I concur in the majority opinion and the result but desire to add some comments with respect to the cases of In re Aaron N. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 931 [139 Cal.Rptr. 258] and In re Samuel C. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 351 [141 Cal.Rptr. 431].
The majority opinion cites In re Aaron N., supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 931 and In re Samuel C., supra, 74 Cal.App.3d 351 without acknowledging that if they are good law, the commitment as to count I should be affirmed. The opinions in those cases state that a juvenile’s prior offenses for which he has already received a disposition can be utilized as a basis for imposing a longer period of confinement than would be justified under section 726 on a new offense which has triggered a subsequent section 602 proceeding without following the procedures and making the findings contemplated in sections 775 through 777.
In the case of In re Aaron N., supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 931, the minor had acquired a lengthy record and had been a ward of the court for approximately two years. He came before the court on two misdemeanors, the most serious of which carried a maximum jail sentence of six months, and was committed to the Youth Authority under section 1769 which could mean confinement of the 16 year old until his 21st birthday. The appellate court modified the order on the ground that the Legislature, in conformity with People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236 [131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375], amended the Juvenile Court Law effective January 1, 1977, and provided that one committed under section 602 may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult. The court therefore held that the minor’s physical confinement could not exceed six months (the maximum jail sentence for the current offense). By way of dicta, however, the court set forth the concept that in measuring the length of physical confinement the entire record of the *258juvenile may be regarded, and the most serious offense committed by the minor may be used. The court did not apply such a rule to the case before it because the trial court’s commitment order was based solely upon the two current misdemeanors and because the minor’s due process rights were not observed. Without discussing or acknowledging sections 775, 776 and 777, the appellate court set up its own due process safeguards by providing that before a minor may be committed to the Youth Authority for the maximum term of some criminal act for which a petition had been sustained previously, the court must advise the minor of its intention to do so and afford the minor an opportunity to be heard. In view of the Legislature’s precise delineation of the procedure to be used in the event the probation officer seeks to modify a prior order, as set forth in sections 776 and 777, I question the advisability of erecting new due process procedures.
The dicta in In re Aaron N., supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 931 was relied upon in In re Samuel C., supra, 74 Cal.App.3d 351. The minor was committed to the Youth Authority for battery, but had previously been made a ward of the court for more serious offenses. Relying on People v. Olivas, supra, 17 Cal.3d 236, the minor complained that his commitment to the Youth Authority could result in a longer period of confinement than could be imposed upon an adult who violated Penal Code section 242 (battery). The case was remanded to the trial court for it to specify the maximum period of confinement under section 726 (using prior offenses as the yardstick). There was no recognition of sections 775, 776 and 777 nor of due process safeguards.
In re Aaron N., supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 931 and In re Samuel C., supra, 74 Cal.App.3d 351 based their conclusions on sections 726 and 731. However, these sections merely limit the maximum term of a commitment which may be imposed on a juvenile. They do not purport to delineate all of the requirements which must be met before such terms may be imposed. These sections do not conflict with or. supersede the mandatory conditions precedent established in sections 775, 776 and 777 for a valid modification of a prior commitment. (See In re Denise C. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 761 [119 Cal.Rptr. 735].) Construed together, sections 726, 731 and 111 require that before a court may modify a commitment on prior offenses or impose a longer term of commitment than justified by the present offense, a determination must be made on a supplemental petition that the prior order has been ineffective.
*259The due process requirements enunciated in In re Aaron N., supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 931 were met in the case before us. If In re Aaron N. is good law, the commitment on count I should be affirmed. I agree with the majority opinion as to count I up to the point that it cites In re Samuel C. and In re Aaron N. But I believe that we should face the inherent conflict between these cases and the case of In re Denise C., supra, 45 Cal.App.3d 761. In my view, and in the view of the majority, In re Denise C. is a correct statement of the law. We should be forthright enough to recognize the conflict and disapprove of In re Samuel C. and In re Aaron N.
Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.