(dissenting). The jury found that the shotgun was fired at the automobile plaintiff, Michael W. Marzonie, II, was driving, rather than at him. The Court of Appeals ruled that because, in contrast with other decisions there referred to, "the assault was directed at the vehicle plaintiff was driving, not at plaintiff” the instant case was distinguishable from those cases. The Court continued: "Here, the car was not merely the situs of the insured’s injuries; plaintiff would not have been shot had he not been in the car. Rather, his injuries stemmed from the functional character of the motor vehicle.”1
Whether one agrees with the analysis of the majority in the Court of Appeals, or prefers the analysis of the dissenting judge, the Court of Appeals discharged its obligation to the litigants, their counsel, and the bench and bar, to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision. The majority, in peremptorily reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals, has not provided a reasoned explanation for the Court’s decision.
i
While the per curiam opinion, because of its length and discussion of decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals, might appear to provide a reasoned explanation, the bulk of the analysis is obiter dictum about cases not now before the Court.
As appears from the syllabus, the Reporter of Decisions gleaned the following from the per curiam opinion:
Because the injuries did not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a *536motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover no-fault benefits.
In determining whether a person who is shot while occupying a motor vehicle is entitled to no-fault benefits, the focus is not on the intent of the assailant, but rather upon the relation between the injury and the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. In this case, shots were fired during a continuing argument. The involvement of an automobile was incidental and fortuitous, the plaintiff’s injuries were not within the ordinary risks of driving a motor vehicle.
One may agree with the majority’s instinct that plaintiff’s injuries were not within the "ordinary risks of driving,” but the majority has not explained how it reached that conclusion. Nor has it explained on what basis it has substituted "ordinary risks of driving” for the statutory phrase "arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle . . . .”2 The profession, trial and appellate judges, will have to struggle with what are the "ordinary risks of driving,” a new gloss on the statute.
Stating that the focus is "not on the intent of the assailant” is somewhat more helpful, but does not explain on what one should focus. The statement that the focus should be on the "relation between the injury and the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” merely restates in another form the language of the statute.
The focus on whether the shots were fired during a "continuing argument,” with the implication that if one concludes that they were that renders the involvement of the automobile "incidental and fortuitous,” says more than need be said to decide this case, and I expect will be troublesome unless *537confined to the facts of this case. The Detroit Free Press reported on December 28, 1992, that a woman traveling home with her family was fatally shot by a tailgating motorist who apparently thought her husband was not driving fast enough. Thus, that the shots were fired during a continuing argument does not necessarily justify the conclusion that the involvement of the automobile was incidental and fortuitous. The instinct of the majority might be different if the vehicle the shooter was driving had chased the Marzonie vehicle following a confrontation at a traffic light.
In the instant case, the shooter, Vernon Oaks, testified that the reason he fired the shotgun was that Marzonie’s automobile was moving toward him. This is not a case where the shooter and the person assaulted were previously acquainted and the shooter set out to find and assault the victim; in such a case, the place where the assault occurs might be incidental and fortuitous.
ii
Marzonie and a companion were driving home from a party.3 They approached a stop light at which another automobile, driven by Oaks, was waiting. One of Oaks passengers made an indecent gesture toward Marzonie or his passenger.4 The reason for the gesture is unexplained.
Marzonie responded by jumping out of the vehicle and taunting the occupants of the Oaks vehicle as if he wanted to fight with its occupants. Oaks, *538running the red light, left the scene. Marzonie returned to his vehicle and chased the Oaks vehicle. Marzonie and his companion were throwing beer bottles at the Oaks vehicle during the chase. The bottles struck the vehicle several times, breaking a window in the process.
Oaks and his passenger testified that they tried to "lose” Marzonie throughout the chase. Oaks drove home and he and his friends went inside. As they were doing so, Marzonie’s vehicle approached the Oaks home. Oaks returned outside with a gun.5 At some point, Marzonie’s vehicle began to advance "at a real slight creep” toward Oaks. Oaks, allegedly aiming only at the front grill of the vehicle, fired the gun, striking Marzonie in the left eye. Marzonie backed the vehicle up as if to turn it around before losing consciousness. His companion took the wheel. Oaks fired at the Marzonie vehicle a second time, striking the left rear wheel. The companion sped off, driving Marzonie to the hospital.
hi
The question what risks arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle is one of the more complex and difficult issues of factual assessment and statutory construction presented by the no-fault automobile liability act.6 It is the subject of over sixty pages in one treatise.7 This Court and the Court of Appeals have struggled inconclusively with these issues on a number of occasions. The *539trial judge and the Court of Appeals did their best, and their effort should not be dismissed with peremptory disposition and conclusory statements that raise still further questions to befuddle the profession.
Peremptory disposition, without plenary consideration, full briefing, oral argument, and an opportunity for the profession to file briefs as amici curiae, should be reserved for cases in which the law is settled and factual assessment is not required.8 In the instant case, as indicated in the majority opinion, factual and legal assessment is required. Peremptory disposition is not appropriate.
The Court should either grant or deny leave to appeal._
193 Mich App 332, 337; 483 NW2d 413 (1992).
MCL 500.3105(1); MSA 24.13105(1).
Marzonie was nineteen years old and his companion eighteen. Both had been drinking alcoholic beverages.
An occupant of the Oaks vehicle testified that either Marzonie or his companion made indecent hand gestures toward the occupants of the Oaks vehicle. In all events, gestures were made and Marzonie left his vehicle to taunt the occupants of the Oaks vehicle who were fifteen and eighteen years of age and were apparently returning from a different party.
There was some testimony that Marzonie or his companion threw beer bottles at Oaks home before Oaks returned outside with the gun.
MCL 500.3101; MSA 24.13101.
1 No-Fault and Uninsured Motorist Automobile Insurance, ch 9, Horton, Scope of Coverage — Type of Incident.
People v Wright, 439 Mich 914, 914-915 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting); Roek v Chippewa Valley Bd of Ed, 430 Mich 314, 322; 422 NW2d 680 (1988) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Grames v Amerisure Ins Co, 434 Mich 867, 868-875 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 769-770; 456 NW2d 237 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Wrenn, 434 Mich 885, 885-886 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Harkins v Northwest Activity Ctr, Inc, 434 Mich 896, 899 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Dep’t of Social Services v American Commercial Liability Ins Co, 435 Mich 508, 515; 460 NW2d 194 (1990) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Yahr v Garcia, 436 Mich 872 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); Universal Underwriters Ins Co v Vallejo, 436 Mich 873, 873-874 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Stephens, 437 Mich 903, 903-910 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Berkey, 437 Mich 40, 54; 467 NW2d 6 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); Turner v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 437 Mich 35, 38-39; 467 NW2d 4 (1991) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Lepior v Venice Twp, 437 Mich 955, 956-966 (1991) (Levin, J., dissenting); Rochester Hills v Southeastern Oakland Co Resource Recovery Authority, 440 Mich 852, 852-856 (1992) (Levin, J., dissenting).
See Schweiker v Hansen, 450 US 785, 791; 101 S Ct 1468; 67 L Ed 2d 685 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("A summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by this Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error”); Leis v Flynt, 439 US 438, 457-458; 99 S Ct 698; 58 L Ed 2d 717 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Summary reversal 'should be reserved for palpably clear cases of . . . error.’ Eaton v Tulsa, 415 US 697, 707 [94 S Ct 1228; 39 L Ed 2d 693 (1974)] [Rehnquist, J., dissenting]”).