OPINION
BOB McCOY, Justice.I. Introduction
Appellant Scott C. Brown appeals from his conviction for Driving While Intoxicated-Misdemeanor Repetition. In one point, Brown asserts that the trial court erred by denying his request for a special jury instruction on the defense theory of involuntary intoxication. We affirm.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
In June 2007, Michael Sands, while driving down a residential street, observed Brown driving towards him in an unsafe manner. Hoping to avoid an accident, Sands pulled his car over to the curb and came to a complete stop. However, as Brown began to pass, he hit Sands’ car, clipped a tree, and crashed into a ditch. When the police arrived at the scene, they performed field sobriety tests on Brown. Brown failed the tests and admitted to the police that he had been drinking. Subsequently, the police took Brown to John Peter Smith Hospital where his blood alcohol content measured .09. Brown was placed in custody and charged with DWI-Misdemeanor Repetition.
During trial, Brown testified that he had consumed two tumblers of whiskey the night before his arrest, and that sometime during the night he had woken up to take his blood pressure medicine but had mistakenly taken Ambien. Brown further testified that, because of the mistake, he did not remember consuming more liquor or driving his car. In fact, Brown claimed that he had no memory from the time he went back to bed, after taking the Ambien, to when the nurse was drawing his blood at John Peter Smith Hospital. Finally, Brown testified that the Ambien pills were a different color and shape than his blood pressure pills, and that he had been warned by his doctor not to take Ambien in combination with alcohol.
At the close of trial, Brown requested an involuntary intoxication jury instruction; *249however, the trial court denied his request. Subsequently, the jury found Brown guilty and the trial court sentenced him to 300 days’ confinement probated for two years, and a $750 fine. This appeal followed.
III. Jury Instruction — Involuntary Intoxication
In his sole issue, Brown complains that the trial court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on involuntary intoxication. The State, however, argues that Brown was not entitled to a jury instruction on involuntary intoxication because involuntary intoxication is not a defense to DWI, where, as here, mental state is not an element of the offense.
A.Standard of Review
Appellate review of error in a jury charge involves a two-step process. Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). Initially, we must determine whether error occurred. If so, we must then evaluate whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal. Id. at 731-32. Error in the charge, if timely objected to in the trial court, requires reversal if the error was “calculated to injure the rights of [the] defendant,” which means no more than that there must be some harm to the accused from the error. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.19 (Vernon 2007); see also Abdnor, 871 S.W.2d at 731-32; Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). In other words, a properly preserved error will require reversal as long as the error is not harmless. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. In making this determination, “the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Id.; see also Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 786 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).
B. Applicable Law
Under Texas law, a person commits DWI “if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04 (Vernon 2008). A person is intoxicated if he does not have “the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol ... or any other substance into the body.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.01(2). Under chapter 49 of the penal code, proof of a culpable mental state is not required for a DWI conviction. Id. § 49.11; Nelson v. State, 149 S.W.3d 206, 211 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). However, an essential element of DWI is voluntary intoxication. See Lewis v. State, 951 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1997, no pet.).
C. Discussion
Here, Brown’s sole argument is that the trial court improperly refused to include the following jury instruction:
[I]nvoluntary intoxication is a defense to prosecution for an offense when it is shown that the accused has exercised no independent judgment or volition in taking the intoxicant, and as a result of his intoxication, the accused did not know that his conduct was wrong or was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he allegedly violated.
To support his contention that the trial court erred by refusing to submit the requested charge, Brown relies on Torres v. State, which recognized involuntary intoxication as a defense to criminal conduct. *250Torres v. State, 585 S.W.2d 746, 749-50 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).
In Torres, an aggravated robbery case, Torres’s accomplice testified that he had put Thorazine tablets into her glass of Alka Seltzer without her knowledge about an hour before they broke into the victim’s home. Id. at 748. The trial judge refused Torres’s requested charge directing the jury to acquit her if they found that she was involuntarily intoxicated and further found that she did not act voluntarily in the commission of the offense because of the intoxication. Id.
In its decision to reverse and remand Torres’s conviction on the basis of jury charge error, the court of criminal appeals recognized the defense of involuntary intoxication. Id. at 749. It reasoned that, even though the common law disfavored intoxication as a defense to avoid criminal responsibility because a voluntary act rendered an individual of unsound mind, the reason for disfavor did not exist when the intoxication was not self-induced. Id. at 748-49.
The Court then held that involuntary intoxication is a defense to criminal culpability when it is shown that (1) the accused has exercised no independent judgment or volition in taking the intoxicant and (2) as a result of his intoxication, the accused did not know that his conduct was wrong or was incapable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law he allegedly violated. Id. at 749 (emphasis added).
Although we have previously extended the holding in Torres to the offense of DWI, we decline to do so from this day forward for several reasons. See Nelson, 149 S.W.3d at 211; McKinnon v. State, 709 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986, no pet.).
First, the Legislature has not seen fit to include a culpable mental state in its definition of the offense. In fact, proof of a culpable mental state is expressly not required for conviction of an offense dealing with intoxication and for alcoholic beverage offenses. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.11.
Second, the court of criminal appeals has declined to include a culpable mental state in the offense. See Owen v. State, 525 S.W.2d 164, 164-65 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Ex parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) (criminal or unlawful intent not essential element of driving while intoxicated), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018, 96 S.Ct. 454, 46 L.Ed.2d 390 (1975), abrogated on other grounds by Ex parte McCain, 67 S.W.3d 204, 207, 209 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).
Third, this court has followed the Legislature’s and court of criminal appeals’ direction and held that the offense does not require a culpable mental state. See Nelson, 149 S.W.3d at 210 (holding that involuntary intoxication is a defense to criminal culpability and that proof of a culpable mental state is not required in prosecuting the offense of DWI).
Finally, other Texas courts that have considered the issue have held that the offense of DWI does not require a culpable mental state and have further held that involuntary intoxication is not a defense to DWI.1 See, e.g., Stamper, 2003 WL *25121540414, at *1 (emphasizing that involuntary intoxication is not a defense to DWI and that the correct defense is involuntary act); Bearden v. State, No. 01-97-00900-CR, 2000 WL 19638, at *4 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 13, 2000, pet. ref d) (not designated for publication) (declining to extend the holding in Torres to the offense of driving while intoxicated); Aliff v. State, 955 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no pet.) (holding that proof of culpable mental state is not required for a DWI conviction, thus, involuntary intoxication cannot be a defense to such a charge).
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing Brown’s request for a jury instruction on involuntary intoxication because involuntary intoxication cannot be a defense to DWI; accordingly, we overrule Brown’s sole issue.2
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Brown’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
. Various courts of appeals, in addressing this issue, have looked at an involuntary act, i.e., automatism, as a defense to DWI. See, e.g., Peavey v. State, 248 S.W.3d 455, 465 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, pet. ref’d) (providing a detailed analysis and application of automatism as a defense to DWI); see also Stamper v. State, No. 05-02-01730-CR, 2003 WL 21540414, at *1 (Tex.App.-Dallas July 9, 2003, no. pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (acknowledging that the appellant incorrectly argued involuntary intoxication when she should have argued involuntary act); Waters v. State, No. 01-96-00631-CR, *2512001 WL 754759, at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 29, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (analyzing whether appellant voluntarily became intoxicated).
.Furthermore, based on the facts in this case, there is insufficient evidence to support a claim to the defense of automatism. First, Brown’s loss of memory is not a defense. See Peavey, 248 S.W.3d at 465 (emphasizing that appellant's lack of memory, as to the events that had occurred, was not enough to raise the defense of automatism). Second, the evidence demonstrates that Brown’s acts were voluntary. For example, Brown testified that he mistakenly took Ambien; however, he did so of his own volition. See Hanks v. State, 542 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (holding there must be an absence of an exercise of independent judgment and volition on the part of the accused in taking the intoxicant). And finally, Brown failed to direct us to any evidence that showed he was unconscious or semiconscious at the time of the offense. See Peavey, 248 S.W.3d at 465.