Defendant pled guilty to robbery armed, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), and appeals. We affirm.
Although defendant argues that he did not knowingly and understanding^ waive various constitutional rights before pleading guilty, the trial court complied with GCR 1963, 785.7. A knowing and understanding waiver was implicit in the plea procedure.
Defendant’s argument that the felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), is unconstitutional because it amended a large number of *681statutes without re-enactment and publication, contrary to Const 1963, art 4, § 25, is without merit, since amendment by implication is. not the evil sought to be avoided by the constitutional provision. Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich 441, 471-474; 208 NW2d 469, 476-478 (1973).
Defendant also argues that his felony-firearm conviction must be set aside because it violates constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. US Const, Am V, Const 1963, art 1, § 15.
The double jeopardy clause1 provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy”.
"[The clause] serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature remains free under the [d]ouble [j]eopardy [c]lause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once the legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial.” Brown v Ohio, 432 US 161, 165; 97 S Ct 2221, 2225; 53 L Ed 2d 187, 193-194 (1977).
Because many statutory crimes are duplicative, it is well established that separate statutory crimes may be the "same offense” under the double jeopardy clause, even though they are not identical in either constituent elements or actual proof. Brown v Ohio, supra, at 164; 97 S Ct at 2224; 53 L Ed 2d at 193. Each case ultimately turns upon whether the Legislature intended a particular act to be punished by only one or more statutes. See Gore v United States, 357 US 386; 78 S Ct 1280; 2 L Ed 2d 1405 (1958). Unfortunately, it *682is rarely possible to divine legislative intent in this area, as the multiple punishment issue rarely receives explicit legislative consideration. Gore v United States, supra, at 394; 78 S Ct at 1285; 2 L Ed 2d at 1411 (Warren, C. J., dissenting). As a consequence the courts have developed tests to determine whether separate statutory crimes are the "same offense”. See, e.g., Harris v Oklahoma, 433 US 682; 97 S Ct 2912; 53 L Ed 2d 1054 (1977), Brown v Ohio, supra, Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932), People v Stewart (On Rehearing), 400 Mich 540; 256 NW2d 31 (1977), People v Martin, 398 Mich 303; 247 NW2d 303 (1976).
Although it may be argued with some force that application of the above tests to the instant case would indicate the presence of a double jeopardy problem, but see, e.g., Kowalski v Parratt, 533 F2d 1071 (CA 8, 1976), cert den 429 US 844; 97 S Ct 125; 50 L Ed 2d 115 (1976), resort need not be had to the tests where the legislative intent is, as here, apparent.
The statute applies by its terms to all felonies except those explicitly excluded.
"A person who carries or has in his possession a firearm at the time he commits or attempts to commit a felony, except the violation of section 227 [MCLA 750.227; MSA 28.424 — carrying a concealed weapon] or section 227a [MCLA 750.227a; MSA 28.424 (1) — unlawful possession of a pistol by a licensee], is guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2 years.” MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. "Felony” includes robbery armed. MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. By this statute the Legislature has attempted to make certainty of minimal punishment *683the standard where firearms are involved in the commission of felonies. The minimal punishment purpose applies with equal force to robbery armed crimes as to other crimes. As it cannot be doubted that the Legislature could have amended the robbery armed statute to add as a proviso that there be a minimal punishment where the dangerous weapon is a firearm, without offending the double jeopardy clause, see Gore v United States, supra, there is no double jeopardy impediment to its attainment of the same goal by separate statute.
Since the Legislature intended the type of result obtained in the instant case, the convictions do not violate double jeopardy protection.
Affirmed.
For purpose of analysis we assume the double jeopardy protection under state and Federal constitutions is equivalent.