Drouillard v. Stroh Brewery Co.

Brickley, C.J.

At issue in this appeal is the coordination of worker’s compensation and early pension benefits pursuant to MCL 418.354; MSA 17.237(354). In particular, plaintiffs contend that they were compelled to accept early payment of their retirement benefits and are therefore exempt from coordination of these benefits under MCL 418.354(l)(d); MSA 17.237(354)(l)(d). We hold that plaintiffs’ interpretation of this statutory provision is erroneous and that MCL 418.354(l)(d); MSA 17.237(354)(l)(d) does not preclude coordination where an employee is required to accept early pension benefits. We therefore affirm the disposition of . these cases by the Court of Appeals and remand them to the hearing referees for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

i

On February 8, 1985, Stroh Brewery Company announced its plan to close its brewery and to permanently lay off all brewery employees effective December 31, 1985. As a result of the plant *296closing, Stroh liquidated its employee pension plan and paid its employees pension benefits. Plaintiff Riss, age fifty-three at the time, received $64,505.13 in a lump sum. Plaintiff Drouillard, then age fifty-four, received $52,748.03 in a lump sum.

At the time the liquidation plan was announced, the contract plan administrator for the pension fund conducted meetings to explain the effect of the liquidation. Different classes of employees were invited to the meetings (salaried, hourly, able and disabled employees), and defendant prepared pension distribution applications for all employees. Riss attended one of these meetings; Drouillard did not attend the meetings and instead received his pension distribution information by mail.

At these assemblies the contract plan administrator gave all employees several forms, including a benefit election form. This form provided the employees with two choices regarding their pension benefits. First, employees could have their pension monies held in a trust, which would then be transferred to an insurance annuity until the employee requested distribution. Second, employees could take receipt of their pension benefits either in the form of a single lump-sum payment or rolled over into an individual retirement account. It is significant to plaintiffs’ argument that they were told that it would be in their best interests to reject the trust option.

Defendant’s contract plan administrator testified that he instructed Stroh’s employees that if they left their pension monies in the trust it would earn no interest and therefore it was not wise to leave the money in the trust. It is disputed whether the plan administrator told the employees that they had the option of leaving the money in the trust. However, he did advise that persons *297with questions about the effect of payouts on their worker’s compensation benefits should seek legal counsel.

Paul Drouillard began working for Stroh’s as a general laborer on June 4, 1956. At some point during the late 1960’s or early 1970’s, Drouillard injured his back while at work. He occasionally aggravated this injury, and he sometimes missed work as a result. On February 19, 1985, Drouillard slipped and fell on oil and allegedly sustained injuries to his neck, right shoulder, back, and musculoskeletal system. Drouillard never returned to work after this accident.

Drouillard received worker’s compensation benefits from defendant from February 20, 1985 until June 26, 1985. He filed a petition for continuing worker’s compensation on July 2, 1985. On November 20, 1985, Drouillard received the lump-sum pension payment of $52,748.03 from the trust fund. In March, 1986, the magistrate found that Drouillard had sustained an aggravation of his preexisting degenerative arthritic condition and granted an open award of worker’s compensation benefits. The magistrate held that Stroh could coordinate Drouillard’s medical and social security benefits, but held that Stroh provided insufficient proof to allow coordination of pension benefits. The Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board submitted an order reversing the magistrate in this regard, stating that the worker’s compensation payments were subject to coordination in accordance with §§ 354(l)(d) and 354(13).

Gerald Riss began work for the Stroh Brewery Company on April 2, 1956. During his employment he sustained injuries to his back, right shoulder, and wrist. Riss injured his back in 1957, 1965, and 1975. In 1965, his injuries required surgery, and he missed six months of work, returning to *298restricted light-duty work. In 1973, Riss injured his shoulder, which also required surgery; however, he did not miss work at that time. In 1973, and again in 1982, Riss sustained injuries to his wrist. From 1982 to 1985, this injury became progressively worse. However, he continued to work through May 28, 1985. He had surgery on his wrist two days later and was unable to return to work before Stroh closed the plant on May 31, 1985. Riss received benefits from May 31, 1985, through July 30, 1985. After recuperating from the wrist surgery, Riss was capable of returning to restricted work, but did not do so.

In May, 1988, Riss was granted an open award of worker’s compensation by the hearing referee. The hearing referee allowed Stroh to "coordinate sickness and accident benefits, unemployment benefits, and pension benefits received by plaintiff, in accordance with the [worker’s compensation] act.” The wcab opined that the funds were set aside for retirement and' because Riss did not retire, but instead was terminated, and because Stroh had shut down the plant, the payments were not for retirement. Instead, the board classified the benefits as "severance benefits] involuntarily received,” which are not within the purview of the coordination language of § 354. 1991 WCABO 761, 771.

The Court of Appeals consolidated these cases and affirmed the wcab determination in Drouillard and reversed the wcab determination in Riss. See Drouillard v Stroh Brewery Co, 199 Mich App 67; 501 NW2d 229 (1993). Citing Barr v Stroh Brewery Co, 189 Mich App 549; 473 NW2d 716 (1991), the Court determined that the lump-sum payouts were subject to the coordination language of the worker’s compensation act. Drouillard, supra at 71.

*299II

Worker’s compensation is one unit in a loosely connected system of wage-loss protection that also includes unemployment compensation, social security old-age, disability, and survivors benefits, aid to families with dependent children, and general assistance. Franks v White Pine Copper Div, 422 Mich 636, 654; 375 NW2d 715 (1985). Such wage-loss legislation is designed to restore to employees a portion of wages lost because of three major causes of wage loss: physical disability, unemployment, and old age. The crucial operative fact is that of wage loss; the cause of the wage loss merely dictates the category of legislation applicable. See, generally, 4 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation, § 97, p 18-9 (1995 Supp, p 106).

Because most social legislation in Michigan was implemented in unrelated fragments, failure to coordinate resulted in an accumulation of benefits. For example, before coordination, it was not unusual for an employee to collect both unemployment and worker’s compensation benefits at the same time. However, if an employee undergoes a period of wage loss, it does not follow that he should receive multiple wage-loss benefits simultaneously. An employee can experience only one wage loss and, in any logical or coherent system, should receive only one wage-loss benefit at any one time. Id.

As part of the 1981 amendments of the worker’s compensation act, the Legislature added § 354, which provides for the coordination of wage-loss benefits. The purpose of this legislation was to prevent duplicate wage-loss payments while main*300taining suitable wage-loss benefits.1 The coordination of worker’s compensation and early pension benefits pursuant to § 354 presents a complicated set of issues previously only considered by the Court of Appeals.2

*301III

Plaintiffs concede that under MCL 418.354(l)(d); MSA 17.237(354)(l)(d), pension benefits ordinarily are subject to coordination.3 However, the statute itself provides exceptions. For example, subsection 354(l)(e) allows the employer to reduce the proportional amount of the pension where the employee has also contributed to the pension. Additionally, subsection 354(14) prohibits an employer from co*302ordinating a disability pension plan that was in existence on March 31, 1982.

Plaintiffs contend that they are exempted from coordination by MCL 418.354(12); MSA 17.237(354X12). In reference to this provision, plaintiffs contend that subsection 354(12) precludes coordination in all cases in which an employer "compels” employees to accept early retirement or pension benefits. We first note that it is not clear that plaintiffs were compelled to accept early retirement benefits. It is apparent that plaintiffs were told that the more expedient course would be to accept their pension benefits. However, it is also true that this was general advice to a disparate audience and plaintiffs were specifically instructed to seek legal advice if they had questions. However, even accepting arguendo plaintiffs’ contention that they were compelled to accept early pension benefits, we believe that the conclusion that subsection 354(12) thereby precludes coordination only follows from a forced reading of the statute.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Murphy v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 447 Mich 93, 98; 523 NW2d 310 (1994). It has long been an accepted principle of statutory construction, in discerning the legislative will through its enactments, to construe a statute so as to give full effect to all its provisions. See, e.g., Malonny v Mahar, 1 Mich 26 (1847). Subsection 354(12) provides:

Nothing in this section shall be considered to compel an employee to apply for early federal social security old-age insurance benefits or to apply for early or reduced pension or retirement benefits. [Emphasis added.]

As indicated by the emphasized language, we be*303lieve a clue to the proper interpretation of subsection 354(12) can be found in the language "Nothing in this section” and "to apply.” A plain and straightforward interpretation of this provision shows that the Legislature was addressing something less than is claimed by the plaintiffs. This statute clearly and unambiguously provides that Michigan’s coordination statute itself should not be interpreted to compel application for early pension benefits.

This interpretation is supported by reading subsection 354(12) in conjunction with the rest of the coordination statute. In fact, this Court is so required; in the interpretation of statutes, effect must be given, if possible, to every word, sentence and section and, to that end, the entire act must be read to be an harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole. Dussia v Monroe Co Employees Retirement System, 386 Mich 244, 248; 191 NW2d 307 (1971). Subsection 354(3) provides that employers shall be notified of an employee’s eligibility for social security benefits and that employees shall apply for social security benefits when eligible.4 *304Subsection 354(4) provides that an employer can withhold worker’s compensation benefits until an employee timely applies for social security benefits.5 In light of these two provisions, subsection 354(12), and particularly its "Nothing in this section” language, manifestly means that an employer cannot withhold worker’s compensation benefits in order to "compel” an employee to apply early for social security or pension benefits.6

The Legislature could have, but did not, easily written the statute to read clearly and unambiguously as the plaintiffs would like: "Coordination of benefits will not apply if the employer compels the employee to receive early or reduced pension, retirement or other benefits that can be coordinated.” We believe that subsection 354(12) was intended only to void any inference that § 354 *305itself might permit or encourage employers to coerce early application for social security or pension benefits by withholding worker’s compensation. It was not written to apply to all cases in which an employee is required or "compelled” to accept early retirement benefits. To have written the statute in such a manner would defeat the twin purposes of the coordination statute, i.e., the elimination of duplicative wage-loss benefits while maintaining a suitable level of wage-loss payment.

IV

Contrary to the argument of the plaintiffs, MCL 418.354(l)(d); MSA 17.237(354)(l)(d) was intended only to void any inference that Michigan’s worker’s compensation coordination statute might permit or encourage employers to coerce early application for social security or pension benefits by withholding worker’s compensation. We therefore affirm the disposition of these cases by the Court of Appeals and remand them to the hearing referees for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Levin, Boyle, Riley, and Weaver, JJ., concurred with Brickley, C.J.

The legislative history of MCL 418.354; MSA 17.237(354) provides:

Coordination of benefits has been a major concern of employers for years. Public Act 357 coordinated workers’ compensation with unemployment compensation (effective January 1, 1982) but failed to address coordination with Social Security and other insurance and pension plans. By coordinating workers’ compensation benefits with Social Security and other benefits, Senate Bill 595 would provide a major savings to employers in the cost of workers’ compensation while maintaining adequate benefit levels for disabled workers.
From its creation in 1912, workers’ compensation in Michigan has been intended as a means of protecting an employee’s ability to earn wages by replacing wages lost because of a disability resulting from an on-the-job injury. Since 1912, other public and private wage replacement insurance programs have appeared with the result that many employees now receive wage-loss benefits from two, three, or four different programs providing a total wage "replacement” greater than the wages the employee earned while on the job, while employers who must contribute to these programs find themselves paying more than once to replace the wages of a single employee. Such a situation is contrary to the basic philosophy of Michigan’s wage-loss system and discourages some disabled employees from returning to work. Coordination of benefits, as proposed in Senate Bill 595, would reduce the overlap between the various public and private wage replacement programs while ensuring adequate wage-loss benefits to injured employees. [Senate Legislative Analysis, SB 595, adopted as 1981 PA 203, Coordination of Benefits, Supporting Arguments (January 7, 1982).]

Barr v Stroh Brewery is the only published Michigan opinion that addresses a fact pattern similar to that presented in this case. In Barr, the plaintiff was receiving worker’s compensation when Stroh divested itself of the plaintiff’s employing unit and terminated its pension plan for those employees. The plaintiff was informed of his options, which included immediately, receiving a pension of slightly more than $600 per month or having an amount of money equal to his share in the pension plan rolled over into an ira. The plaintiff selected the second option and received a draft for over $56,000, rolling over $30,000 into an ira and keeping the balance. The Court of Appeals held that all of the monies paid to an employee from a pension fund when an employer closes its business are subject to coordination.

*301The application of the coordination statute in the context of pension benefits is confused by prior, conflicting Court of Appeals actions. In Knox v Stroh Brewery Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, issued August 18, 1992 (Docket No. 129690), the plaintiff received a lump-sum check from the liquidated pension fund that he then rolled over into an ira. The magistrate in that case disallowed coordination, ruling that a lump-sum payout that was rolled over into an ira is not subject to coordination until the plaintiff receives the payout as taxable income. The wcac affirmed and the Court of Appeals denied the defendants’ delayed application for leave to appeal. Conversely, in Lemke v Stroh Brewery Co, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, issued July 23, 1992 (Docket No. 130194), the Court of Appeals peremptorily reversed a wcac decision refusing to coordinate a lump-sum payment that was immediately rolled over into an ira, and then remanded Lemke to the wcac for further proceedings consistent with Barr.

The relevant subsections of MCL 418.354(1); MSA 17.237(354X1) provide:

This section is applicable when either weekly or lump sum payments are made to an employee as a result of liability pursuant to section 351, 361, or 835 with respect to the same time period for which . . . pension or retirement payments pursuant to a plan or program established or maintained by the employer, are also received or being received by the employee. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the employer’s obligation to pay or cause to be paid weekly benefits other than specific loss benefits under section 361(2) and (3) shall be reduced by these amounts:
(d) The after-tax amount of the pension or retirement payments received or being received pursuant to a plan or program established or maintained by the same employer from whom benefits under section 351, 361, or 835 are received, if the employee did not contribute directly to the pension or retirement plan or program.

MCL 418.354(3); MSA 17.237(354)(3) provides:

In the application of subsection (1) any credit or reduction shall occur pursuant to this section and all of the following:
(a) The bureau shall promulgate rules to provide for notification by an employer or carrier to an employee of possible eligibility for social security benefits and the requirements for establishing proof of application for those benefits. Notification shall be promptly mailed to the employee after the date on which by reason of age the employee may be entitled to social security benefits. A copy of the notification of possible eligibility shall be filed with the bureau by the employer or carrier.
(b) Within 30 days after receipt of the notification of possible employee eligibility the employee shall:
(i) Make application for social security benefits.
(ii) Provide the employer or carrier with proof of that application.
(iii) Provide the employer or carrier with an authority for release of information which shall be utilized by the employer *304or carrier to obtain necessary benefit entitlement and amount information from the social security administration. The authority for release of information shall be effective for 1 year.

MCL 418.354(4); MSA 17.237(354)(4) provides:

Failure of the employee to provide the proof of application or the authority for release of information as prescribed in subsection (3) shall allow the employer or carrier with the approval of the bureau to discontinue the compensation benefits payable to the employee under section 351, 361, or 835 until the proof of application and the authority for release of information is provided. Compensation benefits withheld shall be reimbursed to the employee upon the providing of the required proof of application, or the authority for release of information, or both.

We recognize that while subsection 354(12) refers to both social security and pension benefits, subsections 354(3) and (4) refer only to social security benefits. We note that on submission, the House of Representatives amended subsection 354(12) and added the language "or to apply for early or reduced pension or retirement benefits.” 1981 Senate Journal 2575. The original bill contained reference only to federal social security old-age insurance benefits. We interpret this amendment to subsection 354(12) to require that pension benefits be treated as the statute clearly intends social security benefits be treated. Any other interpretation of this statute would lead to incongruous and unreasonable results.