reasonable basis upon which the statute may be sustained. Where the constitutionality of a statute is merely doubtful or fairly debatable, the courts will not interfere. Thus a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably and without doubt, infringes the constitution. [Authorities.] The legislature is given wide discretion in defining the limits of classes when a statute involves classification of persons or things. If a classification is reasonable and operates equally upon all within the class, it is a valid classification. [Authorities.]” Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687, 689 (Iowa 1974).
Although the majority does not reach the question of whether the challenged statute denied equal protection, I would find no violation. Given the history of the statute, especially the demonstrated willingness of the legislature to include any established veterans organization, I believe the statute does not deny equal protection under the standard described in Keasling.
The late Justice Robert H. Jackson said of the United States Supreme Court, shortly before becoming its member, that its “judgment was wrong on most outstanding issues upon which it has chosen to challenge the popular branches.” Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, (1941).
Legislation is generally susceptible to improvement because it is rarely, if ever, perfect. Nevertheless, except where we are *480driven to it, we should be loath to interfere with the efforts of the legislature. I believe the majority opinion is another unnecessary intrusion into those efforts.
I would reverse.
LeGRAND, J., joins in this dissent.