(dissenting). I disagree with the result and reasoning of the majority. I would send the case back to the trial court for a hearing to determine what benefits, if any, the petitioner, ex-husband, received in the divorce as equitable compensation for making a lifetime commitment to his ex-wife for maintenance.
The ex-husband was not represented in the divorce proceedings by an attorney. That certainly was his right. However, even though the trial court asked him on the record whether he knew his commitment for lifetime *599maintenance would continue even if his wife remarried, there is nothing in this record showing the ex-husband was advised of any tax consequences of the agreement. Tax consequences are of significant importance in a divorce proceeding.
Neither does this record display that the trial court explained the public policy of this state as expressed in sec. 767.32, Stats., that all divorce judgments are appropriate subjects of review if the payee has remarried after the judgment is entered, but only if the payer requests such review. The former husband’s lifetime commitment to maintenance flies in the face of established statutory public policy and he, therefore, would have been better served by either the advice of an attorney or at least a discussion by the trial court on the record of the existence of the statute.
This 1979 divorce judgment is not ancient history incapable of reconstruction to determine what, if any, benefit the ex-husband received for agreeing to lifetime maintenance payments. If the evidence is unobtainable or not worthy of consideration regarding the unrecorded considerations of the settlement agreement, then the ex-husband would fail in his burden of showing the lack of quid pro quo for the commitment he made.
In the past in a divorce proceeding we have had before us a commitment to conditions not required by law. In Bliwas v. Bliwas, 47 Wis. 2d 635, 640, 178 N.W.2d 35 (1970), this court gave force to a stipulation by the father in a divorce action to make certain payments for the education of his son beyond the son’s twenty-first birthday. However, in that case, the father received a quid pro quo for the commitment which this court identified and relied on in its decision. We stated: “Additionally, he procured the benefit of a reduction in child support payments while the child, prior to reaching his majority, was in school.” There the record disclosed the *600husband received a benefit for his promise, contrary to the instant case.
The majority strains the law of estoppel to arrive at its result. First, the form of estoppel is not identified; however, I assume it is equitable estoppel. Equitable estoppel and estoppel in pais are convertible terms. Black’s Law Dictionary, (5th ed. 1979) In Hanz Trucking, Inc. v. Harris Brothers Co., 29 Wis. 2d 254, 266, 138 N.W.2d 238 (1965), we quoted City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee County, 27 Wis. 2d 53, 66, 133 N.W.2d 393 (1965), as follows: “‘An estoppel in pais consists of action or nonaction on the part of the one against whom the estoppel is asserted which induces reliance thereon by another, either in the form of action or non-action, to his detriment.’ ” The only way estoppel appears to apply in this case is that the majority asserts:
“In situations such as this one, all that need be shown to constitute an estoppel is that both parties entered into the stipulation freely and knowingly, that the overall settlement is fair and equitable and not illegal or against public policy, and that one party subsequently seeks to be released from the terms of the court order on the grounds that the court could not have entered the order it did without the parties’ agreement.
“However, it is undoubtedly true of many negotiated settlements that it is impossible to identify after the fact precisely what was traded for what.” (Supra at pp. 596, 597.)
That is a far cry from the normal give and take and reliance which are identified in estoppel cases. The court will now assume a give and take to make the stipulation binding and therefore not reviewable due to estoppel. I would not extend estoppel to reach this result. We cannot tell from this record whether the overall settlement was fair and equitable.
The majority quotes Bliwas as follows:
*601“[W]e hold that the enforcement of a famliy court order, which would not be enforceable without a prior stipulation of the parties that it be made part of the decree, rests not so much in the enforcement of a contractual obligation or even extension of jurisdiction of the court, as it does in recognizing that a person who agrees that something be included in a family court order, especially where he receives a benefit for so agreeing, is in a poor position to subsequently object to» the court’s doing what he requested the court to do.” 47 Wis. 2d at 639-40. (Supra at pp. 594, 595.) (Emphasis added.)
Then, the majority ignores the requirement to identify the benefit the husband received, if any, for agreeing to the commitment.
The majority opinion makes no comment on what the consequences of an estoppel would be if the ex-husband became economically incapable of making the lifetime maintenance payments. Would he be able to avoid contempt consequences for the non-ability to pay; would the unpaid amounts accumulate as arrearages and would he be able to have the court alter the amount of the payment to meet his ability to pay ? If he is estopped for a theoretical equitable benefit of the bargain in the divorce proceedings, does that change if his ability to pay changes? If the equitable estoppel applies to the give and take of the divorce settlement, can the terms be re-examined for any reason or is it only a condition of remarriage that would not allow for reexamination of the judgment based on the agreement?
I would reverse the court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on the former husband’s application for termination of maintenance payments to his former wife. The hearing should include the proof, if any, of the husband’s benefits received for making the lifetime commitment where he would bear the burden of showing the lack of benefit to him, since it is his motion seeking relief. Also, the hearing should *602determine the issue of his knowing, voluntary agreement and whether it should be re-examined in light of his nonrepresentation at the time, any tax consequences relevant to the agreement and the application of sec. 767.32, Stats., since the trial court failed to advise him of the statutory provisions and how it applied to his agreement.
I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS J. CECI joins in this dissenting opinion.