concurring in part and dissenting in part.
For the policy limits of Griffin's automobile insurance coverage, both Marci and David Sears released Griffin "from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever" arising from Evan's accidental death, Record at 30. Now, as administratrix of Evan's estate and as the next best friend of Evan's sister, Marci brings an adult and child wrongful death claim as well as a survival claim against Griffins.3 I agree with the majority's conclusion that no party may bring a survival claim against Griffin arising out Evan's accidental death. I disagree, however, with the result that Elizabeth and Marci may continue to bring wrongful death claims.
*219I. Standing
This court may affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Brown, 696 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied. Summary judgment was properly granted based on the issue of standing. The complaint's caption lists the parties as: "The ESTATE OF EVAN SEARS by and through his administratrix, Marci Sears and ELIZABETH SEARS by and through her next best friend, Marei Sears." R. at 5. A wrongful death claim is a statutory creation and did not exist at common law. Ed Wiersma Trucking Co. v. Pfaff, 678 N.E.2d 110, 110 (Ind.1997), adopting 643 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind.Ct.App.1994); Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Hosea, 152 Ind. 412, 418, 53 N.E., 419, 421 (1899); South v. White River Farm Bureau Co-op, 639 N.E.2d 671, 673 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). The Adult Wrongful Death Statute grants only the decedent's personal representative"4 the right to pursue such a claim. Inp.Code § 34-23-1-1; see General Motors Corp. v. Arnett, 418 N.E.2d 546, 548 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) ("It is a condition precedent that the action against G.M. be brought by someone in the capacity of the personal representative."); South, 639 N.E.2d at 673-74 (holding that order granting South special authority to sue only one defendant-with whom she eventually settled-did not confer general authority to sue all potential defendants, and therefore South was not a proper party to bring suit). The Child Wrongful Death Statute also limits the plaintiffs who may maintain a claim. The statute allows only parents or guardians to bring such a claim. Ind.Code § 34-283-2-1(b).
In the instant case, Elizabeth is not Evan's personal representative. Therefore, she may not bring a claim under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute. Likewise as Evan's sister, Elizabeth may not maintain a claim under the Child Wrongful Death Statute. In short, Elizabeth is not a proper party to bring suit against Griffin.
II. Release
This court must also address whether Marci, having released Griffin from liability, may pursue wrongful death claims against her.5 Under Indiana law, " 'release documents shall be interpreted in the same manner as any other contract document, with the intention of the parties regarding the purpose of the document governing.'" OEC-Diasonics, Inc. v. Major, 674 N.E.2d 1312, 1314 (Ind.1996) (4-0 decision, Boehm, J., not participating) (quoting Huffman v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 588 N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (Ind.1992)). The interpretation of a release is determined by the particular instrument's terms, in light of all of the facts and circumstances. Id. Where a contract is unambiguous, the language used in the contract should determine the intent of the parties. Id.
First, under the Child Wrongful Death Act, only a parent or guardian may bring suit. I.C. § 34-23-2-1. But, for the policy limits of Griffin's automobile insurance coverage, both Marei and David Sears:
release[d] and forever discharge[d] Patricia Griffin from any and all *220claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever....
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[Martha and David Sears] hereby declare[ ] that the terms of this settlement have been completely read and are fully understood and voluntarily accepted for the purpose of making a full and final compromise settlement of any and all claims ... and for the express purpose of precluding forever any further or additional claims....
R. at 30. Thus, according to the release's plain language, neither Marci nor David may bring a child wrongful death claim against Griffin. They have fully and finally released those claims.
Second, neither Marci nor David may bring an adult wrongful death claim. This conclusion rests on the release's terms read in light of all the facts and circumstances surrounding its creation. See OEC-Diasonics, 674 N.E.2d at 1314. Here, Marci and David released Griffin from "any and all claims ... of any kind or nature whatsoever" for the limits of Griffin's insurance policy. R. at 28, 80. "Kind" denotes a "variety; sort; type" or a "class or category of similar or related individuals." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 721 (1978). And "nature" is defined as the "intrinsic characteristics and qualities" of a thing. Id. at 875. Given the definitions, the terms "any kind or nature whatsoever" embrace more than the claims that Marci and David could bring as individuals. These broad terms release claims that Marci or David may have brought in their representative capacities.
In sum, because neither Marei nor Elizabeth may maintain these claims against Griffin, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.6
. Though Marci does not specifically plead these claims, the complaint's facts, at first blush, appear to give rise to them.
. Similarly, the Survival Statute grants only the decedent's personal representative the right to maintain a claim. IC. § 34-9-3-4.
. One who has been appointed as a general administratrix of an estate may bring a wrongful death claim as the decedent's personal representative. See In re Estate of Hutman, 705 N.E.2d 1060, 1064 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (holding by implication that the term "personal representative" could encompass a special administratrix as well as a general one).
. To hold otherwise would compromise the special fiduciary relationship between Marci and Elizabeth. As personal representative of Evan's estate in the wrongful death action, Marci owes an "extraordinary" fiduciary duty to Elizabeth. Vollmar by Vollmar v. Rupright, 517 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 (Ind.Ct.App.1988). In the instant case, Marci depleted the most liquid asset of the claim-the entire proceeds of the insurance policy-and presumably did not allocate it toward Elizabeth's loss. Furthermore, to the extent Marci failed to use the asset to pay for reasonable medical, hospital, funeral, and burial expenses; she has diminished Elizabeth's potential recovery. The Adult Wrongful Death Statute directs thai creditor expenses be satisfied first. I.C. § 34-23-1-1. Then, the "remainder of the damages, if any, ... inure to the benefit of ... dependent next of kin." Id. To let these claims, including Elizabeth's by any personal representative, proceed would potentially expose Marci to liability for breach of fiduciary duly toward Elizabeth. Cf. Vollmar, 517 N.E.2d 1240 (involving suil by minor beneficiary against personal represenialive who settled wrongful death claim after filing suit).