On Petition for Rehearing
Achor, J.In his petition for rehearing, appellee Wade correctly asserts that the court did not discuss the issue as to whether or not appellant Gergely may have been negligent in that she failed to remonstrate to the driver of the car in which she was a guest, be*269cause of the fact that for a distance of a half-mile he drove upon the inner lane of a “four-lane highway” in the presence of heavy oncoming traffic while not in the act of passing another vehicle. Appellant relies upon the general rule of the road that the left side of a highway may be used for passing only.
In connection with this issue, appellee contends that this court should take judicial knowledge of the fact that said highway was congested with traffic approaching from the opposite direction at the time of the collision and that because of this condition approaching cars were likely to cross over onto the east side of the highway and that this fact also presented a material question as to whether or not the appellant’s host was negligent in driving upon the inner lane of the highway. Appellee contends that these circumstances may have created an obligation for appellant to act for her own safety and that they were sufficient to support the instruction on the issue of contributory negligence on the part of appellant which was given to the jury.
The fact of the density of traffic, as asserted, does not appear from the evidence and we are not permitted to take judicial knowledge thereof. Furthermore, upon the related issue, it has heretofore . been determined that a person traveling upon the inside lane of a four-lane highway “with ‘heavy traffic’ approaching and passing in the opposite direction . . . had the right to assume that approaching vehicles would stay on their proper side of the center line as the law required.” Lee Brothers v. Jones (1944), 114 Ind. App. 688, 699, 700, 54 N. E. 2d 108.
Furthermore, appellee’s contention ignores §47-2013(b) of Burns’ 1952 Replacement, which provides:
“(b) The driver of a vehicle may overtake and, allowing a sufficient clearance, pass another vehicle proceeding in the same direction either *270upon the left or upon the right on a roadway with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for four (4) or more lines of moving traffic when such movement can be made with safety. . . . (Acts 1939, ch. 48, §64, p. 289.)”
Appellee’s contention also ignores §47-2018 and subsection (a), which provides:
“Whenever any roadway has been divided into three (3) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following rules, in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply:
“(a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. (Acts 1939, ch. 48, §69, p. 289.)”
Furthermore, the evidence is undisputed that at the time of the collision the appellant and her host were approaching an intersection where they intended to make a left-hand turn. Our statute relating to this circumstance (§47-2020 and sub-section (b)) provides:
“ . . . The driver of a vehicle intending to turn at an intersection shall do so as follows:
“(b) Approach for a left turn shall be made in that portion of the right half of the roadway nearest the center line thereof and after entering the intersection, the left turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection to the right of the center line of the roadway being entered. (Acts 1939, ch. 48, §69, p. 289.)”
Under the evidence in the record, we find no basis for an inference of negligence on the part of either the driver of the Gergely car because of the fact that at the time of the collision the Gergely car was traveling on the left and inner lane of the highway two-car lengths ahead of appellee’s car, or on the part of appellant as a guest because she failed to remonstrate to *271the driver thereof because of the manner of his driving. Therefore, our position that it was error for the court to give an instruction relating to contributory-negligence on the part of appellant is not changed.
Other contentions raised by appellee in his petition are based upon a misstatement of the record and are ignored.
Note.—Reported in 120 N. E. 2d 637.
Rehearing denied 122 N. E. 2d 142.