{dissenting). The issue on this appeal is whether plaintiffs filed a timely notice of claim against a radiology technician, Doug Verhulst, an employee of the University of Wisconsin Hospital and Clinics. The majority concedes that this issue should have been examined under § 893.82(5m), Stats.,1 because plaintiffs seek damages for medical malpractice, but declines to apply the correct statute because plaintiffs failed to argue that the statute applies to their claim. We should summarily affirm rather than decide this appeal under inapplicable statutes. Our decision on the issues as submitted has no value except to terminate this litigation in favor of the respondent.
I believe we should require the parties to brief the dispositive issue, no matter how raised. The issue is before us and we should decide it.
I.
TIMELINESS OF NOTICE OF CLAIM
"Once an issue is raised in a petition for review, any argument addressing the issue may be asserted in the brief of either party or utilized by this court." State *653v. Weber, 164 Wis. 2d 788, 791, 476 N.W.2d 867, 868 (1991) (emphasis added). Likewise, when an issue is raised in the parties' briefs on appeal, any argument addressing the issue may be utilized by this court. Were that not the rule, we would cease to be judges and become arbitrators.
I believe it is my responsibility to decide an appeal according to the law, regardless of whether the parties have overlooked a statute or decision which is disposi-tive. We could refuse to consider any argument based on such a case or statute, leaving it to the supreme court to correct the trial court error. We followed that approach in Gansch v. Nekoosa Papers, Inc., 152 Wis. 2d 666, 449 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1989), rev'd, 158 Wis. 2d 743, 463 N.W.2d 682 (1990). In my dissent, I argued that the important question of third-party liability under the Worker's Compensation Act was controlled in that case by § 102.29(6), Stats., a statute not cited by either party or the trial court. The majority justified its failure to consider that statute as follows:
We obviously disagree with the dissent's formulation of the issue as "whether Gansch is subject to sec. 102.29(6), Stats.," which deals with employees of "temporary help" agencies. Neither party even refers to that statute, much less argues that it applies — or does not apply — to this case.
Gansch, 152 Wis. 2d at 669 n.1, 449 N.W.2d at 308 (emphasis added).
On review, the supreme court considered the statute and reversed our decision. The court said: "While neither party raised or argued the applicability of the statutory provisions governing temporary help agencies to this case in the circuit court or court of appeals, the parties addressed that issue here." Gansch v. Nekoosa Papers, Inc., 158 Wis. 2d 743, 748, 463 N.W.2d *654682, 684 (1990). It is neither logical nor judicial to leave to the supreme court the correction of trial court error, however induced. We are charged with the responsibility to correct such error.
This district of the court of appeals has consistently requested additional briefing if we identify a new issue or "surprise" argument. For example, in Plumbers Local No. 75 v. Coughlin, 166 Wis. 2d 971, 481 N.W.2d 297 (Ct. App. 1992), we twice required the parties to brief the application of statutes and administrative rules to the issue raised. Our decision that manufacturers of manufactured housing were not required to have licensed plumbers install and supervise the installation of plumbing in manufactured housing may have saved Wisconsin's manufactured housing industry.
I do not believe that whether § 893.82(5m), Stats., is the statute which applies to plaintiffs' claim is an "issue"; it is an "argument." Legal "issues" and legal "arguments" are not identical. David L. Walther et AL., Appellate Practice and Procedure in Wisconsin § 11.3e(2) and (5) (1986), cited in Weber, 164 Wis. 2d at 790 n.3, 476 N.W.2d at 868. In Weber, the supreme court adopted the definitions of "argument" and "issue" in Webster's Third New International Dictionary. 164 Wis. 2d at 789 n.2, 476 N.W.2d at 868. An "issue" is "a point in question of law or fact"; an "argument" is "a reason given for or against a matter under discussion." Id.
The Rules of Appellate Procedure require that the appellant's brief contain "[a] statement of the issues presented for review" and "[a]n argument, arranged in the order of the statement of issues presented." Rule 809.19(l)(b) and (e), Stats. Failure to raise an issue may have serious consequences. See Waushara County *655v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 451, 480 N.W.2d 16, 19 ("[Ajppellate courts need not and ordinarily will not consider or decide issues which are not specifically raised on appeal."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 269 (1992). Failure to develop an argument may also have serious consequences. We have frequently stated that we will not develop an argument for a party. See Paul C. Gartzke, Standard of Appellate Review 43 (May 1994) (citing State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 647, 492 N.W.2d 633, 642 (Ct. App. 1992)). However, it is equally well established that an appellate court will search the record to find evidence to support the trial court's decision. Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 111 Wis. 2d 507, 516, 331 N.W.2d 325, 330 (1983). The line between an "issue" and an "argument" is a fine one. If whether § 893.82(5m), Stats., is the appropriate statute is an "issue," we must address it even if we must raise the issue sua sponte. The over-riding concern of any court is to do justice between the parties. See State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 39, 315 N.W.2d 703, 707 (1982) ("That a court should raise issues sua sponte is the natural outgrowth of the court's function to do justice between the parties.").
In this case, the principal "issue" is whether the plaintiffs' notice of claim was sufficient under § 893.82, Stats. My "argument" is based on § 893.82(5m), which prescribes special rules for medical malpractice claims. I argue that plaintiffs' notice of claim was timely and sufficient because Modica's claim was for recovery of damages for medical malpractice, and under subsection (5m), the time limit for filing a notice of claim is counted from "discovery of the injury," actual or constructive, and not from "the event causing the injury."
In Hansen v. A.H. Robins Co., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983), the court adopted a discovery rule *656for tort actions. In Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis. 2d 630, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989), the court explained that the statute of limitations as to most tort claims begins to run when plaintiffs cause of action accrues. A cause of action to recover damages for a tort "accrues where there exists a claim capable of present enforcement, a suable party against whom it may be enforced, and a party who has a present right to enforce it." Id. at 634, 436 N.W.2d at 309 (quoting Barry v. Minahan, 127 Wis. 570, 573, 107 N.W. 488, 490 (1906)) (emphasis added).
In Renner v. Madison General Hospital, 151 Wis. 2d 885, 890, 447 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Ct. App. 1989), we concluded that Spitler did not help the plaintiffs because the identity of the doctors who allegedly caused plaintiffs' injuries was known, or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence. We declined to extend the discovery rule so that plaintiffs' cause of action did not accrue until the status of the defendant doctors as state employees was discovered. Id.
Here, plaintiffs did not learn the identity of the radiology technician who allegedly caused Sherrill Modica's injuries until they received defendants' answers to interrogatories. The claimed lack of information in this case is not the status of the tort-feasor, but the tort-feasor's identity. Under Spitler, plaintiffs' cause of action did not accrue until they could identify "a suable party" against whom their cause of action could be enforced.
The response to plaintiffs' written interrogatories on April 7, 1992, identified Verhulst as the person charged with Sherrill Modica's care when she was injured. Plaintiffs filed an amended notice of claim against Verhulst August 27, 1992. Thus, their claim was filed 142 days after plaintiffs discovered the iden*657tity of the alleged tort-feasor, well within the 180 days allowed under § 893.82(5m), Stats. ,
Verhulst may argue that plaintiffs did not exercise reasonable diligence to learn the name of the radiology technician who caused Sherrill Modica's injuries. "[T]he rule is settled in this state that the expansion of the discovery rule carries with it the requirement that the plaintiff exercise reasonable diligence, which means such diligence as the great majority of persons would use in the same or similar circumstances." Spitler, 148 Wis. 2d at 638, 436 N.W.2d at 311. I conclude that we must remand this case to the trial court to allow Verhulst to try this issue. "The issue of reasonable diligence is ordinarily one of fact." Id. I do not agree that we may conclude as a matter of law that Módica did not use reasonable diligence to discover the name of the alleged tort-feasor.
COSTS AND FEES
I also dissent from the majority's affirmance of the trial court's order assessing reasonable costs, including attorney fees, against the attorney general. Costs, including attorney fees, may not be taxed against the state or an administrative agency of the state unless expressly authorized by statute. Martineau v. Conservation Comm'n, 54 Wis. 2d 76, 79, 194 N.W.2d 664, 666 (1972). However, the trial court could assess costs and reasonable attorney fees against Verhulst. Those costs and fees would be paid by the state pursuant to § 895.46(l)(a), Stats. That statute provides that if the defendant in any action is a public officer or employee and is proceeded against as an individual because of acts committed while carrying out his or her duties and *658the jury or the court finds that the defendant was acting within the scope of his or her employment, the judgment as to damages and costs entered against the officer or employee shall be paid by the state. By this statute, the state has partially surrendered its sovereign immunity.
I do not believe, however, that the trial court’s award of costs including attorney fees can be sustained on the facts. The trial court assessed costs against Verhulst because he violated the court's May 11, 1993 scheduling order. That order provided that "all disposi-tive motions shall be filed on or before August 16, 1993." Verhulst did not file his summary judgment motion by that date. However, on January 12,1994, the court issued a second scheduling order. That order permitted plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, set a new trial date and directed that dispositive motions be filed by June 15, 1994. In February 1994, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. On March 18,1994, Verhulst filed an answer which, for the first time, raised the defective-notice-of-claim defense. Three days later, on March 21, 1994, Verhulst filed his summary judgment motion which resulted in dismissal of plaintiffs' action.
The trial court was rightly upset that Verhulst did not raise the defense of defective notice of claim until its answer to plaintiffs' second amended complaint. However, the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it imposed a sanction on Verhulst's counsel for failing to file Verhulst's summary judgment motion by August 16,1993. The May 11,1993 scheduling order which imposed the requirement that any dispositive motion be filed on or before August 16, 1993, was superseded by the amended scheduling order filed January 12, 1994. Because Verhulst filed *659his motion for summary judgment within the time prescribed by the court's second pretrial order, I conclude that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it imposed sanctions on Verhulst for violating the superseded scheduling order of May 11,1993.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Section 893.82(5m), STATS., provides:
With regard to a claim to recover damages for medical malpractice, the time periods under subs. (3) and (4) shall be 180 days after discovery of the injury or the date on which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the injury should have been discovered, rather than 120 days after the event causing the injury.
(Emphasis added.)