concurring:
I am compelled to agree with the majority that the seizure herein was unconstitutional. I am equally compelled, however, to express my disagreement with the means by which the majority reaches this conclusion.
The question of whether and to what extent it may be appropriate for the courts of this Commonwealth to provide greater rights to the individual is, of course, subject to much debate fueled by the underlying disagreement as to the proper role of courts in general. As an intermediate appellate level court, we need not, indeed may not, engage in such a discourse. We are bound to view our role as the Supreme Court of our Commonwealth has directed. Fortunately, it has offered us clear guidance in that regard. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has taken great pains to explain that we are to construe the Pennsylvania Constitution as providing greater rights to its citizens than the federal constitution “only where *586there is a compelling reason to do so.” Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 484-85, 503 A.2d 921, 926 (1985). The parties must brief and the court must analyze four aspects of any claimed distinction between the constitutions:
1) text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision;
2) history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case-law;
3) related case-law from other states;
4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local concern, and applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence.
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 390, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (1991); Commonwealth v. Peterfield, 415 Pa.Super. 313, 320, 609 A.2d 540, 544 (1992), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 609, 618 A.2d 400 (1992); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 427 Pa.Super. 1, 628 A.2d 398 (1993) (en banc) (Cavanaugh, J. concurring). Although not stated expressly, it appears to be a necessary corollary to the Supreme Court’s guidance in this important area of constitutional analysis, that if no compelling distinction may be found, the courts of this Commonwealth are not entitled to construe the Pennsylvania Constitution as providing any greater rights than the floor level minimum guaranteed by the United States Constitution, as construed by the United States Supreme Court.
Instantly, appellant has challenged the propriety of the seizure of drugs on his person under both the federal and state constitution. The minimum protections provided to appellant under the federal constitution have recently been clarified by the United States Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Dickerson, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). This, of course, is the final word as to the relevant constitutional guarantees under the United States Constitution. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958). Under no circumstances may we question this holding or its applicability in Pennsylvania. Id. It is and will remain the law on the Fourth Amendment unless and until the United States Supreme Court reconsiders and rejects that holding. Id.
*587As the majority notes, the question of whether and to what extent the Pennsylvania Constitution is distinguishable from the federal constitution is not before us today. Neither party has properly briefed or advanced the issue, and we cannot do so for them. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, supra. Accordingly, this question is properly left for another day.
Nonetheless, the majority has interpreted in dicta the decision in Commonwealth v. Marconi, 408 Pa.Super. 601, 597 A.2d 616 (1991), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992). I believe it has done so incorrectly.
In Marconi the Superior Court was not interpreting a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Rather, the constitutional question in Marconi was raised solely under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 628 n. 8, 597 A.2d at 630 n. 8 (Kelly, J., concurring). Quite simply, Marconi has been overruled to the extent that it conflicts with Minnesota v. Dickerson, supra, which is, as United States Supreme Court precedent, the final word on the issue. Cooper v. Aaron, supra.
Moreover, I do not believe that the majority in Commonwealth v. Marconi, supra, specifically rejected the concept that tactile impressions gleaned during a Terry stop may justify the seizure of contraband. In this regard, I believe the Marconi majority well summarized its position in the following excerpt:
[W]e do not hold that under certain circumstances the sense of touch could not be used as an accurate technique of identity. At times, perception through touch is a tool as definitive as perception through the other senses. However, under the facts before us, we decline to extend the “plain view doctrine” to encompass “plain touch.”
Commonwealth v. Marconi, supra 408 Pa.Super. at 615 n. 17, 597 A.2d at 623 n. 17.
In any event, under the standard announced in Minnesota v. Dickerson, supra, the appellant’s rights were violated by the seizure. The officer who arrested appellant and seized the evidence from his person did not in any way describe the *588tactile impression he gleaned from his frisk of appellant. Far from the “immediately apparent” standard articulated in Minnesota v. Dickerson, supra, here the record adduced reveals nothing about the nature of the police officer’s impression.1 Under the Fourth Amendment, therefore, the seizure was unconstitutional.2
. For this reason, I disagree with the dissent. I note only that under the dissent’s analysis it would seem that little could not be inferred from an officer’s testimony. Given the otherwise amorphous nature of such testimony, it would appear that to meet the "immediately apparent” standard, an officer’s testimony would need to be more, not less, specific regarding his or her perception. Moreover, although I agree that the officer’s "beliefs” are not relevant, see Commonwealth v. Tyrone Lee Williams, 390 Pa.Super. 493, 506 n. 6, 568 A.2d 1281, 1287 n. 6 (1990), I am unaware of any authority which would allow us to infer that a mere "bulge” was specific enough or articulated sufficiently to support an objective assessment of probable cause to arrest. Id. It was the Commonwealth’s burden to adduce additional testimony from which we could draw such inferences. The Commonwealth failed to do
. Absent separate treatment pursuant to Commonwealth v. Edmunds, supra, it would be inappropriate at this time for us to hold that the seizure also violated Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.